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Abstract
As interest in implementation deficits has been revived in recent years, this thesis examines the
role and influence that local-level implementers have on the policy implementation process.
The thesis focuses on the implementation of agri-environmental policy in England and Wales
where, to date, limited research has analysed the role and influence that the agri-environmental
implementer has on the implementation and outcome of individual agri-environmental schemes.
As part of this analysis, the thesis seeks to further theoretical and conceptual understandings of
policy implementation by analysing whether a 'universal' theory of local-level implementers
can provide a holistic understanding of any one policy implementer. The theory tested is
Michael Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy.
Adopting an actor-network methodology, the research examines the relative influence of the
agri-environmental implementer in two specific agri-environmental schemes - the Breckland
ESA and the Cotswold Hills ESA. Interviews are conducted with actors identified to be
involved in the implementation of the individual schemes. These include the agri-environmental
implementer - otherwise known as the FRCA project officer - farmers, agricultural officials
and environmental advisors. A postal questionnaire sent to FRCA project officers operating in
England and Wales provides further empirical evidence to support the analysis conducted in
the two ESAs.
Analysing the empirical material it is evident that the FRCA project officer is a relatively
important and influential actor in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes. Operating
at the interface of a number of individual actor-networks, the project officer is, for many
actors, the gateway through which their personal agri-environmental objectives may be
implemented in the locality. Drawing upon the empirical evidence collected in the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESAs, the thesis goes on to confirm that, theoretically, Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy provides a limited understanding of the agn-environmental
implementer. Further, it is asserted that in future studies of specific local-level implementers,
the application of an actor-network approach may provide a more holistic understanding of the
relative influence that local-level implementers have in the policy implementation process.
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In the first part of this thesis, the following chapter seeks to provide an introductory
background to the aims and objectives of the research. The conceptual and theoretical contexts





"The implementation problem is assumed to be a series of mundane decisions and
interactions unworthy of the attention of scholars seeking the heady stuff ofpolitics.
Implementation is deceptively simple: it does not appear to involve any great issues
[in reality however] ... the problems of implementation are profound" (van Meter and
van Horn, 1975:450&452).
Interest in policy implementation has steadily grown in recent years as a number of policy
analysts and academics have sought to understand and explain the apparent intractability of
many policies formulated in Western industrialised societies (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973;
Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Cloke and Little, 1990; Ham and Hill,
1993). Of concern is the increasing realisation that for many policies formulated in the
post-war period, implementation 'deficits', or 'gaps', have emerged where policy maker
objectives are not always enacted at the ground level environment (Sabatier, 1986). In seeking
to understand and explain such inconsistencies between policy and action, analysts have, over
the years, adopted a variety of conceptual understandings of the policy implementation
process, whereupon they have identified a plethora of structural and agency factors which are
believed to influence and shape the wider policy process (Chapter 2). Of particular concern
here is the role and influence that the local-level implementer or 'street-level bureaucrat', as
they are often termed 1 , is believed to have on the implementation of policy.
It is generally accepted amongst policy analysts and academics that the individual local-level
implementer is a powerful autonomous actor who may greatly influence the implementation
and outcome of policy (Lewis and Flynn, 1979; Ham, 1980; Knox and Cullen, 1981; Flynn,
198 1). Critiquing early attempts at understanding policy implementation, Barrett and Fudge
(1981), Cloke and Little (1990) and Hill (1993) are among some of the many scholars who
assert that, rather than acting as subordinate bureaucrats implementing policy in accordance
with a rational top-down system of administration, the beliefs, decisions and actions of the
individual local-level implementer will influence the way in which policies are interpreted and
subsequently transferred to recipients of policy (see also Prottas, 1977; Palumbo and Cahsta,
1990). Baum (1974.6) has gone as far as to argue that "instead of viewing power possessed by
lower participants as aberrant, we may begin with the assumption that they alone will
'The terms 'local-level implementer' and 'street-level bureaucrat' will be used interchangeably throughout the
thesis Both relate to actors who are employed by official bureaucracies to implement policies at the ground
level
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determine the content of the policies they execute". In this context, many scholars have
asserted that if analysts wish to understand policy implementation, they must firstly seek to
understand the personal characteristics, behaviour, activities and relationships of the individual
local-level miplementer (Ham and Hill, 1993; Hudson, 1993). To date, however, little attempt
has been made by contemporary analysts to build upon early studies of policy implementers.
Many scholars accept the conceptual and theoretical debate concerning the local-level
implementer as a powerful and influential actor, but few have attempted to support their
arguments by conducting detailed empirical analyses of the role and influence of the
contemporary policy implementer.
In an attempt to address this gap within cunent policy research, it is the primary aim of this
thesis to revive interest in the policy implementer by analysing the role and influence that the
'local-level implementer' has on the implementation and outcome of contemporary policies. As
a case study, the thesis focuses on the implementation of contemporary agri-environmental
policy in England and Wales, within which the research seeks to analyse the role and influence
that the agri-environmental implementer has on the outcome and 'success' of individual
agri-environmental schemes.
Further, it is one of the major objectives of this thesis to develop an appropriate theoretical
and/or conceptual framework in which to understand and analyse the 'local-level iniplementer'.
To date, little attempt has been made by contemporary policy analysts to adopt a theoretical
understanding of the role and activities of policy implementers. The majority of analyses have
tended to be empirically based, analysing the local-level implementer in relation to specific
case studies (e.g. Rubinstein, 1973; Satyamurti, 1981; Cooper, 1985), rather than as an
analytically unique policy actor. In seeking to understand the role of the agri-environmental
implementer, however, this thesis attempts to analyse the extent to which a universal theory of
local-level implementers can provide a detailed and accurate understanding of any one specific
policy implementer - in this case the agn-environmental implementer. The theory tested here is
Michael Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy.
As Chapter 2 will outhne, Michael Lipsky provides the most detailed micro-sociological
analysis of the role and activities of the local-level implementer. He outlines the behavioural
characteristics and activities of the policy implementer, in addition to describing their
relationship with recipients of policy and bureaucratic superiors. As Chapter 3 discusses,
however, the applicability of Lipsky's theory in relation to the agri-environmental implementer
is brought into question. A number of researchers have identified a complex network of actors
involved in the implementation of UK agn-environmental schemes. In this context, it is
suggested here that Lipsky's micro-sociological theory may not enable the research to
holistically analyse the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer in relation to
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other policy actors. The thesis does not seek to deny that Lipsky's theory may provide an
invaluable glimpse into the world of the individual local-level implementer. However, it is
suggested that, in seeking to analyse the agri-environmental implementer, the research should
attempt to adopt an alternative conceptual approach that analyses the policy implementer in
relation to wider structural and agency variables. Following analysis of existing theoretical and
conceptual approaches to policy, it is suggested here that the actor-network approach may
provide a more useful analytical framework in which to analyse the relative influence of the
agri-environinental iinplementer. In summary, therefore, this thesis has three primary concerns:
i) To further our understanding of the role and influence of local-level implementers with
specific reference to the agri-environmental implementer.
ii) To develop an appropriate theoretical and/or conceptual understanding of the role and
influence of the 'local-level implementer'. This will involve analysing the applicability of
Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy in an analysis of the agri-environinental
implementer and further.
iii) To apply and analyse the usefulness of the actor-network approach to further our
understanding of the agri-environmental iinplementer.
But why is there a need to focus on the implementation of agri-environmental policy in
England and Wales, and, in particular, on the role and influence of the individual
agri-environmental implementer? Since the 1980s, agri-environmental policies have evolved as
a central feature of both European and UK agricultural development strategies. Following four
decades of 'productivist' thinking amongst Ministers, advisors, and farmers, concerns over the
increasing costs of farm support mechanisms and increasing pressure from environmentalists
have forced policy-makers to formulate new policies and schemes designed to decrease
productivity levels and, at the same time, encourage farmers to adopt environmentally sensitive
farming practices (Whitby and Lowe, 1994; Whitby, 1996; Winter, 1996; Harvey, 1997).
Currently, under the European Union's (EU) Agri-Environment Regulation 2078/92/EEC,
which places an obligation on all member states to implement a national agri-environmental
programme, the United Kingdom (UK) has introduced a number of voluntaiy
agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales that are designed to reward farmers for
conserving specific areas of the countryside (see Table 1.1). Some of these schemes, namely
the Habitat Scheme, Countryside Access Scheme, Moorland Scheme, Tir Cymen and Organic
Aid scheme, are currently implemented as pilot schemes, while the Environmentally Sensitive
Areas (ESAs), Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs) and Countryside Stewardship (CS) schemes
were originally formulated as part of EU Regulation 797 85/EEC which accompanied the first
reform of the CAP in 1985 (MAFF, 1993; Potter, 1998). The majority of these schemes are
implemented by individual agri-environmental implementers - or project officers (POs) as they
are	 officially	 termed	 -	 who	 are	 employed	 within	 MAFF's
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Environmentally Sensitive Areas ESAs) 	 Introduced in 1987 the ESA scheme is the earliest of MAFF's
agn-environmental schemes It was formulated with the purpose of protecting
the landscape wildlife and historic interest of specific areas of the UK. which
were perceived to be threatened by contemporary farming methods Within
these areas farmers are able to enter into a 10 year agreement with a five year
opt out clause) where they will receive annual paYments on each hectare of land
entered into the scheme In doing so they will be expected to adhere to specific
agncultural practices which will vary from a basic tier of management
practices such as the retention of field boundanes and the protectmn of
archaeological features to more demanding practices such as the recreation of
extensive gra land or the establi hment of field margins The level of
payments will vary in accordance to the tiers entered into Each ESA is
administered and implemented by the FRCA POs/APOs
Countryside Stewardship (CS Scheme	 Formulated by the Countiyside Comnus ion in 1991 as a pilot project, the CS
scheme was transferred to MAFF in April 19% where it is currently
administered and implemented through a partnership of FRCA POs/APOs and
local environmental interest groups The scheme applies throughout England
where it offers paments to farmers willing to enhance manage, restore or
re-create particular habitat types on their faims The habitats targeted by the
scheme include, chalk and limestone grassland waterside land, lowland heath,
the coast, uplands, old meadows and pastures, lustonc landscapes, old
orchards, field boundaries and field margins
Nitrate Sensitive Areas (NSAs) 	 Smce 1990, 32 NSAs have been established throughout England. The areas
which are predominately arabIc in nature are located in key sources of public
water supplies In an attempt to reduce or stabilise nitrate levels in these
supplies, farmers, whose land falls within these areas are offered financial
payment if they agree to implement specific management practices that will
reduce nitrate leaching The scheme is administered and implemented by
individual FRCA POs APOs
Habitat Scheme	 Launched in 1994, the Habitat Scheme is still in a pilot phase It was
formulated with the prirnaiy aim of creating or enhancing certain valuable
habitats by taking land out of agricultural production, or by introducing
appropriate management regimes The scheme targets three particular habitats,
water fringes, where the scheme targets SIX specific areas, coastal Saltmarsh,
and farmland previously in the five year set-aside scheme Farmers receive
fmancial payment for participating in the schemes which are implemented by
FRCA POs APOs.
Moorland Scheme	 Launched in 1995, the Moorland Scheme aims to project and improve the
upland moorland environment Farmers are encouraged to implement a range
of positive measures designed to conserve the moorland environment
Maximum limits are placed on stocking densities for example and farmers at'
paid for the number of ewes removed from the land This scheme is
administered and implemented by the FRCA POs APOs
Countryside Access Scheme (CAS)	 The CAS offers financial incentives to those farmers willing to make suitable
areas of their farmland accessible to the public for walking Farmers are
required to enter the land into guaranteed set-aside, whereupon they are
expected to adhere to normal set-aside rides, and, in addition, comply with
specific access management conditions This is administered and implemented
by FRCA POs/APOs
Organic Aid Scheme	 The Organic Aid scheme offers financial incentives to farmers wishing to
convert their conventional farming practices to organic methods It is one of the
only schemes formulated by MAFF that is not implemented by the FRCA
POsJAPOs Rather, scheme applicants are inspected annually by inspectors
from the UK Register of Organic Food Standards or on behalf of another
registered organic sector body
Tir Cymen	 Tir Cymen is an experimental scheme available only to farmers m Wales
Aligned to England s CS scheme, it offers annual payments for positive
management of farmland which benefits wildlife landscapes archaeology and
geology It is currently only available in three pilot areas, but due to its
popularity amongst the farming coimnunities in these areas the scheme is set to
expand and be made available to farmers throughout Wales
Table. 1.1. Agri-Environmental Schemes in England and Wales Formulated in Response
to EU Regulation 2078192/EEC (Source: Whitby, 1994, 1996; MAFF, 1996a; Winter,
1996; Potter, 1998).
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Farming and Rural Conservancy Agency (FRCA)2. Operating at the ground level environment
and in direct contact with the fanning community, the FRCA POs are expected to implement
the agri-enviromnental schemes on behalf of MAFF by encouraging eligible farmers to
participate in the schemes, and, following this, to manage the schemes by ensuring that
participants adhere to MAFF's agri-environmental objectives (Chapter 3).
As greater financial and political emphasis has been placed on post-productivist modes of
agriculture, many researchers since the mid-i 980s have sought to analyse the implementation
and effectiveness of the UK's agri-environmental policy programme (e g. Potter, 1983;
Brotherton, 1989, 1991; Robinson, 1991; Morris, 1993; Marsden et al., 1993; Ward, 1994;
Whitby, 1994, Gilg, 1996; Winter, 1996). Initially responding to prevailing policy maker
objectives, which were concerned with the enrolment of as many farmers and land as possible
into the voluntary schemes, many research studies were conducted on farmers'
agri-environmental decision-making strategies, where attempts were made to discern what
factors, if any, were influencing farmers' willingness and ability to participate in
agri-environmental schemes (Potter and Gasson, 1988; Tarrant and Cobb, 1991; Friends of the
Earth, 1992; Potter and Lobley, 1992; Froud, 1994; Skerratt, 1994). This research proved to be
very informative and potentially useful for future policy makers and agri-environmental
implementers. Through their empirical studies, researchers developed a spectnun of 'typical'
agri-environmental adopters and non-adopters. They identified which farmers may need more
encouragement and advice in order to enrol them into the schemes and, at the other end of the
spectrum, identified which farmers are often willing to participate in an agri-environmental
scheme, and who may, thus, be actively targeted when a new scheme is developed and
promoted (Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1997). Expanding upon these studies, an
increasing number of contemporary agri-environmental researchers have sought to adopt
political-economy and regulation theories in order to analyse the macro-structural context of
the agii-environmental implementation process. In particular, they have analysed the influence
that wider political and market forces have on the implementation process (Whatmore Ct aL,
1987; Maclaren, 1992; Munton et al., 1992; Le Heron, 1993; Marsden and Acre, 1995).
Further, they have attempted to analyse the influence that property rights have on farmers'
decisions to participate in an agri-environmental scheme (Marsden et al., 1993; Crabtree and
Chalmers, 1994), the impact that consumerism has recently had on the agri-environmental
policy process (Ward et al., 1995), and the role of the wider agri-environmental information
network on farmers' knowledge and participatory behaviour (Clark, 1989, Winter, 1995).
However, despite established theoretical and empirical debates, which advocate that local-level
implementers are influential actors in the implementation of polices, little attempt has been
2 The terms 'agn-environmental implementer' and 'FRCA project officer' will be used interchangeably
throughout the thesis to desczibe individuals empioyed by MAFF to implement the UK agri-environmental
schemes
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made by agri-environmental researchers to analyse the role and relative influence that the
mdividual agn-environmental unpiementer (i e. FRCA P0) has on the implementation and
effectiveness of the UK's voluntary agri-environmental schemes.
Following a detailed analysis of the most appropriate conceptual framework in which to situate
this study, the thesis seeks to close the gap within existing agri-enviromnental research by
producing an in-depth analysis of the role and influence that the FRCA P0 has on the
implementation of two specific agri-enviromnental schemes, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs. It seeks to analyse the personal backgrounds, implementation strategies and
relationships of the FRCA P0, and to ascertain the extent to which they are a key actor in the
implementation of UK agri-environmental schemes. In doing so, it is hoped that this thesis may
contribute, firstly, to our continued understanding of the implementation and effectiveness of
UK a ri-environmental policy, and, secondly, to further our conceptual understanding of
local-level implementers such as the FRCA POs.
Structure of Thesis
The theoretical and conceptual debates surrounding the local-level implementer are discussed
in Chapter 2. The emergence of the local-level implementer as an important policy actor is
examined and Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy is outlined. Chapter 3 situates the
research within the context of the agri-environmental implementer, where analysis seeks to
discern the most appropriate theoretical and/or conceptual framework in which to analyse the
role and influence of the agn-environmental implementer. Chapter 4 of the thesis will provide a
detailed description of the methodologies used within the research and outline how these were
applied within the two case study areas - the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. Following
this, Part IV contains an empirical analysis of the FRCA P0, examining their relationship with
actors such as MAFF, the FRCA, farmers and environmental organisations in both the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. Drawing on a national postal questionnaire conducted as
part of the research, Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of the FRCA P0, highlighting their
personal characteristics (i.e. age, gender), their educational background, employment history
and training. Following this, the chapter examines the relationship of the FRCA P0 with
MAFF and the FRCA. Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship between the FRCA P0 and
farmers both participating and not participating within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs. Attention is drawn to the farmers' attitudes towards the POs and the strategies used by
the officers to enrol farmers into ESA agreements. Chapter 7, then, furthers our understanding
of the influence of the FRCA P0 by examining the relationship of the FRCA POs with a
number of interest groups involved with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. In light of
the empincal analysis, Part V of the thesis (i.e. Chapters 8 and 9) analyses the applicability of
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Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy and the actor-network approach. Concluding
remarks and suggestions for future conceptual and empirical research are given in Chapter 10.
19
PART II
CONCEPTUALISING STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRATS AND THE
AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLEMENTER
As Part I outlined street-level bureaucrats and, in particular, the agri-environmental
implementer have been placed at the heart of this thesis. Drawing upon established conceptual
debates that the local-level implementer is one of the most powerful and influential policy
actors, the research seeks to contribute to cunent policy research and agri-environmental
studies by analysing the role and influence that the agri-environmental implementer has on the
implementation and outcome of contemporary UK agn-environmental schemes. Prior to
empirical analyses, however, this section of the thesis seeks to develop and establish the
conceptual and theoretical bases of the research. Existing conceptualisations of local-level
implementers are analysed, paying particular attention to Lipsky's theory of street-level
bureaucracy which, to date, provides one of the primary analytical frameworks in which to
study any one local-level implementer (Chapter 2). Following this, the thesis seeks to place the
conceptual debate within the agn-environmental context of the research. The role of the FRCA
P0 is examined in greater detail, with an initial analysis of the power and influence that the P0
is believed to exert on the UK's agn-environmental policy process. However, as this section of
the thesis goes on to analyse, the applicability of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy in
relation to the agri-environmental implementer is brought into question. As an alternative




Understanding the Street-Level Bureaucrat
2.1	 Introduction
As Chapter 1 briefly outlined, it is clearly evident that within the last two decades, 'policy
implementation' has evolved as a central feature of analysis throughout American and Western
European academic communities. Previously rooted within political science theories and public
administration studies, an increasing number of academics, including geographers, economists
and sociologists have sought to analyse and understand the development and implementation of
governmental policies (Palumbo and Calista, 1990; Jones, 1991; Liefferink et al., 1993; Ham
and Hill, 1993; Gilg, 1996; Winter, 1996). In the context of rural sociology, Crow et al.
(1990:255) recently outlined, for example, that" ... it is clear that rural social science in Britain
is currently enjoying something of an invigoration from an infusion of political science theoiy".
This has been further illustrated in the number of publications that have directly addressed the
issue of policy implementation within rural studies (see Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Cloke, 1987;
Cloke and Little, 1990).
Of particular concern to policy analysts and academics are the apparent inconsistencies that
evidently arise between the objectives of many policies, and, their enactment at the ground
level. Blacksell and Gilg's (1981) study of housing in rural Devon found, for example, that the
statutoty policy for the planned location of new dwellings was not fulfilled by the existing
planning permission system. Commenting on Blacksell and Gilg's study, Cloke and Hanrahan
(1984:261) later concluded that "an implementation problem ... [is clearly] ... the major cause
of inadequate planning responses to perceived social and economic needs in the countryside"
(original emphasis). Likewise, Mann (1982:1) has noted in the context of environmental
policies that:
"In the post-World War II perioa particularly the 1960s, there was rapid... creation of
new programs and agencies to meet newly perceived needs ... [Ho'wever] ... the new
programs tended to have too little foundation for the asserted cause-and-effect
relationship between proffered solution and identified problem; too much controversy
about the programs and therefore inevitable resistance to their operations... The result
was often failure or at least limited success and disillusionment with the public policy as
an instrument of social problem solving '
Recognising that an increasing number of post-war policies and programs are experiencmg
gaps between policy intention and action, many analysts have, over the years, sought to
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examine and understand the process of implementation, in an attempt to locate and rectify any
'problems' within the policy process (Dunsire, 1978, Yanow, 1990; Hill, 1993). In doing so, a
variety of conceptual and theoretical understandings of policy implementation have been
developed and advocated. As this chapter will outline, early analyses primarily focused on the
formulation of policy, where it was promulgated that implementation deficits are an inevitable
outcome of inadequately devised policy maker objectives. However, as policy implementation
studies have evolved, this top-down perspective has steadily decimed as the street-level
bureaucrat has emerged, conceptually, as a powerful and influential policy actor, regarded by
many academics and analysts as the key to the implementation and enactment of policy.
Given the objectives of the thesis, this chapter seeks to provide a detailed analysis of this
conceptual development within implementation research. Particular attention will be paid to
critics of the early top-down model of implementation, as it was through these debates that the
street-level bureaucrat emerged as an important analytical policy actor. Following this, the
chapter will seek to outline, in detail, existing conceptualisations of the street-level bureaucrat.
Attention will be paid to their supposed position within policy communities and their role as
professionals within the wider policy process. The second half of the chapter will then turn to
Michael Lipsky' s (1969, 1980, 1981) theory of street-level bureaucracy which has attempted
to synthesise existing conceptual debates within a universal theory of local-level implementers.
2.2	 Understanding Policy Implementation and the Street-Level Bureaucrat: The
Early Years
One of the first major attempts to open up the policy process, and, to analyse gaps between
policy and action, was made by Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) in their influential study of an
employment programme aimed at minority groups in Oakland, California. The programme
provided funds and loans for new businesses in order to encourage greater economic
investment in Oakland and new employment opportunities for ethnic groups. Despite much
initial goodwill, Pressman and Wildavsky observed that, few loans were taken up by firms, and
where new jobs were created, only a small proportion of these were filled by members of
minority groups. Pressman and Wildavsky concluded that, such an apparent failure of
Oakland's programme was primarily due to an inadequate theory of work creation advocated
by the policy makers. According to Pressman and Wildavsky, any policy is a hypothesis
containing individual conditions and predicted consequences. Policy makers will reason that "if
X is done at time t (1) then Y will result at time t (2)" (Hogwood and Gunn., 1993:240). Thus,
every policy incorporates a theory of cause and effect. If policy objectives fail to be
implemented at the ground level, as in the case of the Oakland programme, then Pressman and
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Wildavsky assert that it may be the underlying theoiy which is fundamentally flawed, rather
than the implementation process (see Bardach, 1977).
This was further supported by Hogwood and Gunn (1984, 1993) who advocate that
discrepancies between policy and action are more likely to emanate from policy objectives,
rather than during the execution of the policy. They argue that, "policies are sometimes
ineffective not because they are badly implemented, but because they are bad policies. That is,
the policy may be based upon an inadequate understanding of a problem to be solved, its
causes and cure; or of an opportunity, its nature and what is needed to exploit it" (Hogwood
and Gunn, 1993:249).
These early attempts at understanding and explaining inconsistencies between policy
formulation and implementation, are encapsulated within a positivist 'top-down model', which
has been used by a number of analysts to conceptualise policy implementation (Smith,, 1973;
van Meter and van Horn, 1975; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979). Emanating from Weberian
ideas of hierarchical organisation and management (Weber, 1947), the top-down approach
views policy formulation and implementation as separate dichotomous entities. Policy
implementation represents a discrete stage within a rational process of decision making, which




CONSIDERA11ON LI DECISION L.J IMPLEMENTA11ON .4 EVALUA11ON 4 TERMINATION
Fig. 2.1. A rational decision-making view of the policy process (Jenkins, 1978)
Accordingly, it is believed that through such a rational sequential chain of events, policies that
are formulated and introduced by actors at the 'top' of a hierarchy will, following
implementation, reach compliance at the ground level (Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979, 1980).
In other words, once a policy has been made it is assumed that it will be implemented and the
outcome of implementation will be close to that anticipated by policy makers (Smith, 1973). If
an implementation deficit arises, the top-down approach asserts that, there will be a
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fundamental flaw in the objectives and causal theoiy of policy, rather than in the subordinate
implementation process (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984, 1993).
In this context, the top-down approach views local-level implementers as subordinate
bureaucrats to policy-makers. Quoting Weber (1947), Page (1992:30) asserts that, "politicians
in parliament and the cabinet are to make the policy, while bureaucrats are to simply cariy out
the orders, never being entrusted with policy-making functions" Thus, it is assumed that
implementers will single-mindedly pursue the objectives and implement the decisions of their
superiors. As individuals they will remain 'neutral', possessing no personal interests that may
differ from the policy-makers, or, if they do, they will refrain from pursuing them in their day
to day activities (Jones, 1995). According to top-down theorists, such a 'superior-subordinate'
relationship between policy-makers and hnplementers is, to a large extent, maintained and
controlled through the imposition of legal and political mechamsms, designed to limit the
autonomy of local-level implementers and to assure their compliance to policy-maker
objectives. "Superiors are considered to initiate downward information flows by giving
instructions to subordinates, and to ensure compliance with administrative directives by strict
formal oversight and sanctioning" (Wirth, 1986:60 1). In his discussion of control in public
administration, Wirth (1986) goes on to outline the many different sources of control often
utilised by bureaucratic superiors. These include, legislation, statutes, incentive targets and
surveillance of implementers' behaviour through direct observation of activities or through
periodic reports and records. Thus, as Helms Ct al., (1989:180-181) conclude:
"agencies and practitioners responsible for the implementation of ... policy are bound
by complex legal requirements and restraints. [They] are expected to perfiwm in
compliance with legal mandates. ... To facilitate fit between the intent of statutes and
the operation ofprograms, practitioners should [thus] acquire a basic understanding of
the legal principles that guide administrative processes in public policy
implementation "
Understanding policy implementation in terms of this top-down bureaucratic model is,
according to Jones (199 1:535), reflective of the "'official' explanation of policy making found
in [Britain's] Central Office of Infonnation publications and the utterances of civil servants in
public". Indeed, it is widley acknowledged that in terms of public policy-making Britain's
constitutional ruling advocates a rational bureaucratic policy process. Essentially, it "maintains
that Parliament represents and interprets the public will through its representatives, who
formulate executive policies which are faithfully implemented by civil servants" (Jones,
1991:535). This has been further outlined by Dearlove and Saunders (1984:119) who, earlier,
argued that:
"... the orthodox position with respect to the power and position of the civil service is
clear enougk Civil servants are politically neutraL serving with equal loyalty
government's of any political persuasion ... The Times put it all very nicely in a leader
24
in 1977: 'the constitutional position is both crystal clear and entirely sufficient -
Officials propose, ministers dispose and officials execute ".
However, while Britain's 'official' policy process is clearly outlined in Constitutional ruling,
its application by individual governments and the wider society is, on occasion, believed to
reflect a different scenario to the top-down model of policy implementation. Winter (1996:14)
notes, for example, that:
"time constraints alone mean that much of the groundwork for policy making is done by
political parties, particularly by the party that is in government, or by civil servants in
Whitehall. Thus, rather more plausible variants of the formal structural model have
emphasised the important role ofpolitical parties, as channels ofpolicy making, and of
the Cabinet and the Ciwl Service in formulating policy" (original emphasis).
In this context, Winter (1996:14) goes on to note that while the top-down model may provide
an insight into British policy formulation and implementation, analyses should look beyond
"Parliament and the executive and consider the role of pressure groups and/or private interests
in determining the policy agenda".
Indeed, as interest in policy implementation has evolved, the top-down bureaucratic concept of
policy, power and control has become increasingly criticised and re-evaluated as an
appropriate conceptual framework in which to analyse and understand the policy
implementation process. Critics argue that top-down theorists, such as Weber (1947) and
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), place too much emphasis on policy maker objectives, with
little analysis of the implementation process, and, in particular, the role of local-level
implementers as autonomous actors shapmg and redefining the content of policies (Lewis and
Flynn, 1979; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Hjem and Porter, 1981; Hjem and Hull, 1982; Cloke
and Little, 1990).
Critiquing the top-down model
According to Barrett and Hill (1986), a fundamental flaw in the top-down model is the
assumption that policy formulation and implementation exist as dichotomous entities with
implementation following on from, what is advocated as, the more important and influential
stage of policy formulation. Barrett and Hill (1986:86) advocate, however, that in reality "one
can not separate the process of policy making and policy implementation - they are a
continuum. Implementation must be regarded as an integral part of the policy process rather
than an administrative 'follow-on' from policy-making" (Barrett and Hill, 1986:86). This has
been further supported by Nakamura and Smallwood (1980), Hjern (1982), Cloke and
Hanrahan (1984) and Cloke (1987) who, collectively, argue that any conception of a rational
and sequential dichotomy between policy and implementation is ultimately false. They go on to
assert that instead policy formulation and implementation should be treated as dynamic and
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interactive processes, where policy may be "seen to be made as it is being administered and
administered as it is being made" (Anderson, 1975:98).
At the heart of this debate is the notion that "political processes by which policy is mediated,
negotiated and modified during its formulation and legitimation" will not cease when initial
policy decisions have been made (Barrett and Hill, 1986.35). Rather, it is believed that the
process of political bargaining and negotiation will continue to influence and shape policy as
implementers and recipients of policy seek to protect or enhance their own interests and
objectives. Thus, as Barrett and Hill (1986:35-36) have gone on to outline, this conception of
implementation takes the analyst away "from the traditional focus on formal organisational
hierarchies, communication and control mechanisms, and places more emphasis on . . - the
multiplicity of actors and agencies involved ... [in the implementation process]" - actors such
as the local-level implementer.
Providing an early contribution to this debate, Parkinson (1958) argued in his critique of
Weber's (1947) rational model of bureaucracy that implementers will never behave as true
subordinate bureaucrats. Rather than complying to policy maker objectives, they believed that
implementers would seek to implement their own goals and objectives, and in turn refonnulate
policies so as to match and offer a solution to the problems of society in accordance with their
own definitions and interests. In this context, Parkinson (1958) asserted that the action taken
by recipients at the ground level would reflect the objectives of the individual implementer,
rather than of the 'top' policy makers' (see Gouldner, 1954; Dunsire, 1978; Hjeni and Porter,
1981). Likewise, Hasenfeld and English (1974:11) argued that, local-level implementers will
"bring into ... [the policy process] ... varied external status characteristics reflecting many
different values and attitudes" which, they believed, would, accordingly, influence the way in
which implementers interpret and translate policy maker objectives.
Although Breton and Wintrobe (1982) asserted that this was a somewhat radical departure
from the top-down model of policy implementation, an increasing number of scholars have,
since the late 1970s and early 1980s, turned their attention towards policy implementers, in the
belief that they are potentially powerful and influential policy actors who warrant further
investigation. Barrett and Fudge (1981:26) argue, for example, that:
"actors and agencies should not be considered in single roles, as makers ofpolicy for
others to implement or indeed simply as the implementers of other's policies; instead
they should be viewed in a combinotion of roles indudthg that of interested party
affecting the outcome ofpolicies "
More recently, Cloke and Little (1990:97) have asserted that there is a need to "highlight the
understanding of localised action, rather than merely seeing it as the end result of a longer
chain of decision-making". Further, Hudson (1993) has advocated for greater analysis of
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street-level bureaucrats, whom he believes are the key to understanding policy implementation.
Expanding upon these debates, the following section will conduct a more detailed analysis of
the conceptualisations surrounding the role and influence of the policy implementer. As it will
be discussed, the individual local-level implementer is believed to be a powerful and influential
policy actor who may often shape and determine the future direction of policies. In this
context, many scholars have gone on to assert that if the implementation of policies is to be
fully understood, analysts must seek to understand the role and influence of the local-level
implementer.
2.3	 The Role and Influence of the Street-level Bureaucrat
As Parkinson (1958) advocated, many analysts have come to regard the local-level
implementer as a powerful independent decision-maker who may reject or deflect
centrally-mandated policies in accordance with their personal 'assumptive worlds' - that is,
their interests, motives, values and objectives (Young, 1977; Ham, 1980). Van Meter and van
Horn (1975:473) argued, for example, that:
"implementers may fail to execute policies faithfully beccmse they reject the goals
contained in them. ... The goals of a policy may be rejected for a vaneiy of reasons:
they may offend implementers' personal value systems, extraorganizahonal loyalties,
sense of self-interest, or existing and preferred relationships ".
This was further supported by Lewis and Flynn (1978, 1979) in their study of urban planning,
where it was discovered that planning policies were not implemented in a rational
decision-making process. Reporting disagreements over policy goals, vagueness about policy
details, procedural complexity and conflict amongst policy actors, Lewis and Flynn (1978)
concluded by asserting that the individual goals and actions of local policy actors had a great
mfluence on how the planning policies were implemented. Accordingly, they asserted that the
policy analyst must accept that "an individual actor is not just a cog in a machine" (Lewis and
Flynn, 1978:11). They will act as mediators between the external world of the policy process,
and the political stnscture through which policies are delivered. "The way in which the
individual ... mediates between these two sets of concerns are key processes in understanding
what 'gets done" (Lewis and Flynn, 1978:11). In short, the perceptions, mterests and personal
attitudes of policy implementers are key determinants of policy implementation and outcome.
Given this conceptualisation, a number of policy analysts, commonly refereed to as the
'bottom-uppers', have sought to further an understanding of the power and influence wielded
by local-level implementers, by analysing how their perceptions, interests, objectives and
decisions are shaped and imposed on the policy process (Derthnck, 1972; Berman and
McLaughlin,, 1976; Williams and Elmore, 1976; HanI and Scharpf, 1978; Barrett and Fudge,
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1981, Goodsell, 1981; Hjem and Porter, 1981). Adopting theories of behaviourism, a few
individual researchers have discussed the role and influence that implementers' personal
charactensations, such as their gender, age and education have on their implementory decisions
and actions (Smith and Ostrom, 1974; Stone, 1981). In their survey of police attitudes, for
example, Nelson et al. (1969) noted that officers' educational background had a marked effect
on their attitudes and actions towards their 'clients'. Educated police officers were found to
take a less punitive view than their less educated colleagues and were further believed to
possess far greater aspirations and to be more work motivated than their co-workers. Similarly,
Teahan (1975) conducted research on the American police force and discovered that age plays
a central role in influencing implementers attitudes and behaviour. In general, it was evident
that views towards the public became less sympathetic and more punitive with increasing age
and experience. Moreover, Stone (1981:47) asserts that "youthful idealism is a close cousin of
education; it too engenders hope that work will be interesting and fuffilling. Ageing and
accumulating experience, on the other hand, often lead to a lessened involvement in one's
work. Personal fulfilment may be sought outside the work role". Thus, the older the policy
implementer, the less work conscience and committed they can be expected to be. The more
youthful and educated individuals, on the other hand, may be expected to have a greater input
into the policy implementation process. They may actively seek to reject and/or modify policy
maker objectives believing that they are not in the best interests of the recipients of policy, or
that they are simply unattainable given the local socio-economic and political environment.
Expanding upon these analyses, a group of scholars and researchers have gone on to advocate
that, in addition to personal characterisations, the decisions and actions of many local-level
implementers will be influenced and shaped by the 'professional-bureaucratic complex' (Beer,
1976) in which they are invariably situated (Fnedson, 1970, 1974; Hasenfeld and English,
1974; Ham and Hill, 1993). It is widley recognised that iniplementers of public policy tend to
be members of a professional elite who, by nature, possess similar educational qualifications,
interests and objectives (Greenwood, 1957; Ham, 1985; Laffin, 1986). In Britain, for example,
it is evident that as professionals both teachers and doctors are expected to possess standard
qualifications in order to be able to implement the government's educational and health
policies (Harrison et at., 1990; Smith, 1994). Further, professionals are expected to adhere to a
set of internal ethical and cultural norms which effectively shape and control their personal
decisions and actions. In particular, Stone (198 1:46) notes that "professionals are supposed to
be inculcated with a service ethos - an inner desire to serve the best interests of clients and
promote their welfare". In this context, professionals are expected to be 'client-oriented', to
attach greater importance to the feelings and behaviour of recipients of policy. Thus, if a
professional feels that policies are not in the best interests of their clients, it is widely
recognised that they may seek to modify policy maker objectives in order to further the
well-being of recipients of policy (Larson, 1977; Goodsell, 1981; Laffin, 1986).
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At the heart of this concept of professionalism is the notion of autonomy, and, in particular, the
level of autonomous decision-making that professional bureaucrats may exert over the policy
process. It is widley asserted that, as professionals modif' policies their decisions and actions
are generally conducted with the trust and full support of policy makers and bureaucratic
superiors (Johnson, 1972; Fnedson, 1974). As Laffin (1986) details, professionals may claim
exclusive rights to knowledge and expertise which policy makers invariably recognise as an
essential pre-requisite for policies to be implemented at the ground level as efficiently and
effectively as possible. In this context, professionals are permitted considerable levels of
discretion and autonomy so that they may implement policies in accordance with their expert
knowledge and judgement. In conclusion, Laffin (1986:15) asserts that "the possession of
accepted knowledge can endow the holder with influence that may substitute for the
holder's lack of organisational or political power relative to other actors and vice versa".
Thus, despite the lowly position occupied by implementers within the policy hierarchy,
their intimate knowledge and relationship with the locality and the policy issue, is believed
to propel the local-level implementer into the policy process as a highly important and
influential actor (Mechanic, 1968; Johnson and O'Connor, 1979; Palunibo and Calista,
1990).
Drawing together such conceptions of the role and influence of local-level implementers,
Michael Lipsky (1969, 1980, 1981), a professor of political science at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology has attempted to develop a universal theory of street-level
bureaucracy, where the behavioural characteristics and social relations of any one
local-level implementer can be understood. According to Prottas (1977), Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy represents a distinct advancement in studies of policy implementation.
Where previously local-level implementers have been analysed in relation to specific case
studies, Prottas (1977:4) asserts that:
"the great utthty of Lipsky 's work lies m his assertion that street-level bureaucrats are
an analytically unique category and that their interactions with clients [recipients of
policy] can be understood in terms ofgeneric to the role rather than in orgamsationally
specific ad hoc terms" (Protias, 1977:4).
More recently, Hudson (1993) has asserted that Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy has
enormous potential for helping the contemporary analyst to understand the process of policy
implementation. He argues that "academically, ... [there is a] ... pressing need to find out more
about how street-level bureaucrats are actually behaving. Getting at the truth would be
problematic", but, to date, Lipsky's theory provides the most detailed theoretical exposition of
the role and activities of local-level implementers, which may greatly assist the contemporary
analyst in understanding the relative influence of specific actors implementing policy (Hudson,
1993.397).
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2.4	 Lipsky's Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy
Using the term 'street-level bureaucrat', Lipsky has specifically focused upon public service
workers, such as teachers, policemen, doctors and social workers, who interact directly with
recipients of public policy during their day to day work. Lipsky goes on to describe the
street-level bureaucrat as a pivotal link between policy makers and policy target groups. They
act in a boundary spanning role, bringing policy maker objectives down to the ground level,
whereupon, they may be enacted by recipients of policy. As Prottas (1977:5) argues, "it is the
street-level bureaucrat who actually delivers the agency's service".
At the heart of Lipsky's theory is the notion that street-level bureaucrats are extremely
powerful, autonomous, 'professional' workers, whose individual decisions and actions may
reformulate policy. According to Lipsky (1980:xii):
"the decisions of the street-level bureaucrats, the routines they establish and the
devices they invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures, effectively become
the public policies they carry out '
Thus, it is through implementation 'on the street' that de facto policy is developed. Any
inconsistency between policy maker objectives and policy enactment is, according to Lipsky,
directly related to the street-level bureaucrat (see Ham and Hill, 1993).
Autonomy
Throughout Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy, it is asserted that street-level
bureaucrats are highly autonomous policy actors, who possess a considerable level of
discretionary freedom in their day to day work. By the very nature of street-level bureaucrats
professional positions, they operate at the ground level environment where they tend to be
geographically distanced from their bureaucratic superiors (Lipsky, 1969, 1980; Page, 1992;
Hudson, 1993). Police officers often operate while on 'the beat', for example, while their
superiors tend to be office bound at both local and national level (Rubinstein, 1973).
Concomitantly, social workers will often be expected to conduct individual house visits, where
they will interact with the recipients of policy in the absence of the Social Services' authority
(Jacobs, 1970; Zimmennan,, 1971). Consequently, Lipsky asserts that street-level bureaucrats
will often operate in surroundings remote from many forms of hierarchical control.
"The policy delivered by the street-level bureaucrat is most often ,mm&hate and
personaL They usually make decisions on the spot and their determinations are focused
entirely on the indivithial ... [as a result] ... they characteristically possess high levels of
autonomy from their superiors" (Lipsky, 1980:8).
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As discussed, this has been supported by a number of scholars in America and Europe who
have adopted a bottom-up approach to policy analysis and argued that, the ability of
bureaucratic superiors to guide and control the behaviour of street-level bureaucrats is virtually
impossible to achieve (see Bennan and McLaughlin, 1976; Hanf and Scharpf 1978; Ehnore,
1980; Barrett and Fudge, 1981).
Within his theory of street-level bureaucracy, Lipsky does recognise that often bureaucratic
superiors will attempt to control and monitor the decisions and actions of the street-level
bureaucrat. "Public managers ... [may] ... write manuals ... audit the performance of workers
and insist that workers specify objectives in the hope that accountability can be more
effectively monitored" (Lipsky, 1980:162). Prottas (1977) argues that such attempts to monitor
and control street-level bureaucratic work will be particularly evident where a high level of
public resources have been invested in the implementation process.
"All of the street level bureaucrat's decisions about ... frecipienis ofpolicy] ... are not
of equal importance to the agency. The agency's interest in ... [monitoring] ... follows
from its desire to control the use of its resources, and so its concern with individual
decisions is roughly proportional to the resources committed by those decisions"
(Prottas, 19":V').
However, Prottas (1977) goes on to assert that any attempt to tightly circumscribe the
behaviour of street-level bureaucrats will undoubtedly be resisted by policy implementers (see
Ehnore, 1980). Indeed, Downs (1967:147) makes it a 'law' of organisational behaviour that
"the greater effort made to control subordinate officials, the greater the efforts by those
subordinates to evade or counteract such control". Hill and Bramley (1986) went as far as to
argue that, tighter hierarchical controls will cause low motivation amongst street-level workers.
They will restrict their level of work productivity and may in extreme cases resort to methods
of industrial sabotage and strikes, in order to protest against forms of bureaucratic
accountability. Indeed, it was evident in Weatherley et al.'s (1980) study of US social workers
that the Department of Social Services (DSS) encountered a number of difficulties when they
attempted to introduce new methods to control and momtor the work of their 'street-level'
employees. In an attempt to reorganise the administrative structure of the DSS, 'top'
managerial staff within the department affirmed their commitment to implementing
performance standards and output measures, as a means of improving the efficiency and
effectiveness of social service delivery. However, Weatherley et al. (1980) observed that
operating in surroundings remote from the DSS, social vorkers sought to avoid new forms of
accountability by implementing their own administrative system to deal with official
paperwork. Weatherley et al. (1980:569) argued that, "workers are aware of management's
concern that these unsanctioned forms undermine hierarchical control and stand in the way of
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umform service delivery [but the] workers justify these unofficial forms as more realistic ... to
their immediate needs than those passed down from above".
In this context, Prottas (1977) argues that, the majority of street-level bureaucracies will refrain
from imposing rigid forms of accountability through fear of alienating their street-level
workers. Moreover, Prottas argues that the bureaucratic superiors are highly dependent upon
the street-level bureaucrat to implement policy at the ground level. "The 'output' of a public
service bureaucracy is the work of the street-level bureaucrat" and, thus, few bureaucracies
would wish to jeopardise their productivity by tightly circumscribing their local-level
implementers (Prottas, 1977:28). Indeed, while recognising that bureaucratic superiors may
wish to control street-level bureaucrats, Lipsky asserts that, in doing so, the governing elite
will threaten the very nature and objectives of street-level bureaucracies which require people
to make decisions about other people. As Hudson (1993) outlined, policemen decide who to
arrest, for example, and whose behaviour to overlook; teachers make decisions on who is
teachable; social workers decide on who needs support; healthcare workers establish who
needs priority care, and, housing letting officers decide on who gets accommodation.
Discretion
Central to this issue of decision-making is the notion of discretion, and, in particular, the level
of discretionary power that the street-level bureaucrat may possess and exercise. In what has,
perhaps, been the most influential book on the issue of discretion, Davis (1969.4) asserts that,
"a public officer has discretion wherever the effective limits on his power leave him [sic] free
to make a choice among possible courses of action and inaction". While generally accepted as
a useful definition (see Ham and Hill, 1993), Davis' notion of discretion has been criticised as
a loosely defined concept that embraces a wide range of phenomena (Donnison, 1977).
Developing a more restrictive definition, Bull (1980) argues that a distinction should be made
between situations that only require bureaucrats to judge and interpret regulations; and those
occasions where the rules within a bureaucracy give impleinenters the freedom to interpret
their tasks and make decisions as they think fit (see Simon, 1945). In the latter context, Ham
and Hill (1993:155) argue that, "organisational or planmng activities at the top of such
hierarchies ... [will thus] ... set contexts for, but not necessarily predetermine, decision-making
at field levels, where very different tasks ... [will be] ... performed and very different problems
[willJ ... be solved".
Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy encapsulates this latter definition of discretion. It
advocates that bureaucratic rules give specific functionaries to street-level bureaucrats to make
individual decisions at the ground level (Lipsky, 1980). Thus, according to Lipsky, the majority
of bureaucratic superiors provide the street-level bureaucrat with autonomous decision-making
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powers. They recognise that the street-level bureaucrat must be given the power and freedom
to make local level decisions if policies are to be efficiently and effectively implemented at the
ground (see Wirth, 1986). This was clearly evident in the multitude of studies that have been
conducted on the issue of police discretion, and, its benefits to the operation of the police force
(e.g. Lambert, 1967; Wilson, 1970; Brown, 1981). Ham and Hill (1993:167) conclude that,
"the fundamental reason for police discretion is that, were policemen to arrest all who break
the law a gigantic police force would be necessary ... The police need, therefore, to choose
where to operate, where they concentrate their attention and where efficiency ... is enhanced
by turning a blind eye".
As previously discussed, amongst those researchers who have adopted a bottom-up approach
to policy implementation, it is generally advocated that given autonomous decision making
powers, local-level implementers will seek to further their own policy interests and objectives
(see Gouldner, 1954; Merton, 1957; Lewis and Flynn, 1979; Barrett and Fudge, 1981; Martins,
1986). Selznick (1957:7-8) argues, for example, that individual implementers will:
'.. bring into play his [sic] own personality, his [sic] special problems and interests
The persons and groups who make up ... [an orgamsation] ... are not content to be
treated as manipulable or expendable. As human beings and not mere tools they have
their own needs for self-protection and self-fulfilment - needs that may either sustain
the formal system or undermine it '
Lipsky recognises that the majority of street-level bureaucrats will enter employment with
personal ideas, expectations and intentions of what they may achieve in terms of implementing
public policy. Accordingly, Lipsky asserts that these interests may differ significantly from
their bureaucratic superiors' and from those interests held by other street-level bureaucrats
operating within the same organisation. However, in terms of implementing these interests,
Lipsky asserts that, in reality, the street-level bureaucrat will not be able to fulfil their
individual intentions and objectives. As Hill (1993 :379) stressed:
"the painful problem for street-level bureaucrats is that they enter employment with
ideals which they cannot realise in practice. They do make policy, but not in the way
they would really like to" (original emphasis).
Instead, Lipsky (1 980:xii) argues that "the very nature of the street-level bureaucrat's work
prevents them from coming close to the ideal conception of their jobs. Large classes or huge
caseloads and inadequate resources combine with the uncertainties of method and the
unpredictability of ... [recipients of policy] ... to defeat their aspirations as service workers". In
this context, Lipsky asserts that street-level bureaucrats will use their discretionary freedom to
develop and adopt different coping mechanisms that will enable them to implement policy
efficiently and effectively within the constraints of their working environment. Thus, according
to Hudson (1993: 387 & 397), "street-level bureaucrats are [not] simply malicious and cunning
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functionaries interested only in their own comfort ... [ratherj street-level bureaucrats end up
making policy in circumstances which are not of their own choosing and which impel them to
devise strategies to protect their working environment".
Coping Strategies
In his book, titled 'The Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy', Lipsky (1980) discusses at length
the various strategies chosen and developed by street-level bureaucrats in order to cope with
the pressures they face in their day to day work. According to Lipsky, there are essentially
three different groups of coping strategies that street-level bureaucrats adopt.
i) Street-level bureaucrats will develop patterns of practice that limit demand,
maximise the use of available resources and obtain client compliance.
ii) Street-level bureaucrats will modify the conception of their role to fit in with
available resources and achieving objectives.
iii) Street-level bureaucrats will modify the conception of clients so as to make
acceptable the gap between accomplishment and objectives (Lipsky, 1980).
In terms of rationing services, limiting demand and maximising the use of resources, Lipsky
asserts that the street-level bureaucrat will adopt specific modes of demand control, such as
perpetuating delays, withholding information and preferentially targeting recipients of policy.
According to Lipsky (1980:44), the "fundamental service dilemma of street-level bureaucrats is
how to provide individual responses or treatment on a mass basis", especially where resources
are limited. Faced with this dilemma, Lipsky asserts that street-level bureaucrats will often
target specific recipients of policy who will respond more favourably to the policy than other
individuals.
"Street-level bureaucrats often respond more favourably to clients who are helpful or
co-operative ou their own treatment, or who appear to be particularly responsive to
help. Orienting services toward co-operative clients, or clients who respond to
treatment, allows street-level bureaucrats to believe that they are optimising their use
of resources" (Lipsky. 1980:152).
In doing so, Lipsky argues that street-level bureaucrats will control the content and quantity of
information that recipients may receive. Those experiencing favouritism of the street-level
bureaucrat will obtain "privileged information, permitting them to manipulate the system better
than others" (Lipsky, 1980.90). While those not favoured by the street-level bureaucrat may
receive information "as confusmg Jargon, elaborate procedures and arcane practices that act as
barriers to understanding how to operate effectively within the system" (Lipsky, 1980:90).
Further, Lipsky argues that the street-level bureaucrat may seek to limit the demand for their
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services by preferential selection of recipients, based upon the bureaucrat's personal
conception of the individual. As Lipsky (1980:109) argued:
"... inequality and differentiation among clients may take place because of workers
preferences for some clients over others. Some clients may simply evoke workers'
sympathy or hostility, while biased behaviour can be evident where street-level
bureaucrats respond to general orientations toward clients' worthiness or unworthiness
that permeate the society and to whose proliferation they regularly contribute '
This was clearly evident in Cooper's (1985) study of social security officers in Britain where
he found that the treatment of social security claimants by individual officers would vary
greatly according to the officers' personal feelings towards the individual claimant One
example he drew upon highlighted the differential approaches experienced by two claimants
when they were dealt with by the same social security officer. One claimant, a married man in
his SOs, was evidently favoured by the officer.
"Mike [the officer] treated him vely decently, asking after his and his wife's welfare,
and thanking him pleasantly for the certificate" (Cooper, 1985 in Hudson, 1993:391).
The second claimant, on the other hand, evoked less sympathy with the officer and was
evidently treated with less respect.
"...Mike 's [the officer] approach was abrupL He wanted to know why Mr Z had come
in. Mr Z said he had been told to bring the documents. 'You must have heard wrong'
said Mike. 'We tell people to post them in. Thy don't u leave it with the man on
reception?'. Mike took the papers and dismissed Mr Z, [afterwards] Mike remarked
'That do you make of that one? Bkxxiy odd The best thing you can do is gel them in
and get them out when they 're like him ... " (Cooper, 1985 in Hudson, 1993:391).
Operating in an environment typically constrained by socio-political and economic factors,
Lipsky' s street-level bureaucrats are additionally expected to modify and reconstruct their
work objectives in order to match their ability to implement public policy (Lipsky, 1980;
Hudson, 1993). In particular, Lipsky asserts that street-level bureaucrats will privately modify
the extent to which they may possess and exercise autonomous decision making powers.
Denying their discretionary freedom, street-level bureaucrats may, thus, limit their level of
responsibility, and, in addition, provide the bureaucrat with a defence mechanism against
recipients demanding the services of the street-level bureaucrat (Lipsky, 1980). Further, Lipsky
asserts that, street-level bureaucrats will seek to limit their level of responsibility by
specialising in one facet of their work where only a limited number of recipients will be
involved. A classic example, as Lipsky (1981) outlines, is that of teachers, who by the very
nature of their work specialise in one specific subject which may not be studied by all of the
students attending the same school or college. According to Lipsky (1980:146),
specialisation permits street-level bureaucrats to reduce the strain that would otherwise
complicate their work situation". Concomitantly, it enables the street-level bureaucrat to
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maximise available resources and in turn implement policy as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
Focusing upon his last group of coping strategies Lipsky asserts that, street-level bureaucrats
will continue to adopt mechanisms to cope with work pressures and, in particular, to resolve
the dilemma of 'processing' a large number of recipients (see Prottas, 1977), According to
Lipsky, street-level bureaucrats will often modify their conception of policy target groups by
prejudging the recipients and fitting them into stereotyped characterisations, as defined by both
the street-level bureaucracy and by society at large (see Giler and Moms, 1981; Satyamurti,
1981). As Lipsky (1980:59) argues:
"people come to street-level bureaucrats as unique individuals with different life
experiences, personalities and circumstances. In their encounters with bureaucracies
they are transformed into clients, identifiably located in very small number of
categories, treated as if they fit standardised definitions of units consigned to specific
bureaucratic slots '
Central to Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy is the concept that the coping strategies
adopted by street-level bureaucrats effectively become the public policies that are implemented
at the ground level. As discussed, street-level bureaucrats will not seek to refonnulate policy in
order to seffishly advantage their own interests and objectives. Instead, Lipsky asserts that
street-level bureaucrats will reformulate policy-maker objectives by developing methods to
implement the pohcy within the constraints of their working environment. Thus, "although
these routines and simplifications originate in the coping needs of individual workers, they
nonetheless add up to street-level policy and they become the patterns of agency behaviour
with which clients and policy formers must contend" (Lipsky, 1980:86).
Recipients of Policy
The coping strategies adopted by Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat tend to dis-empower and
marginalise policy target groups from the implementation process. They are labelled and
'boxed' into stereotyped policy respondents, whose requirements and demands are constantly
controlled by the individual street-level bureaucrat. Indeed, throughout Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy, recipients of policy are considered to be relatively powerless actors.
They are believed to possess weaker tactics to respond to street-level bureaucrats' coping
mechanisms, which manipulate and control policy target groups. This has been supported by
Hasenfeld and Steimnetz (1981) who argue that, "the power advantage [street-level
bureaucracies] have, enables them to exercise considerable control over the lives of the
recipients of their services ... clients have to wait for help, experience 'status' degradation,
have problems in securing access to information and are taught ways to behave".
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Lipsky went on to assert that, recipients of policy have little control and influence over the role
of the street-level bureaucrat. "They do not count among the groups that primarily define
street-level bureaucrat's roles" (Lipsky, 1980:48). Rather, peer groups and professionally
related standards are believed to be more significant in terms of influencing and determining
street-level bureaucratic behaviour (Lipsky, 1980). However, if Lipsky' s claims to the
professional status of street-level bureaucrats is to be upheld, Ham and Hill (1993) argue that
analysts applying Lipsky's theory must recognise that recipients of policy, and the public at
large, possess a relative degree of authority in sanctioning the professionalism of the
street-level bureaucrat. According to Ham and Hill (1993:147), "professional status cannot
simply be won ... by becoming more expert and devising an ethical code. It depends upon the
delegation of power, and, on the legitimisation process in society". Using the British medical
profession as an exemplar, they argue that the power, autonomy and prestige currently enjoyed
by doctors, surgeons and healthcare workers, is, in part, due to societies fears of illness, and
the expertise which medical workers possess to assist the public in overcoming ill health (Ham
and Hill, 1993).
According to Lipsky, however, recipients of policy remain dependent upon the individual
'street-level' professional for information and advice concerning those policies that seek to
impinge upon their everyday lives. According to Lipsky, the public view the street-level
bureaucrat as a 'friendly' extension of government who may assist them in interpreting and
implementmg public policy. Further, Lipsky (1980:11) asserts that, "as individuals, street-level
bureaucrats represent the hopes of citizens for fair and effective treatment by government".
Thus, for recipients of public policy the street-level bureaucrat is an important and eminent
actor within their implementation network.
Mediators of a Bottom-Up Approach to Policy
Concomitantly, Prottas (1977) and Lipsky (1980) discuss the powerful position that street-level
bureaucrats hold within the policy networks of their bureaucratic superiors. As discussed,
policy makers are highly dependent on the street-level bureaucrat to deliver policy objectives
as efficiently and effectively as possible. They permit the street-level bureaucrat sufficient
flexibility to assist them in their work and, in addition, they trust in the professionalism of the
individual bureaucrat to implement the policies in the locality.
Further, Lipsky argues that where street-level bureaucrats dominate and control recipients
knowledge of policy objectives, they, in turn, control the content and quantity of information
that policy makers may receive. Often, policy makers require knowledge of local-level action
in order to assist in the revision and formulation of further policies. Operating at the ground
level environment and in direct contact with recipients of policy, Lipsky asserts that, it is
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invariably the street-level bureaucrat who has access to such information. In this context,
Lipsky goes on to argue that the street-level bureaucrat may firstly influence the quantify of
information received by policy makers, and, secondly, through personal interpretation they may
detennine the content of information transferred through this bottom-up approach to policy.
In summary, Lipsky offers a theoretical framework to analyse local-level implementers which
places the street-level bureaucrat at the heart of influencing and deternuning the outcome of
policy (Fig. 2.2). He asserts that, given considerable levels of autonomy, street-level
bureaucrats will adopt a variety of coping mechanisms, reformulating policy in order to
implement a service within the constraints of their working environment. Further, Lipsky
argues that the individual street-level bureaucrat has monopolistic control over the content and
quantity of information received by policy makers and recipients of policy. In short, Lipsky's
theory of street-level bureaucracy maintains that the decisions and actions of the street-level
bureaucrat will determine policy.
2.5	 Conclusion
As this chapter has sought to outline, the street-level bureaucrat has emerged, conceptually, as
a powerful policy actor whose decisions and actions are believed to have considerable
influence on the implementation and outcome of policy. Where previously analysts sought to
understand policy implementation in accordance with a rational top-down model, it is generally
accepted that if policy implementation is to be understood, the role and activities of local-level
implementers must be analysed. To facilitate such research, it is evident that Michael Lipsky
(1980) has developed a universal theory of street-level bureaucracy where he outlines the
behavioural characteristics and social relations that can be expected from any one local-level
implementer. Despite its detailed exposition of the role and activities of the local-level
implementer, Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy has had a relatively muted impact on
contemporary policy studies. In Britain, no known attempt has of yet been made to explicitly
apply Lipsky's theory. According to Hudson (1993), however, it is evident that in a number of
policy studies, Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy has, inadvertently, been supported
in empirical analyses of specific local-level implementers. Hudson (1993) outlines, for
example, that in her study of British social work Carol Satyamurti (1981) indirectly describes
Lipsky's conception of the coping strategies adopted by the street-level bureaucrat. According
to Hudson (1993:390), "Satyamurti cites the way in which social workers encouraged
dependent behaviour in their clients, the way in which social workers treated appointments and




Fig. 2.2 Schematic Representation of Lipsky's Theory of Street-Level Bureaucracy
(Source: Developed from Lipsky, 1980)
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assumptions they made about client 'irresponsibility". Further, Hudson (1993) has drawn
upon Cornwell's (1987) work on the UK's 1981 Education Act to illustrate how Cornwell has
supported Lipsky's theory by revealing details of the modus operand: of educational officers
that correspond with Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat. In fact, there appears to be a
considerable number of policy studies that indirectly reflect and support Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy. As discussed, Cooper's (1985) study of social security officers in
Britain support the strategy of favouritism often adopted by street-level bureaucrats when
dealing with large groups of policy recipients (see section 2.4). Ham and Hill (1993) draw
attention to the need for discretion amongst police officers, while Hasenfeld and Steintmetz
(198 1) support Lipsky's theory by revealing that recipients of policy have relatively little
power in the policy implementation process (see section 2.4).
However, while the central concepts of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy appear to
be replicated in a number of policy studies, the primary question pertinent to the aims of this
thesis is, how useful and applicable is Lipsky's theory in understanding the role and influence
of the agri-environmental implementer? As the following chapter turns to the
agri-environmental context of the research this question will be analysed.
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Chapter 3
A New Conceptualisation of Street-Level Bureaucrats?
The Case of the Agri-Environmental Implementer
3.1	 Introduction
Having discussed, in chapter 2, the conceptualisation of the street-level bureaucrat as a
powerful and influential policy actor, this chapter seeks to place the conceptual and theoretical
debate within the agri-environmental context of this research. In particular, attention is paid to
the applicability of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy as an appropriate theoretical
framework in which to situate an analysis of the role and influence of the UK's
agri-environmental implementer. First, drawing upon agricultural extension science and
historical accounts of the UK's post-war agricultural development strategy, the chapter
provides an initial exploration of the role and influence of the FRCA P0. The motives behind
the decision to employ agri-environmental iniplementers are examined, as are current
assertions that the FRCA P0 is one of the most important and powerful actors influencing the
outcome and 'success' of the UK's voluntary agri-environmental schemes. As the chapter goes
on to reveal, however, the role and influence of the individual FRCA P0 is brought into
question as previous research studies have identified a complex network of actors who operate
alongside the P0 and effectively influence the agri-environmental implementation process. In
this context, it is argued that to analyse the role and relative influence of the P0 in relation to
all agri-environmental actors, a new conceptualisation of the local-level iinplementer is needed
as Lipsky's micro-sociological theory can not provide a holistic analytical framework in which
to situate this research. Following analysis of political-economy theories and Giddens' theory
of Structuration, it is concluded that an examination of the role and influence of the FRCA P0
may be more revealing if situated within the conceptual and methodological framework
advocated by actor-network theorists.
3.2	 A Role for the Agri-Environmental Implementer
Since the evolution of agri-environmental concerns and practices, it has been widely
acknowledged amongst academics and policy makers that, following forty years of productivist
policies, educational and advisory mechanisms have a central role to play in informing and
persuading farmers to adopt nature conservation practices and, where eligible, to participate in
the voluntary agri-environmental schemes that are currently on offer to a large proportion of
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the UK's farming community (Cox et al., 1985a, 1985b; Blunden and Curry, 1988; Eldon,
1988; Clark and O'Riordan, 1989; RSPB, 1996). In his 1984 review of the government's
advisory service - the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) - Professor
R.L. Bell asserted that, in addition to adopting a marketing approach and charging their
customers for advice, ADAS should seek to provide free environmental advice in order to
assist farmers to adjust to the burgeoning post-productivist political philosophy (MAFF, 1984).
This was further emphasised by a House of Conunons Agricultural Committee in 1985, who
asserted that," ... the advisory services ... must be ready to respond on such issues as the
maintenance of rural landscapes, the conservation of wildlife and wildlife habitats and the
avoidance of pollution to the air or water courses" (House of Commons, 1985: para 41: xv).
More recently, Mitchell and Baldock (1996:1) have reasserted that:
"as environmental concerns arising from modern farming practices have gained
greater prominence, with a corresponthng increase in environmental obligations and
incentives: the need for environmental and nature conservation advice has grown.
Advisory services therefore have a role to play for promoting awareness of
environmental issues generally and the practical implementation of environmental
policy measures, thereby maximising their effectiveness".
Conceptually, the need for advice and information throughout periods of agricultural
innovation and development has been addressed by many agricultural researchers within the
developed and developing worlds (Byerlee, 1988; Davies, 1988; Roling, 1988). In the classic
innovation-adoption model, which dominated agricultural research studies in the 1950s and
1970s, it was recognised that following the introduction of a 'new' innovation, and, dining the
early periods of its adoption, "persuasive, timely information and advice" (Buttell Ct al.,
1990:3), would play an important role in the future success of an innovation, whether that be a
new policy or technology (Rogers, 1958; Jones, 1963; ilbery, 1985). Further, the development
of 'agricultural extension science' as an academic discipline (see Roling, 1988, Caiy, 1993),
conceptualised the dissemination of agricultural advice, taking as a central premise the notion
that "advice is a necessary prerequisite to widespread and sustained agricultural development"
(Benor et aL, 1984:5). According to agricultural extension scientists, such as Byerlee
(1988:14), "inadequate technical knowledge ... limits farmers' ability to exploit [new]
opportunities to improve economic efficiency". Accordingly, the key to agricultural
development is believed to be the dissemination of advice and information related directly to
research institutes, whereby farmers may keep abreast of new political and technological
developments and, in turn, advance their agricultural systems in line with contemporary
policies and market forces. In the absence of advice, extension scientists assert that many new
agricultural policies and techniques may 'never get off the starting blocks'. Research results
and new agricultural technologies need to be brought to the farmers. "Someone must teach
farmers how these practices should be employed and adopted under their own individual
farming and resource conditions" (Benor et al., 1984:7).
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Early on in the development of agri-environmental conservation a number of researchers
suggested that individual on-farm conservation advisors may have a central role to play in
shaping the agri-enviromnental knowledge capacities and decision making strategies of
individual farmers. hi their celebrated study of New Agncultural Landscapes, Westmacott and
Worthington (1974:87) asserted, for example, that with the introduction of new
agri-environmental policies a key role could be played by an "enthusiastic and competent
officer who could inform, demonstrate and advise on conservation activities". This was further
supported by Clark and O'Riordan (1989:33) who argued that:
"obviously no two farms, nor two farmers are alike and it is therefore difficult, not to
say undesirable, to contact farmers solely through mass media Direct face to face, and
approaches of adviser to land manager are vital ... f truly worthwhile
farm-conservation investment programmes are to emerge throughout the UK. Advisers
should remain the main filters and communicators for farm conservation work ".
Throughout agricultural extension studies the individual on-farm advisor has been regarded as
an important and influential actor in the development and implementation of new agricultural
policies. Emulating many of the concepts encapsulated m Lipsky's theory of street-level
bureaucracy, agricultural extension scientists assert that individual advisors entrusted with
implementing state agricultural policies occupy a powerful and influential position within the
policy implementation process (Singh, 1981; Jones and Rolls, 1982; Benor et al., 1984).
Acting as a link between agricultural policy makers, research and development institutes, and
farming communities, Roling (1988:272) asserts that the advisory officer may act as an agent
of change, or, "like a dart gun, which shoots knowledge and motivation darts into 'target'
clients ... 'transferring' knowledge" from policy makers down to the farming communities (Fig.
3.1). In this context, van den Ban and Hawkins (1988) argue that the individual officer may
greatly assist policy makers in ensuring that their objectives are implemented at the ground
level. Operating at the ground level environment, they may offer farmers information, advice
and possible strategies in which to integrate new policies and technologies into their individual
farm management plans.
Moreover, Albrecht (1982) is keen to stress that in the dissemination of advice and information
the individual advisor may act as a facilitator to a two-way process of communication. Rather
than information being simply transported down to the farming community, farmers may in turn
discuss their problems and objectives with the officer, in the hope that these may then be
transferred back to agricultural policy makers. This is further supported by other agricultural
extension scientists who argue that individual on-farm advisors should always respect farmers
autonomous decision making powers (Singh, 1981; Giles, 1983; Roling, 1993). They should
seek to enter into consultation with the farmer, discussing their aims and objectives, and then
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Fig. 3.1 The Flow of Information in Agricultural Extension Science
(Source: Adapted from Benor et al., 1984)
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farmer may adopt in order to adjust to external pressures. Giles (1983) goes as far as to argue
that when giving agricultural advice, the individual officer should attempt to place
himself7herself in the shoes of the farmer - a task which is believed to be greatly facilitated if
the advisor possesses an intimate knowledge of farming practices (see also Dalton, 1980). In
doing so, Giles (1983:324) asserts that on-farm advisors may personally gain enriched
experience and knowledge "by listening to and talking to those in the industry who accept the
risks and take the decisions". According to Singh (1981), knowledge of farmers' attitudes and
experiences may then be transferred by the advisor back to policy makers and research
institutes, where they may be integrated into future agricultural policies and technologies. In
this context, Scoones and Thompson (1994) argue that the individual advisory officer occupies
a powerful position as the purveyor of 'new' knowledge for both farmers and policy makers.
They exist at the centre of the advisory process where they may greatly facilitate agricultural
change and assist in the development of future policies (Crouch and Chamala, 1981).
The FRCA P0
Recognising that on-farm advisors have a potentially beneficial role to play in assisting
policy-makers and farmers to implement new policies, MAFF has employed individual
advisors, or project officers (POs) as they are officially termed, to implement a number of the
UK's voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Operating at the ground level environment and in
direct contact with the farming community, the POs are expected to promote and market
MAFF' s voluntary agri-environmental schemes, to encourage farmer participation and,
following this, to manage the schemes on behalf of MAFF by advising agreement holders on
how they may implement and adhere to MAFF's policy rules and objectives (MAFF, 1995).
Prior to 1997, these POs were employed within MAFF's own advisory service - ADAS. They
operated alongside general on-farm conservation advisors situated within ADAS' Farm and
Countryside Service, where they sought to work directly under the auspices of agricultural
policy makers, and under the name of 'ADAS Project Officers'. In 1992, ADAS took its first
steps towards privatisation as Ministers established the advisory service as a 'Next Steps
Executive Agency'. In doing so, ADAS took over their own budgetary responsibilities from
MAFF and sought to provide fee-paying services to the government as well as to the private
sector, which it had been serving since charges were introduced in 1987. These services
included:
• "a) the supply of consultancy, advisory and information services:
i) to government, providing up-to-date technical intelligence and advice;
ii) on behalf of the government, furnishing general advice to the agricultural
community as required by the Departments;
iii)to private or public sector clients on a fee paying basis;
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• b) the provision of research and development services to government, the levy-raising
bodies and the agricultural and related industries;
• c) the conduct of statutory and regulatory work of government" (ADAS, 1992:3).
On the 1st April, 1997, ADAS became a fully privatised agricultural advisory company, and in
its place a new Executive agency was established by Ministers - The Farming and Rural
Conservancy Agency (FRCA). The FRCA now has the full responsibility for implementing
MAFF's voluntary agri-environmental schemes. As Tim Boswell, the Minister for Rural
Affairs asserted:
"The establishment of the FRCA as a separate agency will enable it to concentrate on
delivery of services to the government, leading to efficiencies and improvement in
technical administration of agri -environmental schemes" (?vL4FF, 1996b:1).
Its remit is to carry on the statutory work that was carried out by ADAS, in particular:
• "to provide professional and scientific advice on policy issues relating to agriculture and
the environment;
• provide professional services required to administer European Union and National
agri-environmental schemes - particularly the Environmentally Sensitive Areas scheme,
Countryside Stewardship and the Nitrate Sensitive Areas Scheme;
• provide, on behalf of MAFF and Welsh Office, advice on development plans, strategies
and major individual planning application to ensure that the loss of the best and most
versatile agricultural land is kept to a minimum, and that a positive approach is taken on
proposal to diversify the rural economy;
• enforce, on behalf of MAFF and the Welsh Office, certain aspects of Dairy Hygiene
Regulations" (MAFF, 1996b:1-2).
Throughout all of these administrative changes, the individual P0 continued to be employed as
implementers of MAFF's voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Although they currently
operate under their new title as 'FRCA POs', MAFF assert that their role has not changed
dramatically since they first began to implement the schemes, in 1987 (MAFF, 1996b).
Since the development of UK agri-environmental schemes, MAFF has placed considerable
emphasis on the role and importance of the P0. A large proportion of MAFF's
agn-environmental budget has been invested in the administration of the schemes and, in
particular, in employing the FRCA POs. Looking at the annual budget for ESAs in England, for
example (Table 3.1), it can be seen that on average 90 per cent of the total running costs are
made in payments to the FRCA POs whereas only 10 per cent of the administrative costs go to
MAFF Regional Service Centres who are responsible for processing applications and
administering payments to farmers (see Chapter 5).
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1994/95	 1995/96	 1996/97	 1997/98	 1998/99
_______________	 (Actual)	 (Actual)	 (Estimate)	 (Provision)	 (Provision)
Total Running	 7124	 7053	 5729	 5652	 5616
Costs_____________ _____________ ______________ _____________ _____________
OfWhichRSC	 1279	 1383	 1187	 1187	 1144
Costs__________ __________ ___________ __________ __________
OfWhich	 5519	 5447	 4305	 4169	 4169
Payments to
FRCA_________ _________ _________ _________ _________
Table 3.1. Annual Administrative Costs of ESAs in England, in £'OOO (Source: MAFF, 1996a:1S).
Although P0 run schemes are considerably more expensive to administer than other
agri-environmental schemes, such as the Organic Aid Scheme which does not empioy FRCA
POs (Table 3.2), MAFF (1996a) has asserted that their investment has brought fortune and
success to the development of UK agri-environmental policy. One senior MAFF official has
gone as far as to argue that:
"... these officers have proved to be the key to the whole ... [agri-environmental]
system. They have undertaken their work with great vigour and vision and without their
dedication the ... [agri-environmental schemes] ... would not have achieved the success
which they have" (Smith, 1989:35).
1994/95	 1995/96	 1996/97	 1997/98	 1998/99
________________ (Actual)
	 (Actual)	 (Estimate)	 (Provision)	 (Provision)
Total Running	 97	 130	 127	 129	 129
Costs:	 __________ __________ __________ __________ ___________
Of Which RSC	 42	 74	 66	 67	 67
Costs
Of Which Paymentr 	 0	 0	 0	 0	 0
to FRCA
Table 3.2. Annual Administrative Costs of the (rganic Aid Scheme in England, in £'OOO (Source:
MAFF, 1996a:39).
In an industry where farmers are becoming increasingly regulated by external socio-economic
and political forces (see section 3.4.2), the FRCA P0 is believed to provide one of the few
remaining paternal relationships that exist between rural producers and state policy makers.
According to an official from the FRCA, the POs assist farmers by making the schemes more
user-friendly. He argues that "it is difficult, if not impossible, to manage land in accordance
with a set of rigid rules and without help and advice. ... [However] ... the project officer
provides that advice to agreement holders when needed ... and generally makes the scheme[s]
user-friendly" (Grimble, 1993:67). Further, reflecting the arguments of Lipsky (1980) and
agricultural extension scientists, MAFF (1995) assert that, by acting as a link between farmers
and policy makers, the POs may assist farmers in implementing national agn-environmental
objectives, while, additionally, providing advice and information to MAFF on how well their
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schemes are being received and implemented by the farming community. In this context,
MAFF (1996a) insists that if agri-environmental objectives are to be successfully implemented
by farmers and landowners financial incentives alone are not enough. Farmers need advice and
assistance to implement the agri-environmental schemes in relation to their individual farm
holding. MAFF (1996a) insist that the FRCA P0 provides this crucial implementoiy and
advisoiy role, within which they greatly influence the outcome and success of UK
agri-environmental schemes. As they assert, "the role of the P0 is vital to the success of the
[agn-environmental] policy" (MAFF, 1995: Annex P. pam. 3). But what evidence is there to
support MAFF's claims? Has MAFF invested wisely? Is the individual FRCA P0 key to the
'successful' implementation of UK agri-environmental schemes?
3.3	 Supporters of the Agri-Environmental Implementer
Historically, it is evident that state agricultural advisors and policy implementers have taken a
lead role in implementing new policies and assisting fanners to adjust to changes in political
and economic objectives. Following the outbreak of war in 1939, County War Agricultural
Executive Committees (CWAECs) were appointed directly by the government to identify and
organise the cultivation of millions of acres of under utilised farmland, in a quest to promote
and secure an adequate level of seif-sufilciency during the war years. In doing so, the
committees were placed in charge of implementing a basic state support system through which
farmers could receive financial grants and agricultural inputs, in the form of fertilisers, labour
and machinery (Self and Storing, 1962; Cox et al., 1987; Winter, 1995, 1996). In addition, the
CWAECs established further Technical Development Committees to provide advice at the
local level through individual state advisors who would seek to inform farmers on how they
may improve the efficiency and output of their individual farm holdings. As early predecessors
to the FRCA P0, the Technical Development Committee advisors arranged practical
demonstrations and farm walks, in addition to producing instruction leaflets that promoted new
techniques, the use of better seed varieties, more efficient weed control and various cultivation
methods (Dancey, 1993; Winter, 1995).
The advisory and implementoiy role of the CWAECs proved to be highly successful. Within
the first two years of the Second World War the annual income of the average British farmer
had risen rapidly, productivity levels had increased and hitherto abandoned farmland had been
brought into cultivation (Foreman, 1989; Gardner, 1996). Wishing to mamtain such a healthy
and well balanced agricultural mdustry m the years following the Second World War the
government, in 1946 established a National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) which
became empowered to provide free technical advice to all farmers and landowners engaged in
commercial agricultural and horticultural production. As a state advisory service, NAAS
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initially had little responsibility for the implementation of statutory agricultural policies. It was
promoted as a service dedicated to the interests and needs of farmers, which was strengthened
by their close alliance with County Agricultural Executive Committees (CAECs). These
committees were comprised of farmers appointed by the Ministry from nominees of the NFU
(Cox et al., 1985a; Winter, 1985, 1995). Adopting an agricultural extension role, NAAS sought
to act as an intermediary agency, transferring information and advice concerning productive
farming practices, from their own experimental farms and horticultural stations down to the
UK's farming community. In order to facilitate this role, NAAS was organised into eight
regions with an administrative structure that consisted of an overall director, regional directors,
county officials and district advisers. Based alongside MAFF headquarters in Whitehall, the
director of NAAS, along with other senior staff sought to oversee the administration of the
national advisory service. Within each of the eight regions, a regional director co-ordinated and
controlled county stafl along with groups of regional scientists operating within laboratories to
develop new agro-technologies that would help to increase productivity. At the county level, a
county officer was then present to manage a cadre of husbandry specialists, and district
advisory officers who lived and worked in the local farming communities (Dancey, 1993).
As a predecessor of the contemporary agri-environmental implementer, it was the duty of the
district advisory officer (DAO) to operate at the ground level environment and, in direct
contact with the farming community, to provide advice and information on all aspects of
agricultural production and government policy. Many of these 'front line' workers had worked
as technical officers under the CWAECs. They possessed reasonable knowledge and
experience of agricultural issues and had often established strong links with farming
communities through their work in the war committees, and later in association with the
CAECs. Indeed, such was their alliance to farmers and landowners that many DAOs regarded
themselves as 'servants' of the farming community rather than of the state (Winter, 1995).
Assisting fanners to increase agricultural production the DAOs sought to employ a variety of
extension methodologies in which to transfer new knowledge and information concerning
'good farming practices'. They would conduct farm walks, arrange meetings with groups of
local farmers, conduct lectures on new technologies and lay down demonstration plots to test
the applicability of new techniques within the locality (Dancey, 1993). In addition, they would
visit individual farmers, providing specific advice on productive techniques and assisting the
farmers in their applications for state agricultural improvement grants (Foreman, 1989).
Deciding which of these methodologies to use, where and when, was, like Lipsky's street-level
bureaucrat, often left to the decision of the individual DAO (Dancey, 1983). According to
Roling (1988), specific circumstances may warrant a specific method of comnnmication, and
thus, bureaucratic superiors should provide the advisor with a certain degree of freedom in
which to choose an appropriate methodology that would facilitate the effective dissemination
o.
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of advice. According to Dancey (1993), the Director of NAAS provided broad general
directions on how the DAOs should advise farming communities, but it was evident that these
were then adapted by the DAO to suit local conditions and individual circumstances. In this
context, the DAO was able to exert a relatively high degree of autonomy in the dissemination
of advice and information. MAFF and senior NAAS officials expressed confidence in the
professionalism of the individual district officer and asserted that the individual officer must be
given sufficient freedom in which to develop their own ideas, and to utilise their knowledge
and experience to solve problems within the locality. One senior NAAS official asserted, for
example, that:
"whilst standardisation is desirable we do not wish to stifle initiative. The art of
leadership lies in outlining the overall objectives and policy, and then allowing the
individual officer sufficient scope to develop his [sic] own ideas. These Iwo
requirements, i.e. co-ordination and individual initiative, have to be balanced af an
effective [advisory] service is to be maintained" (Davies, 1966:155).
Given a relative degree of discretionary freedom, the decisions and actions of the DAO were
believed to have considerable influence on the expansion of UK agricultural production.
According to Dancey (1993 :379), "the district officer was the kingpin of the [advisory] service
and by his [sic] efforts the NAAS flourished and became a potent force for change within the
industiy, highly valued for its independent, impartial advice to the individual producer,
unbiased by any external pressure either from Government or commercial interests". Even
when NAAS was forced to adjust to external political and market forces in the late 1950s, and
re-orientate their services to the provision of greater economic advice, the DAO continued to
be employed and advocated as a key actor within the national advisory service. Indeed,
Ministers and senior civil servants reaffirmed their commitment to the employment of DAOs
by investing in retraining programmes for the officers, to enable them to acquire the necessary
knowledge and skills to guide the agricultural industry into the next political and economic
period of growth (Holmes, 1988; Davies, 1988).
Towards the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UK's agricultural industry, with help from the
newly trained NAAS DAOs had responded positively to political objectives, increasing the
level of efficiency throughout the industiy (Smith. 1990; Winter, 1996). In doing so, the shape
of British farming changed. Many farms were amalgamated forming larger, more dominant
capitalistic agricultural businesses. Where smaller, family farms remained, producers became
caught on a technological treadmill where to survive they were forced to adopt intensive
agricultural technologies, increasing agro-chemical inputs and creating a monocultural
landscape (Blunden and Curry, 1988; Foreman, 1989; Harvey, 1996). As the UK's agricultural
industry became more specialised and capital-intensive NAAS responded accordingly. The
general practitioner role of the DAO closely aligned to the farming community retracted. The
officers were required to provide more specialist advice and to take on greater responsibility
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for implementing statutory regulations and grants, which encouraged greater agricultural
efficiency and specialisation (Dancey, 1993).
As Britain moved towards membership of the European Community (EC) in 1973, NAAS
underwent major structural readjustment. Throughout its twenty five year life NAAS had met
public and political demands by assisting farmers in increasing agricultural productivity and
efficiency. However, in doing so, NAAS helped to create an agricultural industry dependent
upon the financial and advisory support of the government which, in 1971, came under
increasing pressure during a period of reduced government intervention and public expenditure
(Dancey, 1993; Winter, 1996). Although NAAS was the primary extension service within
MAFF there were other agencies within the government that also provided advice to the
agricultural industry. The Agricultural Land Service provided advice to landowners on estate
management and the modernisation of building and equipment (see Jones, 1963). The Field
Drainage and Water Supply Service was primarily engaged in land improvement work and
farm drainage, while the Veterinary Investigation Service provided advice to local
veterinarians as well as undertaking animal health investigations (Dancey, 1993). Wishing to
maintain an active role in the agricultural industiy, the UK government decided that in light of
reduced public expenditure NAAS should be amalgamated with these three other services so as
to form "a comprehensive, unified national service capable of integrating its various skills and
deploying its resources flexibly and efficiently to meet changing needs" (MAFF, 1971 in
Dancey, 1993:380). In 1971 ADAS was established. This new agency was to continue to
provide advice to the agricultural industry on all matters of agricultural production, in addition
to furthering its commitment to implementing statutory agricultural policies.
Within the newly formed ADAS, the DAO continued to operate at the ground level
environment and be used as a purveyor of 'new' knowledge and policy for both the
government and farming communities. Operating as part of a bureaucratic organisation,
however, the DAO became subjected to some of the wider political and economic changes that
were occurring in the government and agricultural industry during the early 1970s. Primarily, in
the light of government cutbacks and rationalisation, the DAOs were forced to change their
role as implementers and facilitators of new agricultural objectives. The number of visits made
to farms were reduced and farmers were expected to seek out the ADAS officer when and
where advice was required (Winter, 1995). Despite such changes, however, the DAO
remained as a central component of the state agricultural advisory service. Since the Second
World War they had 'held the hands' of farmers throughout an unprecedented agricultural
revolution,, steering them through previously uncharted waters and ensuring that they were
equipped with the knowledge and skills to implement policy maker objectives. Further, as the
UK entered the EC in 1973, the government continued to promote and utilise the DAO as an
important and influential policy actor. Fuelled by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) the
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UK government offered farmers grants for farm development, improvements to fixed
equipment, machineiy and stock purchase. ADAS took on the duty of administering these
grants and it was recognised that with their experience and innate knowledge of farming
communities the DAOs would be best placed to take on the responsibility of promoting the
statutoty schemes at the individual farm level, and providing advice to those farmers wishing to
take advantage of the financial incentives on offer. Indeed, such was their apparent success as
policy implementers that by 1979 43% of ADAS staff resources were devoted to statutory and
scheme work, compared to only 35% in research and development and 17% providing general
agricultural advice (Dancey, 1993).
As ADAS DAOs entered into the 1980s, their role as statutory policy implementers continued
to grow in importance as they became entrusted to provide environmental advice and to
implement the government's new voluntary agri-environmental schemes. Since then, as
discussed, the FRCA project officer has risen in the minds of policy makers to an
unprecedented level of power and influence in the contemporary agn-environmental
implementation process. Emulating their predecessors within NAAS and the former public
ADAS, it is believed that the contemporary FRCA P0 is the 'kingpin' of the
agri-environmental schemes.
Contemporary Supporters of the FRCA P0
Supporting MAFF's arguments (see section 3.2), a number of commentators have asserted
that, like the DAO, the FRCA P0 is a highly influential actor in the development of the UK's
agri-environmental schemes. In their evidence to the recent Agriculture Select Committee
enquiry on 'ESAs and other UK agri-environmental schemes', the National Farmers Union
(NFU) argued that:
"the accessibility of the project officers and their local understanding of andfamiliarity
with local farming practices has enabled the individual officer to change farmers'
opinions towards the agri-environmental schemes from one of scepticism to
enthusiasm" (NFU, 1996:3).
This was further supported by English Nature (EN) (1996) who argued, with specific reference
to the ESA scheme, that:
"The knowledge of project officers is crucial to the success of ESAs in achieving
environmental objectives" (English Nature, 1996:14).
According to the National Trust (1996), MAFF has invested their agn-environmental budget
wisely. In their evidence to the Agriculture Select Committee they argued that:
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"Agri-environmental schemes have been criticised as being costly to administer, but we
believe that a clear distinction should be made between the cost of advice and
administration. Much of the cost is represented by the employment of project officers
who should be seen as facilitators of change rather than as admznistrators Their role is
vital to change cultures and attitudes as well as to provide detailed on-farm advice on
environmental management. Without good advice, there is a danger that substantial
payments will be made to farmers without achieving the desired environmental
objectives" (National Trust, 1996:3).
Drawing on the historical experience of NAAS and ADAS DAOs, the National Trust (1996)
went on to assert that:
"the Trust considers the post-war agricultural revolution to have been brought about
by a combination of financial incentives, stable market prices and a highly effective
advisory service. Consequently, should a similar environmental revolution be required,
it will not be achieved through the use offinancial incentives in isolation" (National
Trust, 1996:3).
3.4	 Questioning the Rote and Influence of the Agri-Environmental Implementer
Despite such profound support for MAFF and the agri-environmental POs, the precise level of
power and influence that the FRCA P0 exerts over the agri-environmental implementation
process is clearly open to question. Since the development of the UK's agri-environmental
policy, a number of researchers have begun to identit' a complex network of actors which,
along with the FRCA P0, are actively involved in implementing and influencing the outcome
of the voluntaiy agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales. This is not to say that a
network of agri-environmental actors is now complete, indeed research is continuously being
conducted on factors influencing the implementation and effectiveness of agri-environmental
policies. However, as the following sections will outline, these empirical studies bring into
question MAFF's assertions concerning the power and influence of the FRCA P0, concluding
that if the importance and influence of the P0 is to be established analysis needs to ensure that
the FRCA P0 is examined in relation to the complex network of actors involved in the
agri-enviromnental policy process.
3.4.1 Recipients of Policy - The Power of Farmers
'in examining networks of knowledge, farmers should be seen as more than mere
participants. They operate with their own knowledge' of environmental matters and
their Interpretations of the advice and information they receive are shaped by their own
perceptions of the natural world" (Winter. 1995:11).
Throughout the history of agricultural policies farmers have been recognised as powerful
autonomous policy actors whose decisions, either individually or collectively - as represented
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by the National Farmers' Union (NFU) and Countiy Landowners Association (CLA) - have
had profound effects on the shape and future direction of policy maker objectives. In the
development of the UK's post-war price support system, for example, it is widely
acknowledged that the fanning lobby abandoned its old cautious policy of 'defence not
defiance' (Self and Storing, 1962:46), and entered into a tightly knit corporatist relationship
with MAFF, where the NFU successfully negotiated and secured the financial interests of
farmers in return for guaranteed compliance to policy maker objectives (Metcalfe and
McQuillan, 1979; Marsh, 1983; Cox et al., 1985a, 1986, 1987; Smith, 1990). Forging closer
links with the Ministry of Agriculture, the NFU continued to ensure that they were accorded a
key mediating role in the agricultural policy community, whereupon they sought to ensure that
their members interests were foremost in the objectives and directives of future produclivist
policies. In 1947, for example, the Town and Country Planning Act was passed by Parliament
with a primary aim of securing farmers' rights to pre-emptive claims over the use of rural land
for whatever agricultural and forestry practices they deemed suitable and/or desirable. This
was subsequently complemented by the 1948 Agricultural Holdings Act which sought to
secure the property rights of farmers throughout the UK (Marsden et a!., 1993).
As the era of productivism gave way to environmental concerns and policies, the NFU and
CiA continued to draw upon their post-war corporatist relations with MAFF, and successfully
negotiated the introduction of agri-environmental schemes that promoted the principle of
voluntarism and, thus, secured autonomous decision making powers for the fanning community
(Adams, 1993; Winter, 1996). In seeking to analyse the implementation and effectiveness of
contemporary agri-environmental policy, therefore, it is acknowledged that as a basic premise
to any analysis researchers must accept that, as autonomous decision makers, farmers are
powerful recipients of policy who through their decisions to participate or not participate in a
voluntary agri-environmental scheme may greatly influence the outcome and success of
agri-environmental policy objectives (Brotherton, 1989; Wilson, 1996, 1997).
According to Long (1984, 1992), however, this conception of policy recipients as powerful and
influential actors is not simply limited to policies that advocate principles of voluntarism. In his
analysis of 'encounters at the interface', Long (1992) asserts that recipients of any policy will
not always readily accept the dictates of policy makers as expressed in the policies
implemented by street-level bureaucrats. He argues that through negotiations with local-level
implementers, recipients of policy may interpret and redefine ministerial objectives in
accordance with their individual 'lifeworld' - that is, their own objectives, definitions,
knowledge and experiences which are in turn influenced and shaped by the recipients'
socio-cultural background (Long, 1984, 1992; Long and van der Ploeg, 1988, 1989, 1994).
Long goes on to argue that any encounter at the interface between actors of different
hierarchies, such as street-level bureaucrats and recipients of policy, will naturally be
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characterised by some form of resistance, as each actor seeks to defend and maximise their
personal and/or institutional ideas and goals. In doing so, Long asserts that the two actors
situated at an interface will seek to adopt various strategies in order to negotiate with one
another in an attempt to implement their own objectives. Thus, where Lipsky asserts that only
street-level bureaucrats will adopt coping strategies, Long argues that, in light of state
intervention policy target groups will invariably seek to develop various strategies that will
enable them to implement personal objectives. In the context of rural producers and state
bureaucrats, Long and van der Ploeg (1994:79) explain, for example, that:
"...producers and householders actively construct, within the limits they face, their
own patterns offarm and household organisation and their own ways of dealing with
intervening agencies '
This was further developed by Long and his colleagues through field research conducted in
Mexico, where they studied the implementation of a new government-led scheme that aimed to
develop and manage a basic national food chain (Arce and Long, 1990; Long, 1992; Long and
van der Ploeg, 1994). Focusing upon the interface between rural producers and street-level
bureaucrats - termed tecnicos - Long et at. revealed that farmers sought to adopt various
'survival' and 'coping' strategies in order to further their individual interests and objectives. In
the case of one tecnico-farmer relationship, for example, Long et at. observed that, in seeking
to further the adoption of new agricultural technology, the tecnico sought the co-operation of
rural producers. However, interpreting the tecnico and the introduction of new technology as a
form of state intervention, Long et at. observed that rural producers ignored the tecnico 's
claims for co-operation and instead sought to adopt modes of technological improvement based
upon local knowledge and experience.
Supporting Long's (1984, 1992) analysis, Lowe et at. (1997) have recently found in their study
of farm pollution regulation that, like the rural producers in Mexico, many Devonshire farmers
seek to adopt various coping strategies in an attempt to resist powers of externalisation
imposed upon them by the former National Rivers Authority (NRA) pollution inspectors.
According to Lowe et at. (1997), the majority of farmers interviewed in the study area did
comply with policy regulations and subsequently modified their pollution-control practices
However, it was revealed that a number of farmers sought to adopt strategies of resistance,
reminiscent to those adopted by Scott's (1985) peasants in rural Malaysia. These included,
delaying tactics, keeping one's head down, avoiding contact with the pollution inspector,
'blackmailing' the inspector or seeking to convince the pollution inspector that the personal
objectives of the individual farmer are legitimate and in need of urgent implementation (Lowe
et at., 1997). In conclusion, Lowe et at. (1997) have asserted that pollution inspectors may be
armed with powers of authority, but farmers are not powerless policy actors. "Their limited
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scope or inclination for action ... [is] ... a major determinant" of the outcome of any policy
(Lowe et al., 1997:205).
Acknowledging that farmers are powerful autonomous decision makers, there has been a
tendency amongst agri-environmental researchers to further an understanding of the influence
that farmers have on the future of agri-environmental policy by conducting detailed analyses of
how the agri-environmental decision-making nexus of the individual farmer is consiructed. In
other words, what factors are influencing farmers' decisions to participate or not-participate in
an agri-environmental scheme. While recognising that theories of behaviourism take a rather
narrow analytical view of the policy implementation process, the majority of
agri-environmental researchers have continued to adopt a behavioural approach within their
analyses as, conceptually, it is believed to enable the analyst to get inside the world of the
individual farmer and to understand the "motives, values and attitudes that detennine ... [the
farmers'] ... decision-making process" (Morris and Potter, 1995:55). Indeed, adopting a
behavioural analytical framework within their farm based analyses, many researchers have
identified a network of micro-structural and agency factors which, in some cases, have been
proven statistically to influence farmers' attitudes and decisions to participate in an
agn-environmental scheme (Potter and Gasson, 1988; Potter and Lobley, 1992; Wilson, 1996,
1997).
Briefly, the factors identified may be described in accordance with Brotherton's (1989, 1991)
classification of 'farmer' and 'scheme' factors. In terms of 'farmer factors', it is widely
acknowledged that agri-environmental participation may be influenced by a farmer's age,
educational background, length of residency, the presence of a potential successor, farm size,
tenure, the farmers' dependency on the farm as a primaiy source of income and the amount of
non-intensively used farmland (Fig. 3.2.). Further, it has been found that outside the realm of
the farmer's personal characteristics, other factors may influence their agn-environmental
decisions. These include, whether neighbours are participating in a scheme, the influence of
community leaders in a farm district or the pace with which the new schemes are diffused and
adopted within the locality (Jones, 1963; Wilson, 1992).
Classified as 'scheme factors', it is further evident that many additional factors influence
farmers decisions to participate in an agri-environmental scheme. Wilson (1994) asserts, for
example, that the duration of an agri-environmental agreement will influence many farmers'
decisions, as will the severity of change in farm management required by an individual scheme.
Further, it has been widely asserted that the level of payments on offer to farmers willing to
adopt statutory agri-environmental agreements will influence the majority of farmers' decisions





























gone as far as to argue that "the proportion to whom the scheme is financially attractive ... [is]
the key variable in determining the proportion that participates". Within this network of
factors the FRCA P0 has been revealed by a few researchers to be an influential actor in
fanners' agri-environmental decision-making practices (see Skerratt, 1994; Morris and Potter,
1995). In his study of the Cambrian Mountains ESA Wilson (1996, 1997) found, for example,
that many fanners with larger land holdings in the area spoke of excellent relations with their
ESA P0 and considered their role as an essential part of the overall administration of the
scheme. However, it must recognised that as the FRCA P0 seeks to encourage fanners to
participate in an agri-enviromnental scheme they will be one among many possible factors
influencing the agri-environmental decisions of the autonomous fanner.
It is widely recognised that in furthering an understanding of the implementation and
effectiveness of UK agri-environmental policy, farm based behavioural analyses have proved
to be extremely effectual in highlighting characteristic agri-environmental adopters and
non-adopters. Generally, it is accepted that the younger more educated farmers, with the
largest more economically buoyant farms will be the most willing farmers to adopt
conservation practices on their farms, while the older less educated farmers, with the smallest
farm business will seek to maintain an economically driven productivist attitude. Drawing upon
their own study of farmers agri-environmental attitudes in Sussex, Moms and Potter (1995)
have gone on to develop a participation spectrum of conservation adopters and non-adopters,
which offers assistance to the agri-environmental implementer by providing a detailed
exposition of farmers who may either characteristically participate in a scheme if targeted, or
farmers who may need extra encouragement and advice before they decide to participate in an
agri-environmental agreement (Fig. 3.3).
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Fig. 3.3 Morris and Potters' Participation Spectrum (Source: Morris and Potter,
1995:58)
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While acknowledging the value of Morris and Potter's (1995) participation spectrwn, along
with other behavioural analyses, a number of contemporaiy researchers have sought to build
upon existing agri-environmental studies by attempting to follow political-economy theories in
order to analyse the influence that macro-structural and agency factors have on farmers'
agri-environmental decision-making strategies. As the following section outlines, such research
studies have complemented behavioural analysis by identifying additional actors that influence
the agri-environmental policy process. However, in doing so these studies have further brought
the role and influence of the FRCA P0 into question. Essentially, they have revealed that since
the development of the UK's agri-environmental schemes, the traditional elitism of the
agricultural policy community (see section 3.4.1) has slowly declined as new policy actors,
most notably environmentalists, enter the sphere of agricultural decision-making and, at the
ground level, operate alongside the P0 providing new routes through which agri-environmental
values and knowledge may be transferred down to the farming community. In this context, it is
asserted that the role and influence of the FRCA P0 cannot be considered in isolation from
these new policy actors. As active 'members' of the agri-environmental policy process their
relative influence on the implementation of individual agri-environmental schemes is an
important issue for investigation within this research.
3.4.2 The Potential Power of 'New' Agri-Environmental Actors
The evolving context of the contemporary post-productivist regime of agriculture has been well
documented throughout rural policy literature (Blunden and Cuny, 1988; Winter, 1996;
Flarvey, 1997). Writers have detailed the increasing concerns over the structural, economic,
and, in particular, the environmental inequities of productivist policies, noting that
culniinatively they have forced European and national agricultural policy makers to introduce
regulations and policies aimed at the promotion of environmentally friendly farming practices
(Whitby, 1996; Potter, 1998). Throughout this literature, researchers have highlighted the
influential role that two particular actors have played in promoting the agri-environmental
debate, and, forcing the elitist agricultural policy community to open up to external interests
and implement post-productivist policies. Briefly, these actors have been identified as citizens
and environmentalists.
Citizens
It is widely recognised that since the mid 1 960s the social fabric of the Bntish countryside has
undergone considerable transformation. With increasing standards of living amongst
middle-class urban residents, the countryside has witnessed an influx of urban-rural migrants
seeking to escape the polluted sprawl of Britain's towns and cities for, what is often perceived
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to be the peace and tranquillity of the rural idyll (Marsden et al., 1993; Whitby and Lowe,
1994; Ward Ct aL, 1995). As urban migrants have settled in the countiyside, however, the
harsh realities of productivist policies and practices have been felt by many newcomers. The
realisation that their idealised and romantic preconceptions of Arcadia are nothing more than
'chocolate box' imageiy, has sparked many individuals to actively target and challenge
traditional fanning policies, values and practices. In their study of contemporary farm pollution
regulation in Devon, Lowe et al. (1997) discovered, for example, that, as proponents of new
agri-environmental values and ideologies, 'middle-class rural newcomers' would often directly
challenge the productivist practices of individual farmers, going as far as to vigilantly observe
watercourses and report to the former NRA wherever they suspected that a farmer may be
polluting a nearby river or stream. As Lowe et al. (1997) went on to observe, ten of the sixty
daiiy farmers surveyed in Devon had experienced direct pressure from neighbours and local
people to change their farming practices to more environmentally sensitive practices. In this
context, Ward and Lowe (1994:173) assert that such rural social change has effectively
provided "new routes through which environmental values can flow through farm households,
influencing the ways farmers understand the environmental implications of their practices and
the way they and their families think about their long term futures". It would thus appear that
the autonomous decision-making powers of the individual farmer are being transferred to a
new set of actors - one which, according to Whitby and Lowe (1994:176), "reflects concern
more with materialism, consumption and life-style".
Although few researchers have sought to expand upon Lowe et al's. (1997) work and analyse
the direct influence of middle-class neighbours on farmers' agri-environmental decisions and
practices, it is widley acknowledged that the burgeoning population of rural newcomers have,
in the last two decades, helped to catalyse a major shift in public and political attitudes to
agriculture and the environment (Gaskell and Tanner, 1991; Buller, 1992; Hoggart et al.,
1995). As Harper (1993:4) notes, "it is currently politically and socially acceptable to be
'green', indeed almost unacceptable not to be seen as so". This is reflected in the development
of strong local environmental politics, and in the expansion of middle class conservation and
residence groups (e.g. National Trust and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds),
where, during the 1980s, membership levels evidently doubled to over three million (Whitby
and Lowe, 1994). With the financial and ideological support of an environmentally focused
public, conservationists such as the RSPB have been able to carry the public message into the
political arena where, as it will now be discussed, they have, over the last thirty years,




With the passing of the 1968 Countryside Act agnculturists and environmentalists were, for the
first time, brought together as concerns over the detrimental impact that intensive forms of
agriculture were having on the countryside forced statutory environmental agencies (i.e.
National Parks Authority, Nature Conservancy Council (NCC) and Countiyside Commission
(CoCo)) and Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (ENGOs) such as the Royal
Society for the Protection of Birds (RSPB) and the Council for the Protection of Rural England
(CPRE), to embark upon a campaign that sought to challenge the productivist ethos of
post-war agricultural policies. Of concern, was the "increasing realisation that agriculture, with
its exemptions from most aspects of planning control could not be relied upon to protect the
countryside either for the interests of recreationists and landscape preservatiomsts or for nature
conservationists and ecologists" (Winter, 1996:202). As political and public attention
increasingly turned to the agricultural sector in the 1970s, empirical evidence added fuel to the
agri-environmental debate as surveys such as that conducted by the NCC revealed that
annually four percent of all SSSIs were being severely damaged by uncontrolled agricultural
and forestry practices (NCC, 1977; Adams, 1993; Winter, 1996).
Initially, agricultural policy makers and farming interest groups sought to rigorously defend
their elite policy community. Marketing farmers as natural custodians and stewards of the
countryside, the NFU and CLA issued a joint statement in 1977, entitled 'Caring for the
Countryside', in which they outlined how farmers have always cared for the natural
environment and where possible have always sought to adopt conservation practices on their
farms. As the agri-environmental debate deepened with the controversy over the reclamation of
moorland in Exmoor National Park, environmentalists increasingly lobbied government to
introduce statutory legislation to control all aspects of agricultural and forestry practices
(MacEwan and MacEwan, 1982). To a degree their campaign was successful. Following Lord
Porchester's recommendations to introduce statutory controls on farming practices within
Exmoor National Park, a newly elected Conservative government in 1979 discussed plans to
introduce a national legislation that would seek to quell the antagonism between agriculturists
and conservation groups by imposing planning controls on agricultural and forestry practices.
However, throughout the formulation of, what was to become the Wildlife and Countryside
Act, 1981, environmental agencies and ENGOs were forced to remain peripheral in
agricultural policy making functions, as legislative discussions were restricted to officials from
the NFU, CLA, MAFF and the Rural Directorate of the Department of the Environment (DoE)
(Winter, 1996).
In drawing up the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, the NFU and CLA continued to defend
the interests of farming communities by asserting that any imposition on agricultural practices
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would have to be voluntary in nature. Sir Richard Butler, the then president of the NFU warned
conservationists that to press for controls would be counter-productive, "push farmers into a
corner with nowhere else to go and they will go for your throats" (in Cox et aL, 1985b:146).
Further, the farming lobby asserted that to gain farmers co-operation and compliance they
should receive compensation in the form of profits foregone to conservation practices. The
only aspects of compulsion proposed were that farmers would have to give up to twelve
months notice of any intention to convert moor or heath in specific areas of national parks, and
that farmers would have to stipulate any intention to undertake activities on SSSIs present on
their land (see Adams, 1993). Not surprisingly, the environmental agencies and ENGOs voiced
their hostility and opposition to many aspects of the proposed legislation that sought to secure
the future of farmers, rather than that of the British countryside. However, as the Wildlife and
Countryside Act was passed in 1981, it became evident that constrained by limited resources
and poor co-ordination amongst individual groups, the lobbying tactics of the environmental
agencies and ENGOs proved largely ineffectual as ministers implemented the principle of
voluntarism which was to dominate future agri-environmental policy.
Despite the limited involvement that environmentalists were permitted in the formulation of the
Wildlife and Countiyside Act, the NCC did, for the first time, have direct access to the farming
community as it continued to administer the SSSI system and, thus, took on the responsibility
of administering and financing management agreements with farmers whose land fell within a
SSSI. Thus, as Winter (1996:208) argued:
'for all the successes scored by the NFU in the passage of the Act, it represented a
deftat for agricultural exceptionalism. And for the environmental groups, the passage
of the Bill represented something of a baptism offire. They engaged head on with the
might of the farming lobby and emerged scathed but experienced After 1981 most of
the mainline environmental groups made it their business to understand agriculture and
to confront many of the assumptions of the post-war settlement".
Indeed, following the Wildlife and Countryside Act, 1981, environmental agencies and
ENGOs continued to campaign for the introduction of mandatory agri-environmental
management agreements. They argued that under a voluntary pnnciple the dichotomy of
agricultural policies and the need for environmental protection could not be resolved and
would, thus, further jeopardise the future of Britain's countryside. Adding fuel to the fire, new
evidence from a report conducted by the NCC, entitled 'Nature Conservation in Great Britain'
revealed that in the UK alone 82 percent of the lowland meadows had been converted to arable
land, 30 percent of the UK's ancient woodlands had been destroyed, 60 percent of the lowland
bogs had been drained and a quarter of all British hedgerows had been lost to agriculture
during the post-war era (NCC, 1984; O'Riordan, 1987; Robinson, 1991). In the light of this
empirical evidence, the NCC urged that conservationists should no longer compromise with the
agricultural policy community. They must continue to challenge the farming lobby and to try to
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gain a foothold in the agricultural policy process. Indeed, through the 1985 amendment of the
Wildlife and Countryside Act, the NCC did successfully negotiate the introduction of
mandatory agreements on all SSSIs, but it was not until the controversy over the Halvergate
Marshes in the Norfolk Broads, which lasted from 1980 to 1985, that MAFF was forced to
officially recognise the environmental lobby as policy actors within the fonnulation and
implementation of agricultural policies (O'Riordan, 1987; Blunden and Curry, 1988).
During the early 1980s, with the loss of the Broads marshland to agricultural practices at a rate
of more than five per cent per year, the Broads Authority turned to the 1981 Wildlife and
Countryside Act as a means of saving the last remaining stretch of open grazing marsh in
eastern England (O'Riordan, 1987). As the inequities and inequalities of the Act would
inevitably lead to the loss of this valuable marshland, a meeting was forced to take place in
1984 between the Broads Authority, the government's own Countryside Commission (CoCo),
MAFF and the DoE, in an effort to resolve the parody between agricultural and environmental
policies (Blunden and Curry, 1988). For the environmental lobby this meeting represented a
watershed in their campaign to further agri-environmental objectives. It was the first time that a
statutory environmental agency had been permitted into the sanctum of agricultural policy
makers, and, as O'Riordan (1987) details, the CoCo was given substantial decision-making
powers to formulate the resultant Broads Grazing Marshes Conservation Scheme (BGMCS).
Further, it was agreed that through dual funding from MAFF and the DoE, CoCo would
administer the scheme for a three year pilot phase from April 1985 to March 1988. In this
context, conservationists for the first time were able to work alongside the agricultural
community and play an active role in the formulation and implementation of agri-environmental
policy.
As agri-environmental concerns moved to the European debate on the CAP (see Whitby, 1996;
Winter, 1996; Potter, 1998), environmentalists infihirated further into the UK's agricultural
policy community. Responding to EU Regulation 797 85/EEC, MAFF called upon the
statutory environmental agencies to provide advice and assistance in the designation of ESAs.
Forty six areas in England and Wales were proposed by the NCC, CoCo and English Heritage,
from which six were initially chosen through further consultation between MAFF and the
environmental agencies (Whitby, 1994). Since then both the statutory agencies and ENGOs
have played a central role in the formulation of agri-environmental policy. Following EU
Regulation 2078 92/EEC, they have been consulted widely on the implementation of the UK's
agri-environmental programme and have provided evidence and advice to policy makers and
ministers wherever existmg schemes are reviewed. Indeed, a number of environmental
agencies and ENGOs were recently invited to submit evidence to a House of Commons Select
Committee investigating 'Environmentally Sensitive Areas and Other UK agri-environmental
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Schemes' (House of Commons, 1997). Participants included, EN, CoCo, National Trust,
RSPB, Wildlife Trusts, CPRE and the Game Conservancy Trust, who presented their thoughts
and ideas to Parliament on the current and future state of the UK's agri-environmental policy.
Further, in some cases these environmental groups have also acted as policy formulators,
designing and administering schemes such as the Countryside Stewardship (CS) Scheme which
was originally developed by the CoCo and only transferred to MAFF in April, 1996, and, more
recently, the Arable Stewardship option of the CS Scheme which, although still in its pilot
phase, was developed by EN, the RSPB and the Game Conservancy Trust.
Over the last decade, therefore, it is widely acknowledged that environmentalists have reached
unprecedented levels of co-operation with the elite agricultural policy community. Where
previously statutory environmental agencies and ENGOs were forced to occupy marginal
positions of political power, they have become internalised in the agri-environmental decision
making nexus, where agricultural policy makers readily encourage them to act as consultants
and policy formulators. Indeed, following the 1995 Rural White Paper, MAFF (House of
Commons, 1996) established two official consultation groups to assist agricultural policy
makers and interest groups to discuss the development and implementation of the UK's
agri-environmental schemes. These were the National Agri-Environmental Steering Group
(NAESG) and the National Agri-Environmental Forum (NAEF). The NAESG is comprised of
MAFF and statutory enviromnental agencies. According to MAFF (1996a), they meet
approximately four times a year, and discuss the current and future status of the UK's
agn-environmental programmes. The NAEF on the other hand provides an arena for farming
and interest groups, ENGOs, environment agencies and MAFF to meet biannually and consult
with one another on the strategic development of agri-environmental schemes (see appendix 1)
(MAFF, 1996a).
Concerns have been raised that the success of environmentalists over the past decade may,
inadvertently be their demise. Hart and Wilson (in press) argue that, "ten years ago, ... MAFF
would not have been willing to include environmental organisation into AEP debates
However, despite this being a good step forward towards a more inclusive policy-making
strategy, now that environmental pressure groups have become incorporated into the
policy-making process, they are no longer able to speak out against govermnent policy as they
once did, for fear of being excluded once again". While these concerns warrant further
investigation, it cannot be denied that never before have environmentalists enjoyed such close
working relations with the agricultural policy community. They have become internalised in the
'official' agri-environmental policy process where, as consultants and policy formulators, they
The author was present, as an observer at a number of the sessions where the various environmental
agencies and ENGOs submitted their evidence to the Agiiculture Select Committee
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have been able to play a central role in shaping the content and direction of contemporaiy
agri-environmental policy.
At the local level, the extent to which new pressure groups are actively involved in the
'official' policy implementation process is less conclusive. Little research has specifically
analysed the influence that 'new' agri-environmental actors, such as environmental agencies
and ENGOs, have had on the implementation of individual agn-environmental schemes.
However, while this thesis seeks to address this gap in the literature, a number of research
studies have revealed that, since the development of agri-environmental concerns and policies,
there has been an erosion of the state's elite agricultural advisory service as an increasing
number of actors have emerged within the British countryside to transfer general environmental
values and knowledge down to the farming community. In some cases, it is evident that these
new actors have had major repercussions on the decisions and actions of the individual farmer
and have in turn challenged the role and influence of the state's on-farm conservation advisors
(see Lowe et al., 1990, 1997; Ward and Lowe, 1994; Munton, 1995; Ward et al., 1995;
Winter, 1995, 1996).
'New 'Agri-Environmental Advisors
Throughout the post-war productivist era, the state's agricultural advisory service (i.e. NAAS,
and later ADAS), established itself as the primary provider of advice and infonnation to the
farming community in England and Wales. Through DAOs, farmers were continuously
provided with up to date information concerning the utility of new technologies and techniques
aimed at the expansion and intensification of individual farm production units (see section 3.3).
As discussed in section 3.3, NAAS and ADAS proved to be a highly effective advisory
service. They guided farmers through a previously unprecedented 'agricultural revolution' and
in turn assisted policy makers to fuffil their productivist objectives. Directly aligned to the
agricultural industry, the state advisory service proved to be extremely popular amongst many
UK farmers. Results from an independent market research study conducted amongst a
thousand UK farmers in 1985 revealed what Dancey (1993) described as encouraging results
for ADAS. "Overall ADAS was regarded well by the industry, particularly for its impartiality
and independence. Also prized were its strong background in R & D [research and
development] and its ability to foster and promote new developments" (Dancey, 1993:384).
This was further supported in a survey of 262 farmers in southern England where Munton et al.
(1987) found that 87 percent of the sample size favoured ADAS as an advisory source, when
compared with private agricultural consultants.
Towards the late 1980s, however, ADAS' future as the primary agricultural advisory service in
the UK looked increasingly uncertain. As ADAS introduced charges on the provision of
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non-agri-environmental advice (see p. 45), a number of research studies revealed a nse in the
presence and use of private advisoiy sources as the growing subsumption of the farm
production process by industrial capitals forced many farmers to seek more specialist and
technical advice, often provided by seed and chemical merchants, and independent consultants
(Whatmore et al., 1987; Eldon, 1988; Fearne and Ritson, 1989; Hawkins, 1991; Clunies-Ross
and Hildyard, 1992; Ward, 1994). Further, as agn-environmental concerns and policies
emerged within the agricultural policy process, the advisory market witnessed a mushrooming
of 'new' agri-environmental advisory sources provided by many of the environmental agencies
and ENGOs who had earlier campaigned so assiduously for the integration of agricultural and
nature conservation practices.
Throughout their agri-environmental campaign environmentalists had placed considerable
emphasis on the need for advice and information. It was widely asserted that if
post-productivist rhetoric was ever to be implemented at the ground level then farmers must be
able to draw upon a knowledgeable environmental advisory service who could provide up to
date information and advice to any farmer and/or landowner wishing to adopt environmentally
friendly farming practices (Westmacott and Worthington, 1974; Baldock and Conder, 1987).
While the environmental lobby, particularly the CPRE, secured promises from the agricultural
ministry that ADAS would provide free environmental advice (Winter, 1996), many of the
environmental agencies and ENGOs sought to take a more pro-active approach within the
national campaign and established their own agri-environmental advisory services. In the early
1980s, for example, the RSPB established its own Conservation Management Advisory
Service with the primary aim of providing advice to farmers and landowners seeking to adopt
appropriate land-management practices for the conservation and promotion of specific bird
species. Concomitantly, the NCC sought to establish a role as agri-environmental advisors by
sponsoring an experiment with three farm-based ecologists to develop a body of practical
expertise which the NCC could then impart on the UK's fanning communities. While these
advisory services tended to remain closely aligned to the individual interests and objectives of
each environmental group, the formation of the Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group
(FWAG), sought, for the first time, to establish a general agri-environmental advisory service
for the UK's farming community.
FWAG
Formed in the aftermath of the 1970 Silsoe Conference (Barber, 1970), FWAG was initially
intended to act as a national forum for conservationists and agriculturists to come together to
discuss practical mechanisms by which both interest groups could help to resolve the
escalating environmental costs of productivist farming practices (Blunden and Curry, 1988).
Comprised of representatives from NAAS, the CLA, CoCo, the Forestry Commission, NFU,
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NCC, the Royal Society for Nature Conservation (RSNC), Royal Institute of Chartered
Surveys, the British Trust for Ornithology and the RSPB, FWAG set out to specifically:
"1) promote liaison with all appropriate authorities on subjects affecting agriculture
and wildlife conservation;
2) To stimulate and assist the organisatlon offurther conferences on a local basis;
3) To approach agricultural colleges and institutes with a view to their including nature
conservation on their courses;
4) To stimulate the investigation of certain specific problems at suitable Research
Stations and to disseminate the results of research;
5) To discuss with Game Advisers how the advice they give could be modified to take
account of nature conservation;
6) To lecture widely to farming and naturalist audiences ... [and to];
7) explore the possibility of MAFF including conservation exhibits in their displays at
agricultural shows" (Cox eta!., 1990.18).
Much of the initial survival and later success of FWAG, has been attributed to the financial
input from conservation groups such as the RSPB and to Jim Hall, the first national FWAG
officer. With the appropriate resources, Jim Hall set out to actively promote FWAG throughout
the farming communities of the UK, and, in essence, established FWAG's identity and future
as a leader in agri-environmental advisory provision (Cox et al., 1990). Despite their
representation on the national forum of FWAG, the elite agricultural policy community initially
provided limited financial and political support to the new agri-environmental group. In their
respective journals and magazines, the CLA and NFU made little reference to FWAG and
instead encouraged their members to look towards ADAS as the main source of future
conservation advice (Cox et al., 1990). Following the 1981 Wildlife and Countryside Act,
however, the Farming and Wildlife Trust was established to which the NFU and CLA became
patrons. Sceptics immediately asserted that such action on the part of agriculturists, was
essentially being used as a means to stave off any further criticism from conservationists (see
Cox et al., 1985b). As the Countryside Commission's representative on the national FWAG
asserted, "MAFF is tending to use the organisation as a cosmetic screen, which allows them to
parade conservationist ideals without having to do much about it" (Countryside Commission,
internal memo, March 1980 in Cox et al., 1990:45). Indeed, as environmentalists increased
pressure on the farming interest groups to prove that the voluntary principle of the 1981 Act
was more then mere rhetoric and could, in reality, be implemented, the NFU and CLA turned
once again to FWAG as their "main vehicle ... to highlight and reinforce a conservation ethic
and co-operative spirit amongst farmers and landowners" (Cox et al., 1990:47). In this context,
Cox et at. (1985b:148) suggest that, "as a department used to corporatist relations with
producer groups [i.e. NFU and CLA], MAFF has sought in effect to 'license' its own
environmental interest group". Indeed, despite initial isolation, FWAG has, over the years,
become closely aligned to the agricultural community. As a national forum they have
assiduously avoided acting as a pressure group for conservationist interests. FWAG takes no
part in lobbying and seeks to avoid controversial issues such as the right to public access
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(Winter, 1996). It is perhaps at the local level, however, where FWAG's role as an informative
and politically neutral 'environmentally' focused group has gained the support and approval of
the UK's fanning communities.
During the mid 1970s, FWAG sought to build upon their national mediatoiy role and establish
county FWAG groups as a medium through which an agn-environmental advisory service
could be offered to local fanning communities. By the end of 1975, nine groups were
established. However, due to limited funding their advisory capacity remained marginal,
forcing them to offer a mere forum for local agriculturists and conservationists to discuss
specific local agn-environmental issues. Despite its slow development, the advisory capacity of
local FWAG groups began to emerge in the early 1980s. Gloucestershire and Somerset were
among the first county groups to provide a full time adviser, while Suffolk offered a
consultancy service to local farmers keen to obtain conservation oriented advice (Winter,
1996). While acknowledging the potential capabilities of these local advisory groups, some
commentators initially believed that ADAS should fulfil the provision of agri-environmental
advice (Winter, 1985; Lowe et al., 1986). Following the 1984 Bell Report ADAS did introduce
the provision of free conservation advice through the Farm and Countryside Service (see
section 3.3). However, as government rationalisation forced ADAS to enter into the
commercial market of agricultural advice, it became increasingly evident that within ADAS the
promotion of environmental advice would, in the future, take a backseat to the provision of
commercially viable advice. In this context, the market for FWAG's advisory service became
apparent. With other environmental agencies and ENGOs providing specialist advice, and
ADAS clearly constrained by commercialist objectives, FWAG looked set to evolve as a
primary provider of general agri-environmental advice throughout the UK.
With the establishment of the Farming and Wildlife Trust in 1984, funding was made available
to appoint up to 30 local FWAG advisors across the UK. Their main objectives were to
"stimulate and broadcast amongst farmers and landowners, a social ethic concerning
stewardship of the countryside, including the protection and enhancement of national diversity
and beauty with the context of modem farming practices and estate management" (Blunden
and Curry, 1988:18 1). In order to implement these objectives the local FWAG advisors, often
working in close co-operation with ADAS officials, sought to conduct individual farm visits as
the most effective extension tool with which to advise and promote agri-environmental
practise. Throughout their work FWAG advisers promoted the notion of 'voluntary
co-operation and goodwill' (Cox et al., 1985b). They sought to work with local farmers, to
suggest, advise and to set an example of how agricultural and environmental concems could be
integrated within individual farm plans. Throughout FWAG's history great emphasis has been
placed on co-operative action with the farming community. The advisers worked closely to
county committees, who are invariably comprised of local, influential dignitanes from the
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agricultural and environmental sector, with the chairman of the county FWAG usually
represented by a local farmer (Winter, 1995). Today, nearly all counties in England and
Scotland have a full tune FWAG advisor. Their remit remains firmly based on the principles of
voluntarism and compromise. Farmers continue to be encouraged to seek their advice, and
much emphasis remains on the agricultural knowledge and sympathies of the advisors (Winter,
1996).
While FWAG has developed into one of the most "serious players" in the provision of
agri-environmental advice (Winter, 1995), it is evident that operating alongside FWAG and the
state advisoiy service, a network of advisory sources have emerged over the years offering
environmental advice and information to UK farmers and landowners. In what is perhaps the
most detailed contemporary study of agn-environmental advisory provision, Winter (1995)
subdivides this complex network of advisors into primary, secondary and marginal providers
(Table 3.3).
"Primary refers to agencies where advice giving is the main or one of the main
functions. Secondary agencies are those where advice is a recognisedfunction to which
some importance is attached but where it is clearly subsidiary to many other functions.
Marginal refers to those organisalions, where direct on-fann advice may be given
but where it is incidental or marginal to wider functions" (Winter, 1995:56).
Although Winter (1995) goes on to provide a detailed analysis of each of the main advisory
sources, outlining their interests, objectives and output, a brief account of many of these
additional agri-environmental advisors is provided here as an essential pre-requisite to
understanding the variety of 'new' agri-environmental actors known to operate in the locality,
and potentially alongside the FRCA P0 in the implementation of individual agri-environmental
schemes.
i) Local Authorities
Despite difficulties in ascertaining the precise level of agri-environmental advice provided by
local authorities, Winter (1995:79) maintains that they are 'important players' in the UK's
advisory network. The majority of local authorities employ officers to provide advice on
specific conservation grant schemes, such as local countryside management projects and Areas
of Outstanding Natural Beauty (AONB). Where time and finances permit, Winter (1995) noted
that a number of county councils also provide a general agri-environmental advisory service,
providing advice to farmers on a range of issues, such as habitat creation, woodland
management, pollution control, landscape enhancement and ecological assessments. Further,
local authorities evidently contribute to the wider agri-environmental advisory network. As
Winter (1995) detailed, county councils will often provide funding to various organisations,
such as FWAG and county wildlife trusts, and, in some cases, offer practical assistance to
these groups in the form of administrative support and office accommodation.
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11) Game Conservancy Trust
Established during the 1930s The Game Conservancy Trust (GCT) has developed into a
leading research charity, highly regarded by policy makers and farming communities for their
up to date knowledge, information and advice on all aspects of habitat management related to
the successful rearing of game (Winter, 1995; Harvey, 1997). Unlike many charitable
organisations with an interest in habitat conservation, the GCT does not own or manage any
nature reserves. Its contribution to agri-environmentalism is primarily through its largest
research department - the Farm and Ecology Umt, and through The Game Conservancy
Limited - an associated company of the GCT who provides a chargeable advisory service to
members who seek to put into practice the research findings of the GCT.
iii) RSPB
Building upon their earlier work in the Conservation Management Advisory Service, the RSPB
currently provides four person-years of advice to UK farmers in relation to specific RSPB
schemes, which seek to secure sympathetic management of habitats for corncrakes, stone
curlews and cirl buntings (Winter, 1995). Further, as the RSPB has, in recent years, sought to
widen their interests to include broad principles of landscape and ecological management, they
have attempted to offer farmers more general agri-environmental advice, such as the best
management strategy to adopt to promote wildlife on set-aside land. According to Winter
(1995:85), "the RSPB considers that its role in this area [of general advisory provision] is
likely to increase and cite the inclusion of once common farmland bird species on the Red Data
list as a reason for providing more direct advice to farmers".
iv) County Wildlife Trusts
Many of the 45 County Wildlife Trusts currently operating in the UK have long provided an
advisory service to local fanners and landowners keen to conserve specffic areas of their
fannland (Winter, 1995; Dwyer and Hodge, 1996). Generally this advice has been directly
related to the management of designated conservation sites, such as county wildlife sites, local
nature reserves, and often, in conjunction with EN's SSSIs. However, where county trusts
possess a relatively large resource base, Winter (1995) notes that this advisory provision may
be extended, with some county groups providing a more pro-active advisory service, offering
general agri-environmental advice to farmers throughout their locality.
v) Environmental Agencies (i.e. EN, CoCo, EH, Forestry Authority, National Parks Authority)
It is widely recognised that all of the statutory environmental agencies currently provide advice
directly to farmers and landowners throughout the UK (Clark, 1989; Clark and O'Riordan,
1989; Ward, 1994; MAFF, 1996a). However, as Winter (1995:85) noted, this advice is
"almost always in the context of visits to discuss particular features or schemes". In drawing
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Table 3.3. Providers of Agri-Environmental Advice in the UK (Winter, 1995:58).
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up SSSI management agreements with individual farmers/landowners, for example, EN - the
statutory agency responsible for administering the SSSI system - will always ensure that a
conservation officer will visit the farmer to discuss and advise how they may positively manage
the SSSI (English Nature, 1996). Likewise, the Forestry Authority (FA) provides an advisory
service to any farmer and/or landowner seeking grants to plant or maintain any area of
woodland on their farmland (Winter, 1996).
Given the complexity of the number and type of agn-environmental advisory sources, concerns
have been raised as to possible contradictions in advice given to farmers; duplication of
existing work already under way by environmental agencies; and potential confusion for the
individual farmers, not knowing who to contact for what, where or when (Clark and
O'Riordan, 1989; Dwyer and Hodge, 1996). As a solution a number of academics and policy
actors have proposed that farmers in England may benefit from a 'first stop shop' for advice as
recently introduced in Wales (MAFF, 1 996a; NFU, 1996). In particular, it is believed that by
establishing one all-encompassing advisory service, farmers and landowners would always
know that they could contact just one body in which to obtain all the agri-environmental advice
and information that they require. To date, however, the first stop shop in England remains a
topic of debate amongst agriculturists and environmentalists. MAFF appear keen to promote
themselves as the future provider of all agri-environmental advice (MAFF, 1996a), but, not
surprisingly, many of the environmental agencies and ENGOs remain unconvinced by such a
proposal. In their evidence to the recent Agriculture Select Committee, English Nature (1996)
asserted, for example, that "First Stop Shops' should be established but we suggest the
network extends beyond just local MAFF offices" (p3). As agn-environmentalists fail to reach
a consensus, therefore, the complex network of advisory services that evidently operates within
the British countiyside looks set to remain in the near future.
Effectiveness of the 'New 'Agri-Environmental Advisors
Despite the concerns of those commentators advocating the development of a one stop shop
for advice, it is apparent that many UK farmers have succeeded in finding their way around the
complex network of agri-environmental advisory sources. A number of surveys and research
studies have revealed that, since the development of agri-environmental concerns and policies,
a relatively large number of farmers have sought and received conservation advice from a
plethora of public, private and voluntary sources. An OMIFARM survey conducted by CEAS
(1991) revealed, for example, that approximately 28 per cent of farmers surveyed had received
conservation advice during a twelve month period. Further, a telephone survey of 650 farmers
in Devon, North Yorkshire and Suffolk, revealed that 37 per cent of the survey sample were in
receipt of advice concerning conservation and environmental management (PIEDA, 1993).
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In his detailed exploration of agri-environmental advice, Wmter (1995) expressed some caution
over the validity of these figures. He argued that measuring the input of advisory sources and
the level of advice taken up by farmers is extremely problematic. Commenting upon the
PIEDA (1993) survey, Wmter (1995) drew attention to the problems of the definitions of
'conservation advice' used within research studies. He asserted that, in the PIEDA (1993)
survey, "advice is defined as not only 'someone visiting your farm, but also advice over the
'phone, by word of mouth, in pamphlets advice which may have been given during the
course of advice on commercial matters'. With such a broad definition of advice the 37% is, in
fact, worrying low rather than encouragingly high as it first appears". Moreover, a number of
researchers have expressed scepticism as to the level of conservation advice which is actually
implemented by farmers in the locality (Carr, 1988; Lowe et al., 1990). A study conducted by
the Centre for Rural Studies (1990) revealed, for example, that farm conservation advisors
would often report difficulties in persuading farmers of the importance of managing and
retaining existing semi-natural features, or, of the need to integrate conservation into general
fanning practices and plans. Even the most receptive farmers would select the advice given by
advisers and modify it according to their own perceptions of appropriate conservation practices
- further evidence of the power and influence that farmers often wield in the agri-environmental
policy process.
Despite such cautionary findings, the conclusions of the Centre for Rural Studies' (1990)
survey were generally favourable to the advisory agencies covered (four county FWAG's, one
National Parks Authority and one county council). "Advice was taken up to some extent by
two thirds of the fanners interviewed and nearly one half had implemented all the advice
received. The quality of the advice given was consistently high with a good level of detail"
(Winter, 1995:247). Moreover, the study illustrated that many farmers in the UK are willing to
move beyond the state advisory services, to seek and receive advice from the 'new'
agri-environmental advisory sources. Indeed, although farmers are often obliged to contact the
various 'new' actors for advice related to specific schemes and/or grants, there is increasing
evidence that many farmers are, independently turning towards the 'new' advisory sources for
both specific and general agri-environmental advice. Recently, The Game Conservancy Trust
(1995:49) asserted, for example, that:
"it is reassuring to know that even though the opportunities to opt for free general
conservation advice have never been greater, farmers and landowners are increasingly
joining with keepers and shonungfolk by drawing on our professional expertise ".
Winter's (1995) detailed study of advisory provision supported these claims. According to
Winter (1995:84), "Game Conservancy officers make approximately 400 visits per annum to
farmers or groups of farmers in order to provide advice on matters pertaining to successful
game rearing, such as woodland and headland management". Supporting this trend toward the
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utilisation of 'new' agri-environmental advisory sources, Winter (1995, 1996) recently
revealed that, in 1993/94 FWAG provided 34.8 person-years of advice to farmers in England,
while ADAS only provided 13 staff years of free conservation advice. Although Winter (1995)
went on to note that ADAS devoted a further 56 staff years to free pollution advice, he
asserted that the level of advisory provision made by FWAG had increased by 40 per cent
since 1990. Translating this into the number of individual farm visits made, Winter (1995)
noted that annually ADAS had only visited 1,400 farms, in comparison to 3,500 visits made by
local FWAG advisers. Supporting these results, Winter ci a!. (1996) have further revealed that
many contemporary farmers are increasingly seeking the advice of FWAG in preference to the
former public ADAS. Drawing upon a survey of 329 farmers in England, they outhned that, in
particular:
"A significantly higher proportion of the FWAG farmers than of the ADAS sample
had implemented all of the advice given ... [and] ... a significantly higher proportion of
FWAG recipients were highly satisfied with the advice received" (Winter et a!.,
1996:vii).
As a relative newcomer into the field of advisory provision, FWAG is effectively proving itself
to be a more popular and effective source of general agri-environmental advice compared with
the traditional state advisory service. Whether a similar scenario has developed between the
FRCA P0 and FWAG in the specific context of MAFF's agri-environmental schemes is a
primary issue to be analysed in this research.
Summary
In summary, therefore, it is evident that this section of the thesis has brought the role and
relative influence of the agn-environmental implementer into considerable question. As
discussed, MAFF currently asserts that the FRCA P0 is the key to the implementation and
outcome of the UK's agri-environmental schemes. However, despite conceptual and historical
support for MAFF's arguments, this section of the thesis has drawn upon existing research
studies and revealed that a complex network of actors are actively involved in the
agri-environmental policy process, and, in some cases, have directly influenced the
implementation and outcome of the UK's agri-environmental schemes. Firstly, in light of the
voluntary nature of MAFF's agri-environmental schemes, it is evident that the FRCA P0 has
had to operate in accordance with farmers autonomous decision making strategies. In some
cases, the individual P0 has been shown to influence farmers' agri-environmental decisions,
but researchers have revealed that they are only one actor within a network of factors evidently
shaping and detennining farmers' agri-environmental participatory behaviour. Secondly,
drawing upon historical and contemporary accounts, it has been revealed how, over the last
two decades, the traditional elitism of the agricultural policy community has slowly declined as
a 'new' set of actors, most notably consumers and environmentalists, have infiltrated into the
agri-environmental pohcy process. Today, environmental agencies and ENGOs are actively
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involved in the formulation of agri-environmental policy. They help to shape the content and
direction of the agn-environmental schemes, which the FRCA P0 in turn implements. Further,
existing research studies have revealed that at the local level, these 'new' agri-environmental
actors have increasingly provided general on-farm conservation advice to farming communities
and, in some cases, have directly influenced farmers' agri-environmental practices. But what
influence have these actors had in the implementation of individual agri-environmental
schemes? Have they eroded the power and influence of the FRCA P0 by directly influencing
fanners' decisions to participate in an agri-environmental scheme, or, has the FRCA P0, like
the national agricultural policy makers, drawn upon the environmental expertise of these
groups in order to assist them to implement the individual agri-environmental schemes? It is
clearly evident that, in seeking to address these questions, analysis needs to examine the FRCA
P0 in relation to all actors operating in the agri-environmental implementation process. Failure
to do so will impede analysis from gaining a holistic understanding of the role and relative
influence that this one local-level implementer has on the implementation and outcome of
policy.
Having established the necessity to analyse the agri-environmental implementer in relation to
their macro-socio and political contexts, questions are raised as to the most appropriate
conceptual and/or theoretical framework in which to situate this research. In terms of
understanding the role and influence of local-level implementers, Chapter 2 outlined the
possible utility of Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy. In what is one of the
most comprehensive theorisation's of policy implementers, Lipsky (1980) provides a detailed
understanding of the behavioural characteristics and activities of street-level bureaucrats, in
addition to their relationships with recipients of policy and bureaucratic superiors. However, as
Ham and Hill (1993:142) assert, "Lipsky does not really try to link his analysis to a
macro-sociological perspective". Throughout his theory, Lipsky maintains an individualistic
analytical approach. He chooses to focus on the micro-social context of the street-level
bureaucrat with little analysis of the role and influence that external pressure groups may bring
to bear on the decisions and actions of the individual hnplementer. While this theoretical
approach has proven to be useful in the analysis of some local-level implementers (see section
2.5), it would appear that where a holistic understanding of the agri-environmental implementer
requires an analysis of both their micro and macro-social contexts, Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy can only provide a limited theoretical framework in which to situate
such an analysis. Moreover, Lipsky's conceptualisation of policy recipients as powerless and
largely ineffectual policy actors, clearly contradicts the empirically established concept of
farmers as powerful autonomous agn-environmental decision makers. In this context, the
following section seeks to ascertain an alternative conceptual and/or theoretical approach in
which to analyse the role and relative influence of the agri-environmental implementer. This is
not to deny that Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy may still provide a detailed and
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accurate understanding of the agri-environmental implementer's micro-social world. However,
there is evidently a need to search for an alternative approach that may facilitate a holistic
understanding of the agri-environmental implementer.
3.5	 Searching for an Alternative Conceptual Approach
As policy implementation studies have evolved there has been a continual advancement in
conceptual and theoretical approaches to understand the policy process. Many analysts have
attempted to move beyond micro-sociological analyses, such as Lipsky's theory of street-level
bureaucracy, and have sought to examine the local-level implementer in relation to their wider
macro-structural and agency contexts. In the following sections, the various approaches
adopted by researchers will be analytically reviewed in an attempt to ascertain a more
appropriate conceptual or theoretical framework in which to analyse the role and relative
influence of the FRCA P0.
3.5.1 Political-Economy Theories
Towards the late 1980s, an increasing number of policy analysts and academics sought to
adopt and advocate political-economy theories as a means of understanding the complex
inter-actor relations that evidently take place in the implementation of policies. At the heart of
their debate was the notion that to understand policy implementation analysts must accept that
the objectives, decisions and actions of local-level implementers will be shaped and
determined by macro socio-political and economic factors. As Cloke (1987:24) argued:
"the key to our understanding of these processes ... lies in analyses both of the
constraints on the operation of pohcy-action continuum, and of attempts to sinicture
this operation in order to limit the autonomy and discretion available to competing
actors and agencies '
First and foremost, political economy theorists advocated that the decisions and actions of all
policy actors, including street-level bureaucrats will be constrained and influenced by the form,
function and apparatus of the state.
"Any thought ofpolicy makers starting with a clean slate is entirely misleathng. Before
beginning their negotiations within the policy-action continuum, policy makers
implicitly accept an externally imposed definition of the 'art of the possible' which is
thctaied by [the slate-society relations/np]" (Cloke and Little, 1990:101).
Essentially, it is argued that the nature of the state sets specific constitutional rules and
procedures which determine political power, negotiations and activities. Implementers will be
constrained by the need to conform to the existing nature of the state, which will predetermine
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their objectives, action and relationships with other policy actors. In this context, Cloke and
Little (1987, 1990) argue that policy making and implementation should be viewed as complex
political phenomena grounded within the overall context of the state. "Unless the form,
function and apparatus of the state are fully appreciated research into policy making and
planning will be dogged by inherently but largely untested assumptions concerning why
policies are made, and on whose behalf they are implemented" (Cloke and Little, 1987:343).
Attempting to explain the nature of state-society relations m contemporary society, and its
influence upon the policy process, political scientists have developed a number of theories
which, in turn offer different conceptual explanations for the role and influence of local level
implementers. These primarily mclude theories of elitism, Marxism, pluralism and corporatism.
Detailed discussions of these theories can be found throughout the policy literature (see Clark
and Dear, 1984; Cox et aL, 1985; Cloke and Little, 1987, 1990; Ham and Hill, 1993).
However, for the purpose of searching for an alternative conceptual framework to Lipsky's
(1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, a brief review of each theory is provided.
Elitism
Elite state theory advocates that political power is concentrated within the hands of a minority
of policy actors (Mosca, 1939; Wright Mills, 1956; Scott, 1982). According to Bottomore
(1966), these may be defined in terms of a political elite and a political class. "The political
elite ... will include members of the government and of the high administration, military
leaders, and, in some cases, politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house and
leaders of powerful economic enterprises" (Bottomore, 1966:14). In addition, the political
class may comprise leaders of political parties in opposition, trade union leaders, businessmen
and politically active intellectuals (see Ham and Hill, 1993). In this context, elitism may be
based on a multiplicity of sources, such as the occupation of formal office, wealth, technical
expertise and knowledge (Hill, 1993). Further, protagonists of the elite model of power
recognise that pressure groups are involved in the policy process. However, they contend that
their relative influence is dependent upon the extent to which their interests are consistent with
the objectives of the powerful elite.
In accordance with Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy, the individual bureaucrat may
be interpreted as a member of an elite political class. As chapter 2 outlined, Lipsky asserts that
the street-level bureaucrat is a powerful policy actor. They possess knowledge of policies
which policy target groups require, while official policy makers look towards the street-level
bureaucrat for information pertaining to the recipients of policy. Essentially, the street-level
bureaucrat possesses a powerful source of knowledge which, according to concepts of elitism,
actively admits them into a powerful elitist state. In the context of the agri-environmental
77
implementer, however, their position within an elitist state has already been brought into
question. The involvement of environmental pressure groups in the formulation of
agri-environmental policy and in the dissemination of advice indicates that the
agri-environmental hnplementer operates within an open and fragmented political environment.
Marxism
Drawing upon Marx's seminal 'Das Kapital', Miliband (1973) has developed an
instrumentalist conception of Marxism in which to theorise state-society relations (see
O'Connor, 1973; Gough, 1979). Focusing upon the relationship between economic power and
political power, Miliband asserts that the state acts as an instrument for bourgeois domination
in a capitalistic society4. According to Miliband (1973), similar backgrounds between the state
elite and members of the bourgeois facilitate this class power. Concomitantly, it is advocated
that the bourgeois are able to exercise power as a pressure group through personal contacts
and networks within the state. Further, Miliband asserts that, the state is constrained by its
need to assist the process of capital accumulation. In other words, "the freedom of action of
state officials is limited, although not eliminated, by their need to assist the process of capital
accumulation, which stems from their dependence on a successful economic base for their
continued survival in office" (Ham and Hill, 1993:35). Marxist theory goes on to assert that,
driven by economically motivated objectives, states will create conditions to further production
and, thus, support bourgeois capitalists in the production of profit. In this context, Marxism
maintains the political supremacy of the economically dominant class. State officials, formal
policy makers and local-level implementers, such as the street-level bureaucrat, have little
control over the policy process. Their decisions and actions are shaped by production led
objectives, to the benefit of the capitalistic policy target group.
Pluralism
As one of the most influential theories of the state, pluralism emulates Schumpeter's (1947)
definition of democracy and advocates that power is widely distributed amongst mdividuals
and organisations throughout the policy process (Dahl, 1961; Beer, 1965; Lindblom, 1977;
Jordan and Richardson, 1987; Dearlove and Saunders, 1984). "No group is without power to
influence decision-making, and equally no group is dominant. Any group can ensure that its
political preferences and wishes are adopted, if it is sufficiently determined" (Ham and Hill,
1993:28). Within this framework, pluralism places considerable emphasis on the role of
pressure groups within 'official' policy making processes. They are regarded as equivalent
'sit should be noted that Miliband's conception of instrumentalist Marxism has been criticised by structuralists,
such as Poulantzas (1975), Hlrst (1977) and Jessop (1982). According to Poulantzas, the class background of
state officials is not important. Of significance are the structural constraints placed on the state which explain
the political supremacy of the economically elite.
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political actors to government agencies and political parties. In this context, the local level
implementer can not be regarded as the exclusive, important and influential policy actor, that
was advocated by Lipsky in his theory of street-level bureaucracy. Instead, under a pluralist
state, it is argued that all policy actors and pressure groups may influence policy, furthering
their individual interests and objectives through the implementation process (Jordan and
Richardson, 1987).
Although, much of the work on pluralism developed within America, and, in particular, from
the political theorist Robert Dahl (1961), many supporters of the theory have advocated its
relevance to contemporary British politics (Mackenzie, 1955; Mckenzie, 1958). In the
mid-1960s, for example, Beer (1965) noted that in Britain a collectivist theory of
representation was developing, whereby pressure groups were afforded a greater role in the
formulation of policies. According to Beer (1965), as government sought to manage the
economy they were forced into bargaining relations with employer associations, whose consent
and co-population they required. Similarly, "the evolution of the welfare state stimulated action
by organised groups of consumers, such as tenants, parents and patients. The desire by
governments to retain office led them to consult and bargain with these consumer groups in an
attempt to win support and votes" (Ham and Hill, 1993:27). Accordingly, Jordan and
Richardson (1987) argue that Britain is a 'post-parliamentary democracy' where pressure
groups will influence policy from the initial point of formulation through implementation and
final enactment at the ground level.
In this context, pluralist theories of the state would appear to provide some explanation for the
increasing role and influence that environmental agencies and ENGOs are cuffently enjoying
within the formulation of UK agri-environmental policy (see section 3.4.2). Government
agencies, such as MAFF and the FRCA would be treated as lobbying groups alongside
ENGOs, and the apparent power relations that exist between these organisations would be
explained in terms of "a political market place where what a group achieves depends on its
resources and its 'decibel rating" (Ham and Hill, 1993:29). According to Grant (1989:26-27),
however, "pluralist theory often seems to reflect a more open, fragmented political system than
applies in the case of Britain ... Such a picture has considerable validity in the US with its
autonomous executive agencies, but less so in Britain". Instead, it is advocated that however
fragmented the British system may appear, some government agencies will always possess
more power than others, and some pressure groups will always enjoy closer relations with
policy makers (Winter, 1996). Thus, as some political theorists have gone on to suggest,
theories of corporatism may provide a more useful framework in which to understand and
analyse the British state system.
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Corporatism
According to Winter (1996:19), "corporatism has become one of the most persuasive theones
attempting to explain the complex relationships that surround modem government". It has been
defined as:
"a mode of policy formation in which formally designated interest associations are
incorporated within the process of authoritative decision making. As such they are
officially recognised by the state not merely as interest intermediaries but as
co-responsible 'partners' in governance and social guidance" (Schmitter, 1981 in Car
eta!., 1987:80).
Advancing pluralist notions of pressure group mvolvement, corporatism thus advocates that a
strong alliance will be developed between Ministers, civil servants and the leaders of pressure
groups, where "the latter are given a central role in the policy making process in exchange for
exerting pressure upon their members to confonn with government decisions" (Jones,
1991.506). In this context, interest groups are regarded as an extension of government. They
are actively involved in official decision making activities and may influence the
implementation of policy (Middlemas, 1986; Parntch, 1980).
As discussed, theories of corporatism have been extremely useful in helping to conceptualise
policy actor relations within the development and implementation of agricultural policies. The
post-war corporatist relationship between MAFF and the NFU proved to be extremely
influential in the formulation of productivist policies. The NFU was seen to obtain insider
status within the elite agricultural policy community, in return for ensuring member compliance
to policy maker objectives (Self and Storing, 1962; Cox et al., 1987; Smith, 1990). Today, it is
thought that theories of corporatism have been extended into the implementation of
post-productivist policies, where FWAG is believed to enjoy close working relations with
MAFF and ADAS/FRCA advisors and POs. While this particular issue remains a subject for
further investigation within this research, corporatist theories would appear to provide a useful
framework in which to analyse the relationship of the agri-environmental implementer with
various actors operating within the locality.
Although many scholars continue to debate the utility and exclusivity 5 of state-society theories,
political-economy analysts are united in asserting that the nature of the state will influence and
Many scholars have advocated that despite distinct variation in these theoretical conceptions of the State no
one single theory provides an adequate analytical framework in which to analyse the role of the state within
public policy (Cawson, 1981, Cloke and Little, 1987, 1990, Dearlove, 1991, Ham and Hill, 1993). Winter
(1996 21) draws attention to the complementaiy nature of certain aspects of state theories, explaining, for
example, that the "acceptance of the corporatist framework ... does not preclude the possibility of retaining
elements of marxist theory (see, for example, Panitch 1980, 1981) or of elite theory". Concomitantly, it is
generally accepted that pluralism and corporatism are closely aligned, often interlinking as a combined theory
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shape the decisions and actions of policy actors, such as the local-level implementer.
Political-economy theorists do not deny that within the state street-level bureaucrats may
greatly influence the policy process (see PahI, 1977). However, they contend that given the
nature of the state, specific macro-structural constraints will determine the interests, objectives
and political power of the street-level bureaucrat. Further, drawing upon the work of
central-local relations and inter-organisational studies (see Rhodes, 1981; 1988; Laflin, 1986),
political-economy theorists advocate that beneath fundamental state constraints, the
organisational and inter-organisational setting of pohcy makers and implementers will greatly
determine their political preferences and activities (Cloke and Little, 1987, 1990). As Cloke
(1987:25) advocates:
"The primary constraints on ... policy options are ... the restrictions imposed by the
state society relationship. Underneath this primary constraint, however, occurs a series
of more recognisable secondary restrictions, further constraining the already delimited
range of options open to pohcy-makers ... these constraints occur in furganisational
and inter-organisational relations] '
Orgamsational and Inter-organisational Analyses
There has been a tendency for scholars to analyse the influence of organisational setting on
policy implementation, in terms of central-local relations (Goldsmith, 1986; Lewis and
Wallace, 1984; Cloke and Hanrahan, 1984), in particular, central control over resource
allocation to local agencies implementing policy (Hoggart, 1984; Saunders, 1985). However,
contemporary political scientists have sought to move away from the institutional emphasis
prevalent in central-local studies and adopt an inter-organisational viewpoint, focusing upon
the notion of policy communities and policy networks (Cloke, 1986). According to Rhodes
(1981, 1988), this has primarily emerged in response to the increasing number of actors
involved in public policy, both at the centre and in the locality. The simple policy hierarchy
suggested in Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy is increasingly irrelevant in
contemporary society. Rather than three main actors being involved in the policy process, (i.e.
policy-makers, street-level bureaucrats and recipients of policy), Barrett and Fudge (1981)
argue that, a multiplicity of actors seek to negotiate and bargain with one another in order to
further their own interests in the policy-action continuum. Although, this has been addressed at
the state level through theories of pluralism and corporatism, recent developments within the
political-economy approaches to policy have advocated that analyses of policy actors within
their organisational and inter-organisational contexts would find advantages in studying the
decisions, actions and power relations of actors in relation to the existence of policy




"The practice of [British] government in the 1980s continued to accommodate
organised groups in the process of policy making and the response of British political
scientists was to invoke a more appropriate empirical-descriptive theory - this time
focusing upon policy communities and policy networks ".
Policy Communities
Emulating elitist theories of the state, policy communities have been defined as networks that
exist around specific policy sectors, and which primarily comprise actors of hierarchical
authority, such as ministers, key civil servants and the leaders of key interest groups (Knox and
Cullen, 1981; Laffin, 1986; Rhodes, 1988). Centred around the major functional interests of
government, policy communities cut across the traditional territorial central-local divide that
dominated earlier studies of inter-orgamsational relations (Laffin, 1986). As a community, they
are characterised by stable relationships, a continuity of restrictive membership, insulation
from other networks and the general public, a high degree of vertical interdependence and
limited horizontal articulation (Beer, 1976, Laffin, 1986).
Accordingly, policy communities tend to be highly elitist in nature. Access into a community is
limited to participants whose class background and political personality is generally favourable
to the highly structured and conservative world view of key policy actors (Knox and Cullen,
1981; Self 1985). As Laflin (1986:211) argued:
"...policy communities are based on shared beliefs and are exclusive, new entrants
have to satisfy stringent entry criteria such as having high professional standing or
occupying a senior organisational position ".
Sharing similar values, beliefs and interests, bargaining relations are expected to be limited
within a policy community. An internal order will predominate as participants share an
understanding of the policy problems and priorities, illustrated by the development of a shared
common culture within the community (Laflin, 1986; Winter, 1996).
Despite the low hierarchical position occupied by local-level implementers, chapter 2 outlined
how street-level bureaucrats are ofien admitted into elite policy communities. As professional
bureaucrats, policy implementers serve as an accredited source of new knowledge for policy
makers which, according to Laflin (1986:15), "can endow the holder with influence that may
substitute for the holder's lack of orgamsational or political power relative to other actors and
vice versa". Thus, where an elitist and cohesive community exists around a specific policy,
'street-level' professionals are expected not only to be enrolled within the policy community,
but, additionally, to influence the interests and objectives advocated by policy actors.
However, where policy networks are formed, Rhodes (1981, 1988) argues that the power and
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influence of implementers are curtailed, as a multiplicity of actors seek to bargam and negotiate
with one another in an arena of unpredictable power relations.
Policy Networks
Policy networks are considered to be less integrated and elitist than policy comnmnities.
According to Rhodes (1988), policy networks develop as large groups of actors are brought
together by a shared interest in a particular policy or issue. However, where policy
communities develop a strong cohesive culture around these shared interests, policy networks
remain loosely structured with actors maintaining individual and often diverging objectives. As
Rhodes (1988:78) outlined:
"the distinctive features of this kind of network are its large number ofparticipants and
their limited degree of interdependence. Stability and continuity are at a premium, and
the structure tends to be atomistic. Commonly, there is no single focal point at the
centre with which other actors need to bargain for resources
Summarising policy networks, Marsh and Rhodes (1992) advocate that a large number of
participants will be involved, encompassing a range of interests and objectives. Contact
between policy actors will fluctuate in frequency and intensity, with new groups and actors
continuously enrolling into the netwo& In terms of network cohesion, it is argued that a
measure of agreement does exist between actors, but conflicts are ever present as each
individual struggles for supremacy in order to implement their own objectives. Further, the
distnbution of resources within policy networks is considered to be limited. In this context,
Marsh and Rhodes (1992) assert, that policy networks will be characterised by unequal powers
reflecting unequal resources and unequal access. Thus, for participants of policy networks,
influence on the policy process is expected to be a zero-sum game (Winter, 1996).
It is widely recognised that given this conceptualisation, policy networks provide an extremely
useful compliment to pluralist and corporatist understandings of agri-environmental inter-actor
relations (Jordan and Schubert, 1992; Winter, 1996). Where previously the agricultural policy
process was dominated by the elitist farming community, it is acknowledged that contemporary
agri-environmental policies are formulated within a policy network, characterised by a large
number of actors, each with specffic individual interests and objectives, but coming together
within the political arena of agn-environmentalism (Frouws and Tatenhove, 1993).
As an advancement to Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy, therefore, political-economy
theories, and, in particular, the concepts of pluralism, corporatism, and policy networks,
evidently provide a useful framework in which to analyse the role and influence of the
agn-environmental implementer. While recognising that local-level implementers play an
important role in the policy process, they place the implementer within their macro-social
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environment and provide an understanding of how, for example, the agri-environmental
implementer may act in relation to the plethora of 'new' agn-environmental advisors operating
within the countzyside.
3.5.2 Dualism of Structure and Agency
Despite their apparent utility there is growing concern amongst a number of contemporary
policy analysts that political-economy theories are generally failing to recognise the role of the
agent within their structural contexts (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986, 1987; Long, 1990;
Drinkwater, 1992; Law, 1992; Marsden et al., 1993). Although it is acknowledged that
overemphasising the role and behaviour of the individual actor may draw one to the disputed
concepts of methodological individualism, Marsden and Acre (1995) argue that
political-economy theories have forced analysts to move to the extreme and advocate theories
of structural determinism, thus, analysing structure and agency in terms of a unidirectional
relationship where the former is perceived to constrain individual action. According to Giddens
(1979, 1984), however, macro-processes can not be presumed to determine everything in an
actor's decision making nexus. In reality, structural forms and processes may enter the existing
life-worlds of the individuals and social groups affected, and, in turn, be received, defined and,
in some cases, transformed by these same actors. Accordingly, structure and agency may exist
in a continuous dialectical relationship, where they may both mutually constrain and enable the
outcome of policy. This was clearly evident in Long's (1984, 1992) analysis of 'encounters at
the interface' between rural producers and street-level bureaucrats. Long outhned how rural
producers in Mexico took on board the government's policy to improve agricultural
technology, but where the state bureaucrat sought to persuade the farmers to adopt specific
technologies introduced by the government, Long observed how the farmers sought to adopt
technologies that were entrenched within their cultural knowledge and experiences (see section
3.4.1). In the context of this structure-agency dualism,, Long (1984, 1992) has also gone on to
assert that, like the farmers, local-level implementers are autonomous decision-makers who
will not readily accept the dictates of their macro-structural and agency contexts. Thus, as
"social actors ... [they] ... are not simpay seen as disembodied social categories ... or
passive recipients of... [external structural or agency forces] .. but active participants
which process information and sirategize in their dealings with various local actors as
well as with outside institutions and personnel" (Long, 1992:21).
Accordingly, the agri-environmental implementer can not be presumed to operate in
accordance with the dictates of Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis or political-economy
theories. Rather, the implementer may take on board and manipulate external structures and
agencies in order to legitimise their own lifeworlds.
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By bridging the traditional structure-agency dichotomy, and m turn recogiusing that all policy
actors may redefine structural constraints, Long and Long (1992) have gone on to propose that
the issue of power endemic to traditional bureaucratic studies and political-economy theories
needs to be reappraised. Where, traditionally, political scientists have conceptualised power in
relation to a priori definitions of structural and agency characteristics, Long (1984, 1992)
asserts that by studying the interaction of different life worlds and the strategies developed by
actors analysis may focus upon the way in which actors deal with and manipulate
structural-agency constraints, rather than accepting externally imposed power relations.
Supporting Long's thesis, Latour (1986, 1987) has also been keen to overturn some of the
common assumptions concerning power in the social sciences. Following Foucault (1973),
Latour asserts that power should not be treated as something that one individual or
organisation can be presumed to possess. Comparing a diffusion model of power, where actors
derive power from a known central source, with a translation model, where power is obtained
by enrolling many actors, Latour advocates that power should be seen as a consequence of
action rather than a cause. Accordingly, it is only when actors ideas, perceptions and
objectives are put into action by others that they are believed to be able to exert some form of
power. Thus, as Murdoch and Clark (1994.121) contend:
"The 'powerful' are not those who simpy 'hold' power, but are those who can enrol,
convince and enlist others into [a] neiwork"
Given this conceptualisation, Latour goes on to propose that analysts should move beyond
traditional understandings of 'power' and 'society', where abstract social concepts are used to
explain why actors do what they do, and instead focus on how actors construct and define
society itself. Latour (1986) does not deny that society exists in the form of power, capital,
class, hierarchies, professions and institutions, but he argues that by adopting such an
'ostensive definition of society' and analysing these structures as determinants of social action,
"the practical details that make it possible for these entities to last for more than a minute will
escape attention" (p277). Consequently, Latour (1986, 1987) advocates that analysts should
seek to adopt a 'performative definition of society' where, abandoning a priori definitions of
structure and agency, analysis may focus on how society is constructed and defined by social
action itself. According to Law (1994), it is only by analysing how policy actors manipulate,
persuade, convince and enrol structural and agency actors into their lifeworlds that analysts
may be able to gain a greater understanding of the interplay between actors across the
traditional structure-agency divide.
In seeking to conduct such a performative analysis, the following section outlines how the
actor-network approach offers the social scientist a non-deterministic methodological
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framework in which to analyse how power and society are constructed through the interactions
and strategies of a myriad of actors seeking to legitimise their individual lifeworids.
3.5.3 Actor-Network Approach
Developed mainly from a body of work conducted by a French school of sociologists (Callon,
1986; Latour, 1986, 1987, 1990; Law, 1991), the actor-network approach encapsulates
Latour's perfonnative sociology, where, abandoning a priori concepts and theories of society,
it seeks to provide an epistemological and methodological framework in which to analyse how
power relations and structures are defined by actors as they construct networks of associations
with one another. Central to the approach is a simple analytical principle - 'follow the actors'
as they construct their worlds from what is around them, and observe how the actors seek to
persuade and enrol others into their lifeworlds. By analysing how actors create linkages with
one another, and how some actors impose their interests and objectives on others, Callon et al.
(1985) assert that the constitution of society and the distribution of power relations may be
fully understood.
Drawing upon a study of scallop fishermen in St Bneuc Bay, France, Callon (1986) has
developed a detailed exemplar of how power relations may be defined by actors as they seek
to legitimise their own lifeworlds through a process of translation, involving persuasion,
enrollment, definition and representation. According to Callon there a four main stages of
translation, "during which the identity of actors, the possibility of interaction and the margins
of manoeuvre are negotiated and delimited" (Callon, 1986:203). During the first stage,
problematisation, Callon (1986) argues that an actor will try to make himselThersetf
indispensable to other actors by defining a problem in such a way that their knowledge
becomes indispensable to a possible solution. In doing so, Law (1992) argues that actors may
adopt different modes of discourse when seeking to enrol specific actors into their life worlds.
Essentially, actors may construct their arguments using specific terminology, definitions and
meanings which correspond to other actors' life-worlds, thus, persuading them of the personal
benefits that may be achieved by enrolling in the lead actors' network. Once actors begin to
recognise that their alliance with this main actor may be beneficial, Callon (1986) asserts that
the leading actor will attempt to consolidate the emerging network by strengthening any
associations that exist between actors. According to Callon (1986) and Latour (1986, 1987),
this second stage of translation - interressement - may be achieved by drawing upon
intermediaries, such as texts, empirical data, legislative documents, technical artefacts and
statistical infonnation. Latour (1987) goes on to argue that, by utilising such resources, the lead
actor may move away from previous rhetorical strategies, to strengthen their arguments
through one of the most powerful tools, the visual display.
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In this context, the actor-network approach advocates that unlike previous conceptual
approaches, no distinction should be made between human actors and structural resources.
According to Callon (1986), the lead actor will not seek to distinguish between a human or
non-human entity, all that is of concern to the lead actor is whether a certain entity will help
them to strengthen their arguments. Within the actor-network approach, therefore, an 'actor' is
considered to be any human or non-human resource which is drawn upon and enrolled into a
network. As Hindess (1986:115) clarifies, "an actor is a locus of decision and action where the
action is in some sense a consequence of the actor's decisions". It is not until the third stage of
translation, enrollment, that agencies and structures are defined.
During enrollment, the lead actor will seek to define the roles and relationships that each actor
will play within the network. According to CalIon (1986), this may involve a set of complex
negotiations between actors over how their identities are to be defined. However, as Callon
(1986) goes on to argue, such negotiations will be dependent upon the strength of those actors
that were drawn upon during the stage of interessement. Returning to these supporting
intermediaries, the lead actor may attempt to mitigate negotiations and, thus, define the actors
in relation to their own perceptions and objectives. Achieving this, Callon (1986) argues that,
the lead actor may enter into the fourth stage of translation - mobilisation - whereupon he/she
may successfully turn himsell7herseff into a spokesperson for the network of actors who have
become enrolled into the lead actor's arguments and objectives (Fig. 3.4). Summarising
Callon's (1986) study of the evolution of actor-networks, Marsden et al. (1993:144) state that:
"translation is [thus] a process whereby various disparate social entities and actors are
brought together within a network, for which a strategically placed representative
speaks. It is through this process that actors or entities gain identity and interest. These
are not pre-given but are evoked as the links in the chain are forged"
According to Callon (1986), however, the power and influence of an individual actor may often
be a difficult and protracted process to achieve and maintain. In his study of the scallop
fishermen in St Brieuc Bay, Callon found that, within a network of relations established by
three scientists, fishermen in the Bay refused to accept the scientists' claims for a halt to
fishing within the Bay. By continuing with their trade the fishermen were seen to disavow the
lead actors (i.e. the scientists), bringing an end to the original network of actors. In the light of
this, Callon (1986) believed that new alliances may subsequently form and new networks
become established, within which, those actors that were enrolled in the previous network may
be re-defined in accordance with the objectives of the new representative (e.g. the fishermen).
Accordingly, actor-network theorists argue that, constructing networks, establishing power
relations and defining both agency and structure are not straightforward processes which can
be discerned through a priori definitions and theories (Latour, 1987).
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Fig. 3.4. The Process of Enrolment (Source: adapted from Callon, 1986)
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Rather, they will be determined through a dynamic and interactive process of associations that
may span a variety of spatial and temporal scales. As CaIlon (1986:224) explains:
"understanding what sociologists generally call power relationships means describing
the way in which actors are definea associated and simultaneously obhged to remain
faithful to their alliances. The repertoire of translation ... permits an exploration of how
afew obtain the right to express and to represent ihe many silent actors of the social
and natural worlds they have mobil,sed".
In recent years, an increasing number of social scientists have turned to Callon's sociology of
translation in order to understand how a myriad of actors, from the global to the local interact
and establish power relations with one another (Murdoch, 1995; Ahson, 1997). Of particular
concern to this thesis are two specific ESRC funded research programmes which have applied
and advocated the use of an actor-network approach in analyses of the social, economic and
political restructuring of the UK's countryside. First, in their study of the changing construction
of the rural land development process, Marsden Ct al. (1993) identified that, at the local,
national and transitional levels, economic actors, regulatory planning systems and local
political actors are all involved in shaping and determining the future of specific developments
within the wider countryside. Given these observations, Marsden et a!. (1993:129) went on to
consider complex conceptual questions:
"What kinds of relationships might we expect to find between economic and political
actors operating at the national and transitional levels, and such actors operating
locally? How do the forces of economic change interact with regulatory powers to
condition local outcomes? What scope do locally based actors have to resist or
sigmficantly alter such outcomes? '
Recognising that traditional sociological theories provide little conceptualisation of the
interplay between structures and agencies at any spatial scale, Marsden Ct al. (1993) drew
upon Callon's sociology of translation in order to fully understand the power relations of actors
across a spectrum of traditionally fixed dichotomous categories, such as the technical,
economic, political, social, local, and global. While Marsden et al. (1993) were keen to assert
that Callon's analysis should only ever be treated as an "insightful exemplar" of how power
relations and networks of associations are constructed, they conclude that:
"this methodology ... [of actor-networks] ... seems to us essential if we are to
understand rural change in an increasingly differentiated countryside. We caimot
simply 'read off' action from some pre-given rural social structure or rural economy.
We must 'follow' actors as they enter into and construct networks of social relations.
These networks give rise to the processes of economic, social and political change that
form the rural and provide the context for the next round of restructuring" (p190-191).
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hi the second ESRC research programme 6 that focused on 'countryside change, farming and
pollution', Lowe et a!. (1997) emulated the arguments of Marsden Ct al. (1993) concerning the
applicability and utility of the actor-network approach within contemporary rural studies.
According to Clark and Lowe (1992), a whole host of structures and actors are entwined
within the process of farm pollution regulation. "There are entities known as farmers, advisers,
pollution inspectors, scientific researchers, technicians, civil servants, farms, laboratories,
cows, wheat, sluny, effluent tanks, isoproturon, silage, wild oats, oxygen meter, fines . . .and so
on" (p21). In this context, Lowe et al. (1997) went on to assert that, in seeking to analyse the
regulatory process of farm pollution, they must seek to adopt a methodology that would enable
them to "encompass this assemblage of actors and the interactions that take place between
them". Following Marsden et at. (1993), the PATCH team chose to adopt the actor-network
approach, whereupon they followed the key actors involved in the farm pollution story:
farmers, pollution inspectors and advisers - analysing how they sought to persuade, enrol and
represent one another in the implementation of pollution regulation. Having conducted their
empirical analysis, Lowe et at. (1997) went onto outline how Callon's sociology of translation
had provided an extremely useful exemplar for understanding how farm pollution actors
interact and establish power relations throughout the regulatory process.
Drawing upon the experiences of these rural research studies, it would appear that where this
thesis seeks to analyse the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer within
their micro and macro-societal contexts, the actor-network approach offers an epistemological
and methodological framework that stretches far beyond the conceptual boundaries of Lipsky's
theory of street-level bureaucracy. Adopting a non-deterministic approach to structural
constraints and agency relations, the actor-network approach strips away Lipsky's predefined
concepts of street-level bureaucrats' interests, autonomy, decision-making strategies and
relationships with their bureaucratic superiors and recipients of policy. This is not to deny that
the street-level bureaucrat is an autonomous and powerful actor. Empirical evidence supports
Lipsky's theonsation (see section 2.5). However, by 'wiping the slate clean' of predefined
theories and concepts, the actor-network approach may help analysis to understand how the
agri-environmental implementer interacts with the myriad of 'new' actors involved in the
implementation of the UK's agri-environmental schemes. Further, how power relations are
constructed and distributed within the agri-environmental implementation process. As Latour
(1986:273) explains:
"to understand power, one must examine how actors enrol, convince and enlist others
into their life worlds'
6This is the Pollution, Agriculture and Technology Change programme (PATCH) It was conducted by
researchers at University College London, the University of Bath, and, the Royal Agricultural College,
Cirencester.
90
Thus, focusing upon concepts of persuasion and enrollment within a non-deterministic
framework, the actor-network approach offers this research an opportunity to 'throw the
analytical net' wider than Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis of the street-level bureaucrat,
and, observe and examine a multiplicity of associations between those structural and agency
actors that may be involved in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes.
3.6	 Conclusion
Drawing together the various sections of this chapter, it is evident that considerable conceptual
and theoretical questions have been raised concerning the role and influence of the
agri-environmental implementer. As the chapter initially outlined, contemporary agricultural
policy makers have placed considerable emphasis on the role of the FRCA P0 in the
implementation of agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales. Given farmers' innate
conservatism and scepticism toward new agricultural technologies and policies, MAFF
recognise that many farmers will be reluctant to participate in the schemes. However, they
insist that, as on-farm advisors and implementers of the 'new' agri-environmental schemes, the
POs have successfully persuaded and encouraged many farmers to implement the voluntary
schemes. Despite support from historical literature and contemporary commentators' however,
it was evident from existing research studies that the role and influence of the
agri-environmental implementer is open to question.
As the chapter reveals there are a number of actors involved in the formulation and
implementation of agn-environmental policy, who may potentially influence the outcome and
'success' of MAFF's voluntary agri-environmental schemes. It is widely acknowledged, for
example, that farmers are powerful autonomous decision-makers who may accept or reject the
notion of agn-environmental participation. Further, the potential power of 'new'
agri-environmental actors was revealed. In recent years, it is widely recognised that, with the
advent of post-productivism, the elite agricultural policy community has been forced to open
up to new interest groups, most notably environmental agencies and ENGOs. At the national
level of agri-environmental policy making, contemporary environmentalists currently enjoy
close working relations with agricultural policy makers. They are frequently consulted
wherever new schemes are developed or existing schemes reviewed, and, in some cases, they
have evidently become active policy formulators, designing and administering new schemes on
behalf of MAFF. At the local level, the extent to which new pressure groups are involved in
the implementation of agri-environmental schemes is less conclusive. However, as the chapter
discusses, a number of research studies have revealed that a network of 'new'
agri-environmental advisors has emerged within the countryside, offering on-farm conservation
advice to farmers and landowners who appear willing to accept and implement their advice. In
seeking to analyse the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer, therefore, it
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was recognised that analysis must examine the FRCA P0 in relation to all actors operating in
the agri-environmental implementation process. As the chapter argues, failure to do so will
prevent the research from gaining an accurate representation of how influential the
agri-environmental implementer is.
In this context, the applicability of Lipsky's theoiy of street-level bureaucracy was brought into
question. Despite Lipsky's detailed theorisation of local-level hnplementers, it is asserted that
the micro-sociological perspective adopted by Lipsky, would not facilitate the research to
holistically analyse the agri-environmental implementer in relation to their micro and
macro-social contexts. As an alternative analytical framework the actor-network approach
appears to offer the research a useflil conceptual and methodological framework in which to
analyse the role and relative influence of the agn-environmental implementer. In seeking to
fully understand inter-actor relations it asserts that analysts need to abandon traditional theories
of society and instead seek to analyse how individual actors, such as the agri-environmental
implementer, interpret and react to external agency and structural factors. Further, how they
construct networks of association with other actors. How these relations are maintained or
contested. It is only by analysing how actors interact with one another that analysts are
believed to be able to gain a greater understanding of how actors may gain power and
influence over others.
In seeking to adopt the actor-network approach in an analysis of the role and relative influence
of the agri-environmental iinplementer, questions are raised as to the methodology by which
the research may analyse how the agri-environmental implementer interprets and defines
external structures and agencies; how they construct networks of associations with other
agri-environmental actors; and how they may gain power and influence over the
agri-enviromnental implementation process. As the following chapter details, the actor-network
approach has outhned a methodology in which actors may be 'followed' as they construct




Following the debate within Part ll where it was concluded that the actor-network approach
may provide the research with a useful conceptual framework in which to holistically analyse
the role and relative influence of the individual agri-environmental unpiementer, this section of
the thesis turns to the methodological principles of the actor-network approach and seeks
to outline how they were applied within an analysis of FRCA POs. In doing so, Chapter 4
provides a justification of the case study areas selected for the research and details the
methodological processes by which quantitative and qualitative information concerning
the role and inter-actor relations of the FRCA P0 was collated.
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Chapter 4
Applying The Actor-Network Methodology
4.1	 Introduction
In seeking to adopt the actor-network approach as an appropriate conceptual framework in
which to analyse the role and relative influence of the FRCA P0 a methodology advocated by
actor-network theorists was applied in two case study areas - the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills Environmentally Sensitive Areas (ESAs). This chapter seeks to outhne rthe actor-network
methodology adopted in this study. In addition, it provides a detailed justification of the study
areas chosen, and outlines how interviews were conducted within the two areas. The chapter
then goes on to outline the decision to adopt a quantitative postal questioiinaire within the
research. Particular attention is paid to the structure of the questionnaire and the questions that
were asked in order to elicit information that would assist in the analysis of the POs'
agri-environmental implementation network.
4.2	 Actor-Network Methodology
Methodologically the actor-network approach has its roots within Glaser and Strauss' (1967)
Grounded Theoiy. Abandoning a priori definitions and ideas, actor-network theorists (e.g.
Callon, 1986; Latour, 1986, 1987) advocate that researchers should inductively follow those
actors both enrolling and being enrolled in actor-networks so as to establish how power
relations and structural processes are defined and contested. In doing so, Callon (1986) argues
that the researcher should remain neutral throughout the process of observation and data
collection. They should refrain "from judging the way in which the actors analyse the society
which surrounds them" (Callon, 1986:200), and should not define actors or power relations if
these are still being negotiated and constructed. Instead, the researcher should remain sensitive
to the meanings and definitions that actors ascnbe to the world in which they live (Marsden Ct
al., 1993; Morris and Andrews, 1995). Actors should be left to speak for themselves, to reveal
their own ideas, definitions, objectives and associations with other actors (CaiJon, 1986;
Latour, 1986, 1987).
In seeking to follow this actor-network methodology, there has been a propensity amongst
researchers to adopt ethnographic and qualitative methodologies such as semi-structured
interviews, case studies, oral histories and participant or non-participant observational
94
techniques (Marsden et a!, 1993; Lowe et al., 1997). It is widely acknowledged that such
qualitative methodologies facilitate an intensive analysis of actors' socio-cultural definitions,
objectives and experiences of their macro-structural environment (Walker, 1985; Burgess,
1984; McCracken, 1988; Hamel et at., 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995). As Ackroyd
and Hughes' (1992:132) eloquently explain, they enable analyses of:
"... the interactive, interpretative and negotiated basis of social life, created and
sustained by the meanings actors use to make sense of and interpret the world in which
they live ... the social structure is seen more as a kind of multitude of scenic processes,
constantly moving and changing as actors negotiate and renegotiate their course of
action. An essential part of this is ... [that they] ... see the society from the point of view
of the actor concerned since it is this which shapes his or her course of action '
However, while the methodologies of ethnographers and qualitative researchers assist the
actor-network theorist, ethnographers have highlighted a major discrepancy in the
actor-network methodology. Throughout the analysis of actor-networks, Callon (1986) asserts
that the researcher must remain distant and agnostic to the research field. As Drinkwater
(1992:368) argues, however, "it is inconsistent not to acknowledge the ... active nature of the
researcher in shaping fieldwork encounter ... the researcher plays . . . [a central role] ... in the
selection and interpretation of field material". This has been further supported by many
ethnographers who assert that researchers cannot be neutral within the field (McCracken,
1988; Foddy, 1993; Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995; Revill and Seymour, 1996). The
"researcher is the instrument" in qualitative field research (Patton, 1990:14). They are integral
actors in the construction of actor-networks and must, therefore, question and reflect upon their
own positionality, ideas and objectives in relation to the respondents and research process. As
Outhwaite (1985:29) argues:
"we cannot simply record in an objective and value free way the practices and beliefs of
other human beings ... it is precisely the encounter between the social scientist's own
behefs and practices and those of the people he or she is studying which makes up
whatever understanding we can have of another social reality".
In this context, ethnographic and qualitative researchers have highlighted the importance of
incorporating reflexive accounts into field research. These accounts often include detailed
descriptions of the researcher's feelings during the period of data collection, their interpretation
of the respondent, interview location and general perceptions on the relationship between
themselves as the researcher and the researched. Indeed, despite Callon' s (1986) reluctance to
acknowledge researchers as integral actors within emerging networks, many researchers
adopting the actor-network approach have supported their qualitative methodologies with
reflexive accounts (Ward, 1994, Revill and Seymour, 1996) - an action which is endorsed in
this research.
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4.3	 Applying the Actor-Network Approach in the Analysis of the FRCA P0
Following Callon's (1986) actor-network methodology, in conjunction with the principles of
reflexivity, the research sought to conduct an in-depth qualitative analysis of the role and
relative influence that the FRCA P0 possesses in the implementation of agri-environmental
schemes in England and Wales. In doing so, a case study approach was adopted where
analysis focused upon one UK agri-environmental scheme - the ESA scheme, and in turn two
specific ESAs - the Breckland ESA and the Cotswold Hills ESA.
4.3.1 Case Study Areas
Faced with an extensive analytical subject, it has been common practice for many researchers
to narrow their focus of study and analyse a specific case within the research sample. In doing
so, it has been widely advocated that the case study approach is one of the most suitable
methods to use when conducting in-depth qualitative analyses of a large sample. Indeed,
Hamel et al. (1993:39) have gone as far to assert that "the case study approach has proven to
be in complete harmony with the three key works that charactense any qualitative method:
describing, understanding and explaining". As such, the case study serves as "the most
complete and detailed sort of presentation of the subject under investigation", which has been
made possible "by giving special attention to totalising in the observation, reconstruction and
analysis of the objects under study" (Zonabend, 1992:52).
Despite its advantages, however, it is widely acknowledged that the case study approach is
beset with many methodological problems. According to Hamel et al. (1993) the notion of bias
and subjectivity are thought, for example, to be inherent features of a methodological approach
which, to a large degree, is dependent on the perceptions and decisions f the researcher who,
in most cases, will ultimately decide on which case studies will be chosen for investigation.
Moreover, concern has been widely expressed as to the extent to which many case studies fail
to represent the wider sample under investigation. In this context, Hamel et al. (1993) assert
that when adopting a case study approach researchers must accept that "the scope of the study
is only relative to that case, and, accordingly, can only be considered microscopic. From this
view point, the case study only permits the understanding of a single facet that is intrinsic to
the case under investigation". Indeed, in selecting the case studies for this research it was
acknowledged that the analysis would be specific to the agn-environmental implementer within
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. From these case studies conclusions may be made
concerning the wider implications of the research, but it must be stressed that these will be
largely speculative in nature (see Chapter 10).
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Justification of Case Study Selection
Of the six agri-environmental schemes currently implemented by the FRCA P0 in England and
Wales, the ESA scheme was chosen as a case study owing to its established histosy in the
development of UK and European agri-environmental policy (see Table 1.1). As Chapter 3
outlined, the UK's BGMCS effectively acted as a prototype for the national ESA scheme
which set out the principles of voluntarism and zonal targeting which was later to be
encapsulated within EU Regulations 797/85/EEC and 2078 92/EEC (Whitby and Lowe, 1994).
Today, the ESA scheme has maintained its status as the flagship of MAFF's commitment to
agri-environmental objectives (Potter, 1998). In the recent Agriculture Select Committee
Enquiry on 'ESAs and other UK agri-environmental schemes', MAFF (1996a) asserted, for
example, that the budgetary allocation for ESAs in 1998/99 would total £50 million which, as
Table 4.1 illustrates, is a large proportion of the UK's total agn-environmental budget.
Agri-Environmental Scheme 	 Expenditure Forecast for 1998/99 (f 000)
Environmentally Sensitive Areas 	 50, 429
Countryside Stewardship 	 27, 032
Nitrate Sensitive Areas 	 9, 906
Habitat Scheme	 3, 769
Countryside Access Scheme 	 2, 285
Moorland Scheme	 1, 768
Organic Aid Scheme	 1,155
TOTAL	 96,344
Table 4.1. MAFF Expenditure on agri-environmental schemes in England (MAFF, 1996a)
There are currently 38 ESAs in the UK, covering 986,027 hectares (MAFF, 1996a) (Fig. 4.1).
The first eight were designated by MAFF in 1987, followed by three further 'rounds' of ESA
designation in 1988, 1993 and more recently in 1994 (Table 4.2).
Second Round of ESA
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Breck/andESA
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Fig. 4.1. Environmentally Sensitive Areas in the UK (Source: Vhitby and Lowe, 1994)
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Given the qualitative nature of the actor-network methodology, it was evident that, m seeking
to analyse the role and influence of the FRCA P0 in the implementation of an ESA scheme, a
decision had to be made as to which of these ESAs the research should focus on. Initially the
selection procedure was assisted by eliminating the ESAs located within Scotland and
Northern Ireland as they are not implemented by FRCA POs. Rather than selecting just one of
the 29 remaining ESAs as a case study, however, it was felt that by analysing two highly
differentiated ESAs the empirical analysis may reveal interesting conclusions concerning the
influence that different social, natural and political environments may have on the role and
influence of the FRCA P0. In this context, the Cotswold Hills ESA (Fig. 4.2) and the
Breckland ESA (Fig. 4.3) appeared to be suitable case studies.
It is recognised that ESAs are characteristically unique in tenns of their objectives and
prescriptions. As Table 1.1 outlined, each ESA was originally designated to safeguard the
distinctive landscape, wildlife and historic interest of specific areas of the UK. However, as the
following paragraphs will outline, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs are further highly
differentiated in terms of their age, 'typology', administration, their interaction with other
environmental designations, and participation levels, which all generate a multiplicity of
questions concerning the possible influence that these factors may have on the way in which
FRCA POs implement their respective schemes.
Age of ESA: Firstly, it is evident that the two ESAs are different in terms of their length of
existence. As Table 4.1 outlines, the Breckland ESA was one of the early ESAs to be
designated in 1988, while the Cotswold Hills ESA, designated in 1994 is a relatively new
agri-environmental scheme. According to agricultural extension scientists there is a relatively
strong correlation between the age of a policy and the implementory strategies adopted by
agricultural advisors and extension workers (Benor et al., 1984; Farrington and Martin, 1987;
Roling, 1988). As a new policy is formulated and introduced to a farming community, Benor et
al. (1984) insist that the individual extension officer will initially seek to adopt a role as a
public relations officer, promoting and marketing new policies, often to a sceptical policy
target group. In doing so, extension officers are believed to adopt a number of promotional
strategies, such as publishing and distributing promotional literature to farmers, orgarnsing
regional and local farm meetings, arranging lectures, and conducting farm walks. Throughout
the penodicity of a 'new' policy, it is recognised that agricultural extension officers may
continue to utilise such promotional techniques. However, generally, van den Ban and
Hawkins (1988) argue that, as time progresses, the promotional role of the individual extension
officer will retreat and be replaced by a new more managerial role. In this context, agricultural
extension officers are expected to devise and adopt a programme of activities geared towards















Fig. 4.2. Location of the Cotswold Hills ESA (Source: author)
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Fig. 4.3. Location of the Breckland ESA (Source: author)
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Hawkins (1988) suggest that the extension officer may conduct individual farm visits where, on
a regular basis, they may visit fanners in order to offer continuous on-going advice and to
ensuse that the individual fanner is implementing the policy as efficiently and effectively as
possible.
Drawing upon this conceptual literature questions may be raised concerning the differentiation
in the ages of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs and the influence that this may have on
the implementation strategies adopted by the respective POs. For example, as the P0 of a
younger ESA, has the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 adopted a greater promotional role than the
Breckland ESA P0? Further, will the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 be forced to adopt more
promotional strategies, such as group meetings and farm walks, compared to the Breckland
ESAPO?
'Typology': As questions are raised concerning the influence that the different ages of the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA schemes may have on the agri-environmental
implementation process, it is evident from previous research that differences between two
ESAs in terms of the 'typology' of the schemes may further influence the decisions and actions
of the individual agri-environmental implementer. Fundamentally, the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs are two different 'types' of ESA schemes. The Breckland ESA may be classified as
a 'part-farm' scheme, seeking to enrol specific habitats into ESA agreements by offering
financial incentives to those farmers whose land encloses the targeted habitats - namely river
valley grasslands and heathiands (see appendix 2). The Cotswold Hills ESA, on the other hand,
is among one of the 'whole-farm' schemes currently implemented in the UK. Within this
scheme any farmer or landowner with over 0.25 hectares may enter into an agreement with
MAFF to farm all of their land within the ESA in accordance with pre-specifled
environmentally sensitive practices. Although farmers within the Cotswold Hills ESA may
agree to undertake more demanding conservation or restoration practices on specific areas of
their land, the ESA scheme does not set out to target individual habitats in the same way as the
Breckland ESA scheme (see appendix 2).
According to Wilson (1997), the typology of an individual scheme may influence the
implementation strategies adopted by scheme administrators and implementers. In his study of
the Cambrian Mountains (CM) ESA Wilson (1997) found, for example, that given the targeted
nature of the 'part-farm' scheme, the P0 set out to specifically enrol and advise farmers whose
land fell within the ESA habitat target areas - most notably, 'semi-natural rough grazing',
broad-leaved woodland and hay meadows. According to Wilson (1997), this invariably
involved the POs targeting the larger farms within the Cambrian Mountains, as the larger farms
evidently possessed "larger areas of non-intensively used farmland, i.e. land eligible for the
CM ESA scheme" (p207). Where POs are in charge of implementing 'whole-farm' schemes,
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such as the Cotswold Hills ESA, Wilson (1997) goes on to infer that a different set of
implementation strategies may be adopted by the FRCA POs. hnplementing schemes that do
not seek to target specific habitats, the POs may not have any recourse to target individual
farmers, but is this the case? Do the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs adopt different
implementation strategies in accordance with the typology of the individual schemes? Does the
Breckland ESA P0, for example, set out to specifically target those farmers with areas of
heathiand and/or nver valley grassland on their land, while the Cotswold Hills ESA P0, in
charge of implementing a whole-farm scheme has no need to target specific habitats and/or
farmers? In short, how does the nature of the agri-environmental scheme influence the
decisions and actions of the individual ESA P0?
Administration: As differences in the age and typology of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs raise questions concerning the role and influence of the ESA POs, the differential
administrative structure of the two ESAs leads analysis to further question the contexts in
which the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs implement their respective schemes. As
Chapter 3 discussed, each ESA is implemented by an FRCA P0 who advises farmers eligible
to participate in the schemes, and who manages the schemes on behalf of MAFF by ensuring
that participants adhere to the schemes' prescriptions. However, wherever an ESA covers an
extensive area and/or there are a large number of agri-environmental participants, the
individual P0 may possess administrative support in the form of assistant project officers
(APOs) (see Chapter 5 for detailed discussion). As an ESA with a relatively high percentage of
participants (approximately 70%), the Cotswold Hills ESA, for example, is currently
implemented by a team of POs, consisting of one P0 and five APOs (White, 1996). hi
comparison, the Breckland ESA, supporting a much smaller percentage of agri-environmental
participants (approximately 23%) is implemented by only one FRCA P0 (White, 1996). Given
such administrative differentiation questions can be raised as to how this may shape the role
and influence that the individual Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs can exert within the
implementation of their respective schemes. With the advisoiy and administrative support of
five APOs, has the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 been able to persuade and advise many more
farmers to participate in the ESA scheme than if operating alone? Further, how has the
Cotswold Hills ESA accommodated the role and activities of the APOs? Has the Cotswold
Hills ESA P0 adopted specific implementation strategies that enable a team of POs, rather
than an individual officer, to implement the ESA scheme? Likewise, how does the Breckland
ESA P0 operate as a sole P0? Does this influence the strategies that the P0 adopts to
implement the Breckland ESA scheme? Is the P0 ever forced to seek assistance from other
sources, and if so how does this influence the network of actors in which the ESA P0
operates?
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Environmental Designations: As Chapter 3 outlined in detail, it is of further interest to this
research to analyse the presence and influence of 'new' agn-environmental actors within the
agri-environmental implementation process. In particular, the research seeks to analyse the
influence that local environmental agencies and ENGOs have on the role and relative influence
of the individual FRCA P0. Have environmentalists, for example, eroded the power of the P0
by directly influencing farmers' agri-environmental decision-making strategies or, like their
national counterparts, have they constructed a role as a local environmental advisor whom the
FRCA P0 will call upon for help and assistance in implementing the individual
agri-environmental schemes? In order to address these questions, the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs are suitable case study areas given the number of environmental agencies and
ENGOs who may, potentially, be involved in the agri-environmental implementation process.
As Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 outline, there are a number of environmental designations situated within
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA boundaries. Both ESAs support SSSIs and County
Wildlife Sites, and it is evident that National Nature Reserves (NNRs) are situated within the
ESAs. Through their administration of these environmental designations, it can be anticipated
that groups such as English Nature and County Wildlife Trusts will, to some extent, be
involved with the ESA schemes (see section 3.4.2). In their evidence to the recent Agriculture
Select Committee enquiry, MAFF (1996a) asserted that it is a duty of the P0 to liaise with the
appropriate environmental organisations wherever an ESA agreement coincides with an
existing environmental designation, but in what form will this liaison take place? Will the
environmental agencies and ENGOs offer advice to the ESA POs, or, during this liaison, will
they take on a more active role in the implementation and administration of those ESA
agreements coinciding with existing environmentally protected areas?
While the existence of environmental designations common to both the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs raise questions concerning the role of environmentalists within the
agri-environmental implementation process, there are evidently some differences between the
two ESAs in terms of the quantity and specificity of existing environmental sites, which raise
further questions in relation to the role and influence of local environmental organisations
within the implementation of individual agri-environmental schemes. As Figs. 4.4 and 4.5
illustrate, the Breckland ESA supports a substantially larger area and number of SSSIs and
NNRs than the Cotswold Hills ESA. Given that English Nature is the statutory body in charge
of administering the SSSI and NNR system, will the number of such designations in an ESA
detennine the level of involvement that English Nature has with the implementation of that
ESA? Further, it is evident from Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 that despite many commonalties between the
two ESAs in terms of the type of environmental designations present, there are some
differences - most notably where the Cotswold Hills ESA is part of the wider Cotswold
AONB. Of interest to this research is the extent to which such differences may influence and
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contact with. As Chapter 7 will detail, the Cotswold AONB is implemented and managed by
an advisory committee comprised of a number of individuals from representative bodies such
as the CPRE and County Councils. Given that the Cotswold Hills ESA is part of this
designation, will the AONB advisory committee be enrolled in the P0's actor-network? if so,
will the implementation strategies of the Brecidand and Cotswold Hills ESA POs reflect their
differential actor-networks?
Participation Rates: Finally, in seeking to analyse the role and relative influence of the
agri-enviroiunental implementer, the Breckland ESA and the Cotswold Hills ESA offers the
research a useful comparison of participation rates, from which analysis may seek to discern
the extent to which agri-environmental participation may be influenced by the individual FRCA
P0. According to MAFF (1996a), in 1996, approximately 70% of farmers eligible to
participate in the Cotswold Hills ESA had signed ESA agreements, while only 23° of eligible
participants within the Breckland ESA had participated in the scheme. As Chapter 3 outlined,
it has been widely acknowledged throughout agn-environmental research studies that a number
of farmer and scheme factors have influenced participatory rates within individual schemes
(see Brotherton, 1989,1991; Moms and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1996, 1997). The level of
income possessed by an individual farmer, and the size of their farm have, for example, been
found to greatly influence their decisions to participate in a scheme, but what influence has the
FRCA P0 had on farmers' agri-environmental decision-making processes?
4.3.2 Following Actors in the Case Studies
In seeking to analyse whether such differences between the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAS have had any influence on the composition of actor-networks constructed by the
individual POs, and consequently on how the FOs implement the ESA schemes, the research
has attempted to adopt Callon's (1986) actor-network methodology and follow the POs as they
implement their respective ESAs - observing and analysing the different actors enrolled into
the POs' implementation network. In doing so, actor-network theorists assert that a snowball
technique common within many qualitative studies (e.g. Burgess, 1984; Kingdon, 1984;
Johnson, 1990) should be adopted, where the researcher initially starts their analysis with the
main actor under investigation - in this case the FRCA P0. Callon (1986) asserts that this actor
should be left to speak for himself/herself; to reveal their own definitions, objectives and
associations with other actors. if the actor under investigation reveals that they are in contact
with any other actor(s), then, in accordance with the snowball technique, Callon (1986) asserts
that the researcher must move on and analyse the lifeworids of these 'new' actors. Again, these
actors should be left to speak for themselves and in turn reveal how they operate within the
emerging actor-network. Are they in contact with any other actors who influence and shape
their lifeworlds? if they are then the researcher is again expected to move on to those actors
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mentioned by the 'second' actor and analyse how they construct their decisions, actions, and
associations with other actors. if they reveal that they are in contact with any other actors the
snowball methodology should continue accordingly (Fig. 4.6).
Adopting such a snowball methodology, therefore, the POs implementing the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs were the first individuals to be interviewed, as they were the main actors
under investigation. In seeking to observe and listen to the POs as they speak and reveal their
own beliefs, objectives, feelings and relationships with other actors, the research sought to
emulate other agri-environmental researchers who have adopted the actor-network
methodology (e.g. Ward, 1994; Murdoch and Marsden, 1995; Munton, 1995) by utilising a
non-directive interview technique. Commonly this style of interviewing involves the researcher
holding a list of questions relevant to the aims of the research, however, rather than asking the
interviewee set questions, the researcher lets the respondent guide the structure of the
interview to whatever issue they feel is important to the subject under investigation. The
researcher will only refer to their list of questions whenever the interviewee digresses widely
from the general aims of the research. Adopting such a methodology, Pile (1990) asserts that
each interview will be unique, reflecting the individualism of the respondent, rather than of a
pre-given theoiy or concept.
Although no structured or consistent interview questions were to be adopted within the
research, a pilot interview with a recently retired P0 (made known to the author by an official
within the head office of the FRCA) was conducted, primarily as a means of enabling the
researcher to gain some experience in conducting non-directive interviews. Following the pilot
interview, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs were contacted by letter m the early
months of 1997, to explain the research and to request a convenient time for an interview.
Their co-operation was subsequently secured and they were respectively interviewed in April
and June, 1997. Both interviews took place in the offices of the individual P0 and lasted from
approximately one hour with the Breckland ESA P0, to a two hour discussion with the
Cotswold Hills ESA P0. Both interviews were tape recorded with prior consent from the POs
and subsequently transcribed. Additionally, a detailed account of each interview was made
immediately following the interviews. These accounts included information on the location of
the interview and any unspoken gestures and expressions that helped to contextualise the
respondents' views and perceptions that were expressed throughout the interview.
'7M of the interviews conducted within the Breckland ESA were conducted in April and May, 1997 Within







As the POs spoke of their involvement in the implementation of their respective ESA schemes
they revealed a number of actors who they are in contact with throughout their day to day
work. As Chapter 5 will detail, both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs revealed how
they are in frequent contact with MAFF's Regional Service Centres (RSCs) and their Team
Manager within the FRCAL Chapter 7 will also discuss the fact that the POs spoke of their
contact with local environmental interest groups, drawing particular attention to their role as
agri-environmental agreement holders, and advisers to the P0. In accordance with the
snowball technique advocated by actor-network theorists the research went on to conduct
non-directive interviews with most of the actors whom the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA
POs revealed as being involved in the implementation of their agri-environmental schemes
(Table 4.3).
Breckland ESA	 Cotswold Hills ESA
FRCA Project Officer	 FRCA Project Officer
FRCA Team Manager 	 FRCA Assistant Project Officer
MAFF's Regional Service Centre (RSC) 	 FRCA Team Manager
EnvironmentalManager 	 _______________________________
English Nature Conservation Officer for Norfolk MAFFs Regional Service Centre (RSC)
____________________________________ Environmental Manager
Norfolk Wildlife Trust Breckland Field Officer	 English Nature Conservation Officer for
_______________________________________________ Gloucestershire
Suffolk Wildlife Trust Breckland Field Officer 	 Gloucestershire Wildlife Trust Conservation Office
Brecks Countryside Project Officer 	 Gloucestershire County Archaeologist
RSPB Breckland Officer 	 Gloucestershire FWAG Advisor
Suffolk FWAG Advisor 	 National Trust Officer for Gloucestershire.
Norfolk FWAG Advisor	 AONB Joint Advisory Committee
SuffolkCounty Archaeologist	 ______________________________________
Ministry of Defence Conservation Officer
Directorof Strutt and Parker Farms Ltd. 	 ________________________________________
Game Conservancy Trust Lowland Director
Table 4.3. Actors interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs.
Given the fact that the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs spoke of the majority of these
actors by name, their identification was made simple, and letters requesting interviews were
able to be sent directly to each of the relevant actors. As with the POs, interview dates were
secured with all of the individuals contacted, whereupon the interviews took place in the
offices of the respondents where they varied in length from 30 minutes to two and a half hours.
All of the interviews were tape recorded and supported by reflexive accounts. However, for
one group of actors - namely the farmers - mentioned by the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESA POs, the research initially found it more difficult to identif' and contact specific
individual farmers in order to request and secure interviews.
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Identifying A Farmer Sample
Not surprisingly, in their respective interviews, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs
spoke of the contact, or in some cases the lack of contact, that they have with ESA participants
and non-participants. In these discussions, however, the POs tended to refer to the farmers as a
generic group. In light of a confidentiality clause imposed by MAFF, where the P0 is obliged
to retain the names and addresses of any ESA agreement holder (see Chapter 7), the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESA POs did not reveal the names of any specific farmer or landowner
with whom they were in contact. Throughout their interviews they spoke of their contact with
ESA participants and non-participants in terms of "visits made to an agreement holder" or
"phone calls to non-participants ". On occasion, both POs used the cases of individual farmers
to illustrate their arguments, but they maintained the confidentiality of the farmer and, instead,
used references such as, "there is a farmer, whose got land near ..." or "there was one farmer
who ...". Given MAFF's confidentiality clause the snowball methodology adopted within the
research was presented with a distinct obstacle. Without knowing which specific farmers the
POs are in contact with, how could the research go on to interview farmers and analyse their
involvement in the agri-environmental implementation process? Faced with this problem the
research, for the first time, deviated from the methodology advocated by actor-network
theorists.
Acknowledging that there was a need to analyse the role of the ESA participants and
non-participants in the agri-environmental implementation process, the research drew upon the
methodologies of previous agri-environmental studies and sought to establish an analytical
sample of farmers within both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. In each of the ESAs,
the initial intention was to interview ten participants and ten non-participants. It is recognised
that such a sample is not large enough to support detailed statistical analyses of farmers'
objectives and decisions within the two ESAs. However, the aim of this research is not to
construct a generalised representation of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills farming
communities. Instead, like Pile's (1990) study of Somerset dairy farmers, this research focuses
upon case histories and in-depth qualitative accounts of individuals' objectives and
experiences. Thus, a smaller farmer sample was favoured in order to facilitate in-depth analysis
of each individual case histoiy (see also Burgess, 1984; Johnson, 1990; Foddy, 1993; Hamel Ct
al., 1993). As McCracken (1988:17) argues:
"less is more ... for many [qualitative] research projects, eight respondents will be
perfectly sufficient. The quantitatively trained social scientist reels at the thought of so
small a sample', but it is important to remember that this group is not chosen to
represent some part of the larger world. It offers, msieaa an opportunity to glimpse the
complicated character, organisations and logic of culture '
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In seeking to construct a sample of farmers to be analysed many agri-environmental
researchers have turned to the local Yellow Pages busmess directories as one of the most
accessible and adequate samplmg frames for contemporary research studies (Potter and
Gasson., 1988; Scainbier, 1989; Bishop, 1990; Morris and Potter, 1995; Holloway and llbeiy,
1996). In a recent paper, Burton and Wilson (in press) have expressed some caution, however,
over the use of the Yellow Pages as an appropriate sampling frame for agri-enviromnental
research They argue that the Yellow Pages may exclude less-commercial or 'life style' farmers,
who, although still deriving much of their income from farming, are generally more
conservation-oriented in their environmental management approach and farm on a lower profit
margin. Essentially, by utilising the Yellow Pages, therefore, Burton and Wilson (in press)
argue that such agri-environmentally significant individuals may be excluded from research
studies. Earlier, Errington (1985) had recognised that there were a number of limitations and
potential sources of bias when using the Yellow Pages. "It is inadequate because particular
types of farm and farmer tend to be excluded thus giving a biased sample of the entire
population" (Errington, 1985:252). Despite this one primary criticism, however, Errington
(1985) went on to conclude that the Yellow Pages provides a relatively accessible, effective
and accurate sampling frame. Indeed, in their sharp critique of this sampling frame, Burton and
Wilson (in press) were forced to conclude that faced with little alternatives the Yellow Pages,
in conjunction with recognition of its limitations, continues to present itself as the most
appropriate farmer sampling frame. Thus, in the absence of any names and addresses of
farmers who the POs were in contact with, the research drew upon a combination of local
Yellow Pages business directories and Ordnance Survey (OS) 1:25,000 maps in order to
establish the farmer samples within both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs.
Initially, all farm holdings situated within both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA
boundaries were identified on the 1:25,000 OS maps of the study areas. The farm holdings
were then compared to those listed in the local Yellow Pages in order to obtain the names and
addresses of farmers occupying these holdings. Given the small sample size requirement of
qualitative research (McCracken, 1988; Johnson, 1990; Foddy, 1993), not all of those farm
holdings identified in the Yellow Pages were contacted. Rather, given the target of the sample
size, twenty farmers were contacted within each area. Often, researchers conducting qualitative
studies, select their infonnants on the basis of personal acquaintance (Gasson, 1981; Pile,
1990), or through previously conducted surveys (Ward, 1994). However, faced with limited
knowledge and connections with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills farming communities, the
twenty farmers within each area had to be selected randomly, using a computer based random
number generator (Oppenheini, 1992).
Once the names and addresses of twenty farmers in each ESA had been selected a letter was
sent explaining the aims of the research and asking for the farmers co-operation with the
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ensuing interviews. Additionally, the farmers were asked to complete and return (by means of
a stamped addressed envelope) four initial questions (see appendix 3), in order to confirm their
name and full address as often the Yellow Pages does not provide such detailed infonnation,
and, further, to reveal whether they are ESA participants or non-participants.
Within the Breckland ESA, seventy percent of the twenty farmers returned these initial
questions, compared to an eighty percent response rate in the Cotswold Hills ESAs. However,
when the initially unresponsive farmers were contacted by telephone they all agreed to
participate in the research. Thus, as intended a farmer sample of twenty farmers in both the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs was established. In terms of the distribution of
participants and non-participants the fanner sample within the Breckland ESA was evenly
distributed, whereas in the Cotswold Hills ESA only a third of the fanner sample were
non-participants (Table. 4.4). Given that the current overall percentage of participants within
the Cotswold Hills ESA is believed to be approximately 70 percent (Appleton, 1997), it was
felt that the low number of non-participants in the farmer sample population was simply
reflective of the whole ESA, and would not impede the qualitative nature of the research.
_________________	 Breckland ESA




Table. 4.4. Farmer sample population in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA.
Once the farmers' co-operation was gained, either through receipt of the completed questions
or through telephone conversations, each farmer within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs was contacted in order to arrange a convenient time for interview. Returning to the
actor-network methodology, non-directive interviews were conducted with the farmers where
they were left to speak for themselves, to reveal their own agri-environmental definitions,
objectives and inter-actor relations. Each interview lasted from 30 minutes to an hour and a
half; depending upon the willingness of the respondent to converse at length. Further,
continuing the same approach adopted in earlier interviews, all of the interviews conducted
with the farmers were tape recorded with the prior consent of the respondent, and a detailed
reflexive account of the interview was constructed, noting in particular where the interview
took place, and any unspoken gestures that may help to contextuahse the farmers' views and
opinions expressed during the interview.
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Resuming the Snowball Methodology
Following the farmer interviews the research sought to resume the snowball methodology of
the actor-network approach. Throughout their interviews the actors initially revealed by the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs spoke of a number of associations that they have
established with other actors during their involvement with the implementation of the ESA
schemes (Fig. 4.7). As Chapter 6 will detail, a number of participants in the Breckland ESA
revealed how they are in contact with the Game Conservancy Trust for advice and infonnation
pertaining to the management of conservation headlands for game rearing. Further, many
participants and non-participants in the two ESAs revealed how they are in close contact with
their landlords, who they assert have considerable influence on their decisions to implement the
ESA schemes. Concomitantly, a number of the field officers from local environmental interest
groups evidently in contact with the ESA POs went on to reveal in their interviews that they
possess close working relations with their parent organisations and other local
environmentalists (see Chapter 7). Again, following the snowball technique these actors were
in turn interviewed, but at what point was the research to stop following the agri-environmental
actors? According to actor-network theorists, the researcher will complete the snowball
methodology when it becomes apparent that no new actors are enrolled in the individual
actor-networks under investigation. As Chapter 9 will discuss in detail, however, knowing
when and where the networks end is a much more difficult process than advocated by the
actor-network theorists. In reality, the researcher often has to make a personal judgement when
to cease following the actor-networks. Naturally, this will introduce elements of bias and
personal interpretation, further highlighting the important need for researchers to be reflexive
throughout their field work. In the field, it was apparent that for many actors their ESA
implementation networks 'died a natural death'. For many of the local environmental interest
groups, for example, their implementation networks evidently ceased at their parent
organisation, where during interviews with the officials from these organisations they revealed
that in relation to the ESA schemes they had not established any 'new' links with other actors
(see Fig. 4.7). However, where the networks of actors, such as that of MAFF's and many
farmers', appeared to extend into the European arena, a personal judgement had to be made to
stop the snowball methodology at a level of analysis that would be attainable given the
financial and temporal limitations of the research. The cut-off point for the methodology was
chosen to be the national level of analysis, where interviews were conducted with officials
within MAFF and the FRCA head offices. Where individual actor-networks appeared to
extend further, the research sought to draw upon existing research studies which focused on
















4.4	 Quantitative Methodology - Postal Questionnaire
Given the qualitative nature of the research conducted in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs, it was recognised that despite one of the primary aims of the thesis - to further an
understanding of the role and relative influence of the agri-environmental implementer - little
was known about the FRCA POs/APOs as a body of officials employed by MAFF to
implement agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales. What gender and age, for
example, do POs/APOs tend to be? What is the educational background of the average P0?
What form of training, if any, have they received? Have they any previous experience with
implementing agricultural or environmental policies? By asking such questions it was felt that a
detailed profile of the UK's agri-environmental implementers may be compiled and used to
contextualise the qualitative analysis which specifically elicited infonnation on the
relationships that the POs have with other agri-environmental actors.
In order to acquire this background information on the characteristics of the UK's
agri-enviromnental implementers a quantitative postal questionnaire was sent to all FRCA POs
and APOs currently implementmg agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales (see
appendix 4). The APOs were included in this extensive survey as preliminary analysis of policy
documentation revealed that very little difference exists between the implementation roles of
the POs and APOs. They are both local-level implementers employed within the FRCA, who
work together at the ground level to implement the agri-environmental schemes. The one
hundred percent PO/APO sample was made known to the author by the FRCA Contract
Manager. As Chapter 5 will detail, the FRCA Contract Manager is an official within the FRCA
whose primary duty is to administer and oversee the employment of the FRCA POs/APOs.
Early on in the research process, a preliminary interview was conducted with the Contract
Manager where the objectives of the research were discussed. Initially the FRCA Contract
Manager expressed his concerns that such an independent survey may prove damaging to the
future of the FRCA POs/APOs. He insisted that the research proposal must be discussed with
MAFF, before any further work could commence. Although the research was momentarily
halted by these discussions, the concerns of the FRCA and MAFF were extremely indicative of
the level of importance that agncultural policy makers attach to the POs/APOs. As Chapter 3
discussed, MAFF has invested a large proportion of their agri-environmental budget into the
employment of the FRCA POs/APOs, and it appeared from the FRCA Contract Manager that
it is an investment which MAFF are keen to defend (see Chapter 5). However, despite their
initial hesitation as to the feasibility of the research being undertaken, MAFF and the FRCA
did eventually agree to co-operate with the postal questionnaire by providing the names and
addresses of all the FRCA POs/APOs implementing MAFF's agri-environmental schemes.
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It is recognised that many methodological problems are associated with structured
questionnaires and, in addition, with postal questionnaires. As Oppenheim (1992) and Foddy
(1993) outline, structured questionnaires are limiting in their ability to reveal detailed
information concerning actors' personal beliefs, attitudes and feelings. Further, it has been
empirically supported that the length and format of a questionnaire, the ordering of individual
questions and the style of questions can greatly influence the responses given by the
interviewee. When a structured questionnaire takes the form of a postal questionnaire,
additional problems are encountered. The possibility of a low response rate is frequently cited,
as is the lack of control that the researcher has over the order in which the questions are
answered, and, in turn, the limited opportunity that the researcher has to observe the behaviour
of the respondent and, thus, to obtain additional information that may be crucial to the research
objectives (Dixon and Leach, 1977; Burgess, 1984; Foddy, 1993). Despite these many
problems, however, the structured postal questionnaire has been adopted by many researchers
seeking to analyse a large spatially heterogeneous sample. According to Oppenheim (1992),
the postal questionnaire is simply the easiest, most cost-effective methodological tool with
which to reach a large population. In this context, it was recognised that in seeking to analyse
all of the FRCA POs/APOs, the advantages of the structured postal questionnaire outstripped
their apparent limitations and provided the most suitable quantitative technique with which to
survey the personal backgrounds and characteristics of the POs/APOs.
Prior to distributing the PO/APO questionnaire, a pilot study was conducted, in order to test
the questionnaire's format, its length and clarity of questions. Although pilot surveys are
standard procedure throughout all quantitative methodologies, it is essential when adopting a
postal questionnaire that the clarity of questions is exact, the format is comprehensible, and the
length of the questionnaire is appropnate to encourage a good response rate. As the
questionnaire sought to cover 100 per cent of the POs/APOs, however, it was recognised that,
in seeking to conduct a pilot study, the research was effectively left with no contemporary
POs/APOs who could analyse and test the applicability of the questionnaire. As a result, the
author turned again to the FRCA Contract Manager who, as the primary official in charge of all
POs APOs past and present, was believed to be the most appropriate individual to contact in
search of a suitable pilot sample. With little hesitation this time the FRCA Contract Manager
provided the names and addresses of four recently retired POs who would be possible
candidates on which to test the structured questionnaire. These retired POs were contacted and
all completed the questionnaire and commented where they felt improvements could be made
to the structure and clarity of the questions.
Drawing upon the comments of the pilot sample it was evident that the questionnaire was too
long. Many of the POs argued that the length of the questionnaire would elicit a very poor
response rate amongst their former colleagues. In addition, some questions were thought to be
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too ambiguous and easily misinterpreted. As a result, the terminology used in a number of the
questions was reappraised in order to clarify the objectives of the questions. Further, a number
of open ended questions were shortened by providing pre-given answers in a tick-box-form, as
the pilot sample drew attention to the fact that an open ended postal questionnaire would be
beset with a number of methodological problems, such as a low response rate from the
contemporary POs/APOs. Following the pilot survey, therefore, necessary amendments were
made to the fonnat and length of the questionnaire. A flnalised version of the questionnaire
(see appendix 4) was then sent to each of the 101 FRCA POs/APOs, in conjunction with a
covering letter explaining the objectives of the survey.
The final questionnaire was divided into three main sections, each of which sought to obtain
information on the role of the POIAPO, their relationships with other actors involved in the
implementation of agri-environmental schemes, whether any differences exist in terms of how
they implement the different schemes, and finally, the personal characteristics of the
POs/APOs, including,, for example, their gender, age and educational background (see
appendix 4). In seeking to fulfil the aims of this research by analysing the role and influence of
the FRCA P0, in relation to other agri-environmental actors, the first section of the
questionnaire sought to establish the relationship of the PO/APO with their bureaucratic
superiors - MAFF and the FRCA. Of particular interest was the extent to which the PO/APO
reflects Lipsky' s (1980) street-level bureaucrat by possessing a high level of autonomy from
their superiors (see section 2.4). In this context, questions were asked concerning the level of
contact that the POs/APOs have with their superiors, why this contact takes place and if they
are permitted any flexibility when implementing their respective agri-environmental schemes.
The second section of the questionnaire followed a similar format in order to discern what
contact the P0 APO has with interest groups such as English Nature, the County Wildlife
Tmsts and FWAG. As Chapter 3 outlined, there has been an increasing number of interest
groups operating in the locality, providing agri-environmental advice and information to
individual farmers. In some cases, it is evident that farmers have chosen to receive and
implement the advice of these interest groups, rather than the advice provided by state
agricultural advisors (see Winter et a!., 1996). However, to date little is known of the level of
involvement and influence that these interest groups have within the implementation of UK
agri-environmental schemes. As a result, the questionnaire sought to obtain information from
the FRCA POs/APOs concerning the level of contact that they have with local interest groups,
in particular, which groups they are in contact with, and why such contact takes place.
Towards the end of the questionnaire, further information was sought on the relative influence
of the FRCA P0 APO in relation to other agri-environmental actors, namely farmers
participating and not-participating in the respective schemes. Questions were asked concerning
the level of contact that the individual P0 APO has with agri-environmental participants and
non-participants. In addition, the questionnaire sought to obtain information on whether the
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P0 APO had any previous contact with their local farming community and whether they felt
that this had any influence on their relationship with the farmers as agri-environmental
participants or non-participants. Finally, the last section of the postal questionnaire sought to
construct a detailed profile of the individual P0 APO. In this context, questions were asked
requiring information on the gender, age, educational background, employment histoiy and
agri-environmental interests of the respondent.
The FRCA POs APOs were given a month in which to return the completed questionnaires. If
after this period any PO/APO had failed to return the questionnaire, they were sent a reminder
letter and another copy of the questionnaire in case the former had been mislaid. Compared to
a number of quantitative research studies employing a postal questionnaire technique the
response rate was relatively high. Eighty percent of the POs/APOs returned the questionnaire
in full. The expected response for postal questionnaires is usually placed around 41 per cent
(Dixon and Leach, 1977). The high response rate within this research must partly be attributed
to the co-operation of the FRCA Contract Manager which was gained in the initial stages of
establishing the survey sample. In addition to providing names of retired and contemporaiy
POs/APOs, the Contract Manager agreed to write a covering letter to accompany the
questionnaires, explaining to the POs/APOs why this research was being undertaken and that it
had approval from the FRCA and MAFF. Initially the Contract Manager wished to distribute
the questionnaires to POs/APOs' immediate superiors - the regional FRCA Team Managers
who oversee the work of the individual PO/APO. However, recognising that this may give the
FRCA superiors control over the questionnaire and, thus, possibly influence the way in which
the POs/APOs would respond to the questions, careful negotiation succeeded in ensuring that
the questionnaires would be administered by the author. The fact that this negotiation took
place, in addition to MAFF's and the FRCA's earlier scepticism of the research, provided
some initial evidence of the control which bureaucratic superiors seek to place over the FRCA
PO/APO (for detailed analytical discussion of this issue, see chapter 5).
On receipt of the completed questionnaires, the pre-coded data was analysed using the
computer based statistical programme Minitab. Given that the objectives of the questionnaire
was to develop a detailed profile of the characteristics and relationships of the individual
FRCA P0 APO, this programme enabled basic descriptive statistical tools to be applied to the
data, in order to reveal, for example, the average age of the FRCA POs/APOs, for what reason
most of the POs/APOs are in contact with either MAFF, the FRCA or a specific interest group,
and how many POs/APOs have received training in conservation management skills.
Drawing upon such quantitative empirical data, in conjunction with the qualitative analysis,
Part IV of the thesis seeks to construct a detailed profile of the FRCA POs/APOs and to
analyse their role and influence within their agri-environmental actor-networks. In particular,
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the ERCA POs/APOs' relationship with their bureaucratic superiors in MAFF and the FRCA
will be examined, followed by an analysis of their relationship with farmers and local interest
groups. Part V will subsequently draw on this analysis and examine, in relation to empirical
evidence, whether Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy is applicable in an analysis of
the agri-environmental implementer, or whether the actor-network approach is a more suitable




THE ROLE AND INFLUENCE OF THE FRCA PROJECT OFFICER:
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Throughout Part II, the thesis outlined the need to further our understanding of the role and
influence of the local-level implementer. It was explained that while policy analysts and
academics recognise the influential role played by implementers in the policy process, few
contemporaly researchers have attempted to move beyond the textbook debate on policy
implementation and empirically analyse the role and influence that local-level implementers
have on the implementation and outcome of contemporary policies. Part II went on to assert
that such empirical research is evidently required in relation to the UK's agri-environmental
policy. Chapter 3 outlined how agricultural policy makers have invested a large proportion of
their agri-environmental budget in employing agri-environmental implementers - or project
officers as they are officially termed - who they believe to be key actors determining the
outcome and 'success' of individual agri-environmental schemes. As little is known of the
validity of such assertions the thesis proposed that a detailed analysis of the role and influence
of the FRCA P0 would further an understanding of the implementation and effectiveness of the
UK's contemporary agri-environmental policy. Following an actor-network methodology, the
research sought to analyse the role and influence of the FRCA P0 within two specific case
studies - the Breckland ESA and the Cotswold Hills ESA.
In this section of the thesis policy documentation and empirical evidence derived from the
project officer postal questionnaire, and interviews conducted within the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs will be used to analyse the relative influence of the FRCA P0 in
comparison to other policy actors involved in the implementation of UK agn-environmental
schemes. Situating the analysis within an actor-network context, the following analytical
chapters will outline and analyse those actors who, according to the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESA POs, are involved in their agn-environmental implementation network. Chapter 5
will analyse the relative influence of the POs' personal characteristics, such as their age,
educational background and employment history. Further, the chapter will examine the
relationship of the POs with their bureaucratic superiors in MAFF and the FRCA. Following
this, Chapter 6 will focus on the relationship between the POs and farmers, analysing how the
POs seek to enrol farmers into the agri-environmental schemes, in particular, what strategies
the POs use to persuade and convince the farmers to participate in the schemes. Chapter 7 then
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turns to analyse the FRCA P0 in relation to local agri-environmental actors and again analyses
how the P0 interacts with these local actors, whether the P0 enrols them into MAFF's
agri-environmental implementation network, or whether the P0 has little influence over the
decisions and actions of other policy actors. In conclusion, Chapter 7 will seek to draw
together the empirical findings from the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs and discuss how
influential the FRCA P0 is in the individual ESA implementation processes.
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Chapter 5
Constructing the FRCA Project Officer's Life World
5.1	 Introduction
In seeking to analyse the relative influence of the FRCA PO/APO in the implementation of
agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales, this chapter draws upon the postal
questionnaire and interviews conducted in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, in order to
demonstrate how the role of the P0 as an agri-environmental implementer is largely shaped
and influenced by their personal characteristics and, in particular, by their bureaucratic
superiors in MAFF and the FRCA. In doing so, the analysis firstly constructs a detailed
analytical profile of those FRCA POs/APOs currently implementing agn-environmental
schemes within England and Wales. Particular attention is paid to the age, gender, educational
background and employment history of the POs/APOs in order to understand the personal
experiences and knowledge that the officers may bring to the agri-environmental
implementation network. Following this, the chapter continues to draw upon the postal
questionnaire and analyses interviews conducted with ministerial actors and the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESA POs in order to analyse the relationship of the POs with their bureaucratic
superiors.
5.2	 Profile of FRCA Project Officers and Assistant Project Officers
There are currently 76 POs and 25 APOs implementing the various agri-environmental
schemes within England and Wales. While these figures are correct at the time of writing the
number of POs and APOs employed by MAFF fluctuates as new schemes are introduced and
where increasing levels of participation in individual schemes require additional project officer
support. Indeed, throughout the period in which the FRCA and its predecessor ADAS have
been implementing agri-environmental schemes there has been an overall increase in the
number of POs/APOs, with distinct periods of recruitment that reflect the different stages in
which the UK's agn-environmental schemes have been formulated and introduced. In
particular, significant periods of recruitment have coincided with the introduction of
agri-environmental schemes following EU Regulations 797 85/EEC and 2078 92/EEC, and
when POs/APOs implementing the CS scheme moved from the Countryside Commission to
MAFF in April 1996 (Fig. 5.1).
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In terms of their spatial distribution the FRCA POs/APOs are located throughout the country,
reflecting the widespread designation and target areas of the various agri-environmental
schemes. Generally, each project officer is assigned a specific agri-environmental scheme. In
the case of the CS scheme POs/APOs are given a specific county in which to implement the
scheme's requirements. However, where schemes cover a large area, or participation levels are
exceptionally high, a team of POs and/or APOs will often work together to implement the
respective schemes. The Cotswold Hills ESA, for example, is implemented by a team of five
APOs with one lead P0 overseeing and co-ordinating their activities. The Breckland ESA, on
the other hand, as a decidedly smaller scheme with fewer participants, is implemented by only
one FRCA P0. Additionally, many project officers are assigned more than one
agn-environmental scheme, but agam this will depend upon the size of the various schemes
and the current workload of the individual project officer. For example, one P0 completing the
questionnaire outlined that he was in charge of implementing a total of six schemes 8 However,
he did go on to reveal that in relation to a number of these schemes participation levels were
either minimal, or he operated as a member of a team which enabled him to divide his time
amongst all of the individual schemes under his charge. With some agri-environmental
schemes, thus, being implemented by either one P0 or by up to five POs/APOs, the spatial
distribution of the FRCA POs/APOs throughout England is evidently uneven2.
Age and Gender
Analysing the postal questionnaire further, it is evident that the majority (73%) of the
POs/APOs implementing the agri-environmental schemes are male, with an average age of
4 1-50 years old. According to Blackford et al. (1997), within the UK there are generally more
males than females occupying agricultural advisory positions. Kolizeras (1988) highlighted that
in the late 1980s only 25 per cent of ADAS' agricultural advisors were female. Today, in the
FRCA this figure has not increased dramatically. Only 27 per cent of those POs/APOs
surveyed were female, reflecting what Blacklord et al. (1997) believes to be the current gender
balance on agricultural courses and a traditionally male dominated agricultural industry, where
farmers have tended to be male and often prefer to seek and receive advice from male advisers.
Any increase in the number of female POs/APOs has tended to occur in recent years. For
example, only 4 per cent of the POs working for ADAS in 1988 were female, while today the
figure has increased to 18 per cent.
included, the Pennine Dales ESA, Moorland Scheme, Habitat Scheme-Water Fringe, Habitat
Scheme-Former Set-Aside, Habitat Scheme-Saltmarsh and Countryside Access Scheme
2 influence with which this has had on the implementation of the individual agzi-environmental schemes
will be discussed at a later point within the analysis when the implementation strategies adopted by the various
POs/APOs are discussed (see section 5 6)
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Within the FRCA a hierarchical promotional strategy is adopted whereby, with increased
experience, there are opportunities for APOs to rise to P0 status. Not surprisingly, therefore, it
is evident from the postal questionnaire that the majority (67°o) of APOs are younger
individuals aged between 2 1-30 years old, while the majority (87%) of individuals occupying
the higher status P0 positions tend to be aged between 4 1-50 years old, and with a relatively
long employment history of working in the state advisory service. Naturally, the POs/APOs
implementing the CS scheme have only been employed within the FRCA, and its predecessor
ADAS, for a short period of time, but of the remaining POs/APOs the average length of time
that they have been employed within ADAS/FRCA has been 14.72 years, with the longest
record of employment extending to 34 years for one project officer (Table 5.1). As a further
support to Blackford et aL's (1997) argument, Table 5.1 also reveals that in terms of gender
relations, the longer periods of employment within ADAS/FRCA were experienced by male
POs, with younger female APOs being recently recruited into the agency.
	
Length of	 No.	 FRCA Project Officers	 No. FRCA Assistant Project Officers
Employment in
ADASIFRCA - yrs. ____________ ___________ ___________ ___________
______________	 Male	 Female	 Male	 Female
	
0-5	 6	 6	 3	 2
	
6-10	 6	 2	 0	 0
	
11-15	 3	 0	 1	 1
	
16-20	 3	 2	 2	 1
	
21-25	 8	 0	 0	 0
	
26-30	 13	 0	 0	 0
	
31-35	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
TOTAL	 40	 10	 6	 4
Table 5.1 Length of employment in ADASIFRCA in relation to gender and PO/APO status
(Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Employment History
Having been employed within the state agricultural advisory service for a number of years, a
large proportion of the FRCA POs/APOs have developed a strong background in agricultural
related issues. Within the questionnaire information was obtained concerning the exact detail
of the POs/APOs' previous work within ADAS/FRCA (see appendix 4). As Table 5.2 outlines,
the nature of their work varied throughout the different specialist departments of ADAS before
the advisory service was privatised in April 1997 (see section 3.2).
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Previous Employment in ADAS	 No. FRCA POs/APOs
Not Employed	 15
General Agricultural Consultant 	 38
General On-Farm Conservation Advisor	 I
Wildlife Storage Biology Expert 	 3
Rural Enterprise Consultant	 2
Former ESA APO	 1
TOTAL	 60
Table 5.2 FRCA PO/APO employment history in ADAS (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Whether the POs/APOs were livestock specialists, surveyors, agronomists or commercial dairy
advisors they have all developed a knowledge of agricultural issues and gained experience of
working with farming communities. Indeed, the postal questionnaire has revealed that, in some
cases, the FRCA POs/APOs are currently in contact with the same farming community which
they had previously advised when employed within their respective ADAS departments. For
example, the Breckland ESA project officer was previously employed within ADAS' Farm and
Countryside Service, and although he was based in Norwich, Norfolk, his work encompassed
the Breckland area and brought him into contact with a number of those farmers who he is
currently in contact with vis-a-vis the Breckland ESA scheme. As he outlined in a recent
interview:
"Well, I've been employed in ADAS most of my working 1fe so its quite a long time ... I
was based in Norwich for afew years and I did some work in the Breckkmd area; but
quite a lot outside of it, but eryea, I've known some of the Brecklandfarmers for quite
a long time '
One project officer implementing the South Wessex ESA scheme outlined how he considers it
to be rather ironic that many of the FRCA POs/APOs are now having to go back to the same
farmers whom they were once encouraging to expand and intensi1', and, in accordance, with
the current post-productivist ethos of agricultural policy, encourage and advise the same
farmers to adopt environmentally friendly farming practices.
"ft does seem ridiculous sometimes when you are Iviving to go and by and encourage
people to plant afew hedgerows here or there, or to restore a pond when previously you
were telling them to rip the hedges up and drain the ponds' on their farm" (Belding,
1996).
However, while this reflects the overall contradiction of the post-war agricultural political
approach (see Cox et aL, 1985a; Blunden and Curry, 1988; Whitby, 1996; Winter, 1996),
many of the FRCA POs/APOs outlined within the questionnaire that their previous contact
with the same fanning communities has helped them to develop a good rapport with those
farmers eligible to participate in their respective agri-environmental schemes. As the Breckland
ESA project officer explained when asked if his previous contact with the Breckland farrmng
community has helped him to implement the ESA scheme:
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"Yea, I think it does help ifyou 'ye worked in the same area. I think anybody going into
an area cold it takes quite a long time to just build up contacts and liaison, so if you
already know people it does help '
Education and Training
Having been employed within the productivist services of ADAS many of the FRCA
POs/APOs currently implementing agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales have a
formal educational background in agncultural related issues. Indeed, part of ADAS'
recruitment policy for agricultural advisors required individuals with a minimum tertiary
qualification, such as a degree or diploma in agricultural and horticultural science, crop and
plant science, social science, agricultural engineering or agriculture (ADAS, 1992). Of those
FRCA POs/APOs surveyed, 95 per cent possessed degrees or diplomas from a national
agricultural college. Due to the nature of these qualffications and the length of employment
that many POs/APOs have experienced within ADAS, it was not surprising to find from the
questionnaire that 80 per cent of the officers have received some form of training in farm
business management issues. Of this percentage, 42 per cent had received their training solely
from university education, 21 per cent had gained training simply through internal ADAS
training sessions, while 29 per cent stated that they had obtained a knowledge of farm business
management through both their university diplomas/degrees and from 'in house' training
within ADAS (Table 5.3).




Combination of University and In House
	 13
TOTAL	 60
Table 5.3 Total number of FRCA POs/APOs with Farm Business Management Training
(FBMT) (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Interestingly, further analysis of this data has revealed that great disparities exist between the
level of farm business management training that POs/APOs implementing the CS scheme have
received in comparison to their colleagues implementing, for example, the ESA schemes.
nmental Scheme	 No. FRCA POs/APOs With FBMT
ESA	 39
CSS	 6
Table 5.4 Number of Environmentally Sensitive Area and Countryside Stewardship Scheme
POs/APOs with Farm Business Management Training (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
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As Table 5.4 illustrates, of those POs/APOs implementing the ESAs within England, 86.5 per
cent have received some form of training in fann business management, while only 54.5 per
cent of the CS POs/APOs have received such training. This may be attributed to the fact that
the CS POs/APOs were, until April 1996, employed within the CoCo, who, as chapter three
outlined, are not by nature associated with farm management decisions in the same way that
ADAS/FRCA are. Rather, the CoCo is primarily a conservation oriented organisation which
may further explain why many of the CS POs/APOs possess a more formal educational
background in conservation related issues compared to their colleagues implementmg the ESA
schemes.
The issue of conservation training amongst the FRCA POs/APOs has become a major issue of
debate amongst a number of conservation groups such as the RSPB, English Nature and Safe
Alliance. Concerns have been expressed that, while many of the POs/APOs may be experts in
farm business management, they lack the basic knowledge and training in conservation which
the environmental groups believe to be essential if the POs/APOs are to assist fanners in
implementing schemes that seek to many farm production methods with environmental
conservation. As the head of Safe Alliance outlined:
"... the project officers and the people doing the analysis are not well trained enough.
for instance they don 't define overgrazing how we define overgrazing and that's always
a big probkm" (Safe Alliance, 1997).
This was further supported by the RSPB (1996) in their recent report to the Agriculture Select
Committee's enquiry on 'ESAs and other UK agri-environmental schemes'. They stated that:
some concerns have been expressed that project officers and agricultural
department staff are strong in terms of agricultural expertise, but often lack
environmental expertise. Ills important therefore that staff are given adequate training
and that scheme administrators seek environmental advice from appropriate sources"
(RSPB, 1996:29).
Of those FRCA POs/APOs who returned the postal questionnaire 97 per cent stated that they
had in fact received some form of conservation training. While a few of these officers received
such training as part of their personal degree courses, most notably the CS POs/APOs, it was
revealed that the majority of the officers had participated within internal FRCA training
programmes which, often held in conjunction with environmental groups such as English
Nature and the RSPB, focused on conservation related issues (Table 5.5). Unfortunately,
because of the structured nature of the postal questionnaire little information was obtained
concerning the precise content of these internal training days. However, following interviews
with the POs and APOs in both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, it was revealed that
these in house training sessions covered both the theory of nature conservation as well as 'in
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field' advice on the practical application of conservation principles. As one of the APOs in the
Cotswold Hills ESA outlined:
'We have hada lot of courses and things over the years ... they have always been hands
on e of courses as well as the theory, you know, where best to plant hedges, what
species to include ...




Combmation of University and In House	 23
TOTAL	 60
Table 5.5 Number of FRCA POs/APOs with conservation training (Source: Postal questionnaire,
1997)
Recognising that such training takes place, some individuals within the environmental groups
believe that a step is being made to improve the conservation experience and knowledge of the
FRCA POsIAPOs. Indeed, the agricultural officer for the RSPB in a recent interview professed
that, in her opinion:
"things are improving. Certainly, some of the FRCA people I've met, they're very
variable, some are ched-in-the-wool agriculturists and some of them now generally
come from environmental and ecology backgrounds and have learnt about agriculture '
However, while she spoke in terms of the growing conservation expertise among some of the
FRCA POs/APOs, she remained hesitant in stating an overall improvement to the FRCA
officers' knowledge of conservation. Instead, she represented the RSPB and many other
environmental groups interested in agricultural conservation by calling for continued project
officer training in conservation management. Whether the FRCA will follow the
recommendations of the environmental groups and place more emphasis on project officer
environmental training is at this stage unclear, but it is interesting to note that amongst the
FRCA POs/APOs there are diverse opinions and personal interests vis-à-vis
agri-environmental conservation. Drawing upon data collected through the postal
questionnaire, it has been revealed that, on a scale of one to five (i.e. one being of little
importance, and five being very important), 50 per cent of the FRCA POs/APOs returning the
questionnaire stated that in their opinion it is very important for farmers to integrate
environmental practices on their individual fanns. However, there was still a significant
proportion of the POs/APOs who believed that it is not highly important that farmers should
farm in an environmentally friendly way (Table 5.6).
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Level of Importance	 No. FRCA POs/APOs




5 - Least Importance	 2
Table 5.6 Level of importance which FRCA POs/APOs assign to agri-environmental
conservation (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
This was further supported in interviews conducted with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESA POs/APOs where it was revealed that, while some of the POs/APOs are personally
interested in conservation, others remain slightly reserved in their opinions. For example, the
Breckland ESA P0 expressed a keen interest in nature conservation and outlined that despite
his original training in agriculture, he independently read for an Open University degree within
which he choose to take specific ecological units to further his own interest.
"1 actually did wi OU degree during my employment with ADAS, which I took
ecological units within that, so I did ecology, biology ... because, well I've always had
that interest '
Likewise, the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 outlined why he had originally applied for the position
to implement an agri-environmental scheme, highlighting his personal interest in the
environment and, in particular, how he sees the environment as part of the whole farm system.
"I 'in not an ecologist, I am an agriculturist, but I have always been interested in ... well
a couple of things 1 think led me to apply for the job. Yes I have always had an interest
in the environment and I've also always been interested in the whole fann, what makes
the whole farm tick '
In comparison, however, one of the Cotswold Hills ESA APOs, when asked if he had a
personal interest in conservation confessed that:
"not really, no. I mean / was a genera! agricultural advisor and an agronomist. I
suppose I spent all of my time killing things. I enjoy it [the environment], but I see it
more as a technical thing rather than as an interest thing '
Thus, while many of the FRCA POs/APOs exhibit siirnlar characteristics in terms of their
gender, age, educational and professional backgrounds, their personal opinions and interests
vis-à-vis agri-environmental conservation remain diverse.
In seeking to understand the life world of the individual FRCA P0 APO, therefore, it is
evident that the majority of POs/APOs possess an in-depth knowledge and experience of
agricultural related issues. Many have received formal educational training in agricultural
production techniques. They have a history of being employed in the state advisoiy service and
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have gained experience of working with and advising farming communities. The majority of
POs/APOs have received training in conservation related issues and some bring a personal
interest in the environment to their duties as agri-environmental policy implementers. The
extent to which the knowledge and experience of the FRCA P0 APO influences the
implementation of agri-environmental schemes will be discussed throughout the analysis,
however, it is evident from the postal questionnaire and interviews conducted in the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESAs, that the lifeworld of the individual P0 APO is further shaped by a
number of statutory and bureaucratic controls imposed by MAFF and the FRCA, which greatly
influences the administrative and implementory system of UK agri-environmental schemes.
5.3	 Influence of MAFF's Rules and Expectations
Under EU Regulation 2078 92/EEC, the development of national agri-environmental schemes
and the actions of national agricultural policy makers, such as MAFF, have been naturally
influenced and shaped by the EU. While Member State policy makers have been permitted a
relative degree of autonomy in terms of the specific schemes that they may formulate, there is a
legal obligation to implement an agn-environmental policy that encompasses the objectives of
the Agricultural Directorate as set out in the form of Regulation 2078 92/EEC (Whitby, 1996).
In terms of implementing national agri-environmental schemes, however, Regulation
2078/92/EEC encompasses the principle of subsidiarity whereby the EU has a relatively
marginal influence over the implementation strategies adopted within individual Member
States. As a result, agri-environmental schemes formulated under EU Regulation 2078/92/EEC
have, throughout Europe, been implemented in many different ways, often in accordance with
national political and administrative structures (see Whitby, 1996). Wilson (1994, 1995) has
outlined, for example, that within the Federal state of Germany national agri-environmental
schemes are implemented in accordance with a regional strategy whereby each of the sixteen
Lander have the responsibility for formulating, implementing and funding regional schemes that
comply to EU agri-environmental objectives. The UK, on the other hand, like many other
European countries such as Spain (Garrido and Moyano, 1996), have drawn upon their
traditional structuralist approach to policy and implemented the national agri-environmental
schemes within a centralised bureaucratic government (Palumbo, 1987; GiIg, 1996; Winter,
1996).
Following a hierarchical system of administration, which is indicative of classical political
theories (Weber, 1947; Jones, 1973; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1979), agri-environmental
schemes in England and Wales are currently formulated, administered and implemented by
three distinct spatial and political levels (Fig. 5.2). At the 'top' of the hierarchy, the
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Fig. 5.3. Implementation Structure for UK Agri-En'vironmental Schemes
(Source: Author)
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administered by MAFF's Regional Service Centres (RSCs), and finally implemented by the
FRCA POs and APOs located at the ground level. As Part II of this thesis outlined, this
centralised approach to policy is indicative of a number of functional departments within the
British Government where central offices, such as MAFF and the Department of Education
have frequently sought the managerial resources of their regional counterparts in order to
facilitate the implementation and integration of central administrative tasks into the locality
(Hoggart, 1984; Rhodes, 1988; Winter, 1996). In doing so central government has often sought
a number of controls such as statutory provisions, adjudicatory functions, inspections and
audits in order to ensure that within this centralised policy process, regional and local actors
execute ministenal objectives (Lowi, 1972; Laffin, 1986; Kaufmann, 1986; Wirth, 1986; Jones,
1995) (see section 2.2).
Regional Service Centres
Indeed, exhibiting structuralist notions of power, MAFF has employed a number of resources,
such as statutory legislation and policy documentation, in order to define the roles and
objectives of the RSCs and FRCA POs/APOs, and in turn ensure that these ministerial actors
implement MAFF's agri-environmental objectives and not their own. This was clearly ouflined
by the head of MAFF's Conservation Policy Division who explained that in terms of
implementing the agri-environmental schemes:
the object of the exercise is that we [MAFF central office] tell them what to do and
they get on and do it. And if there is a breakk,wn IA those communications then we put
it right as soon as we can. Effectively there are very clear instructions as to how
everyone should operate. .. " (emphasis added) (Boyhng. 1997).
In terms of the objectives of the RSCs, for example, MAFF has, through the Ministiy's Citizen
Charter, asserted that the role of the RSC within the policy process is one of administration
and not policy formulation.
"The role of the Regional Service Centre is to administer UK Government and EC
pohcy. It is not in itself responsible for policy formalation" (emphasis added) (MAFF,
1994:17).
This is reinforced by MAFF (1995) in their Memorandum of Understanding (M0U) for
agn-environmental schemes, where the responsibilities and work objectives of the RSCs are
defined in terms of administrative and managerial roles, rather than policy decision-making
functions. For example, MAFF (1996a) asserts that in terms of admimstering
agri-environmental schemes, their RSCs are responsible for:
• "processing applications and determining their eligibility in accordance with relevant
legislation and scheme rules
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• issuing formal agreements to successfijI applicants
• processing claims for payment, determining eligibility and arranging payment of valid
claims
• responding to queries or concerns from applicants, potential applicants and agreement
holders in relation to the schemes, carrying out compliance monitoring, including field
inspections, to check that management prescriptions and other scheme rules are being
followed, and dealing with breaches of scheme rules" (MAlT, I 996a 9)
Acting as a link between the implementers of policy and the higher echelons of policy makers
situated within MAFF central office (Fig. 5.2), the RSCs are also expected to transfer
information down to the POs/APOs and in turn act as a gatekeeper, transferring information
from the FRCA PO/APO to MAFF Headquarters concerning the applicability of national
agri-environmental objectives in the locality (MAFF, 1995; 1996a).
This Weberian hierarchical relationship between agri-environmental policy actors was
reinforced by the FRCA POs/APOs in response to a series of questions within the postal
questionnaire concerning their relationship with each of the different policy levels, and, in
particular, what level of communication the POs/APOs currently experience with MAFF
central office and their RSCs. In terms of their relationship with MAFF central office, 90 per
cent of the FRCA POs/APOs stated that they had no form of direct contact or coimnunication
with any individual located within the central office. For those few officers that were in contact
with individuals at the top of the policy hierarchy, this tended only to occur on average,
between six to ten times a year and was primarily in relation to non agri-environmental issues.
However, in accordance with MAFF's MoU, all of the POs/APOs responding to the
questionnaire stated that they were in frequent contact with MAFF's RSCs, with many officers
stating that contact usually occurred on a weekly basis, and in relation to a plurality of
agri-environmental issues. These included, wherever the PO/APO forwarded applications to
the RSC for processing, advising the RSC on the acceptability of individual applications,
advising the RSC on any amendments to individual agreements and, in turn, receiving
information from the RSC concerning individual agreement holdings. This was further
explained by the Cotswold Hills ESA project officer who outhned the 'official' relationship
between the RSC and the POs/APOs in terms of administering and implementing the ESA
scheme.
"I mean basically you have to rk fairly closely with the PSC ... the actual
,nellwdology, is that when the application comes in, either directly from the farmer or
via us, it is formally recorded by the MAFF RSC. They open afile, they are responsible
for thaL hwy are responsible for providing wy MAFF arimuusinztn backgmtawl
information which now also involves mformahon on the L4CS system which hsis all
other govermnenl grant schemes ... Thefik then comes to the project officer to th some
ground mapping and negotiate with the farmer azy detail that is required... then when
you think everything is right in terms of the maps and everything else is tied up. it then
goes back to MAFF wiih a recommendation tofonnally offer the agreement ".
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While this administrative nature of the agri-environmental schemes naturally requires close
contact and communication between the POs/APOs and MAFF's RSCs, their close working
relationship can additionally be explained by the fact that the majority (87%) of the FRCA
POs/APOs are currently based within MAFF's RSCs, where they are physically situated
alongside the RSC staff responsible for administering the agri-environmental schemes within
the different regions of England and Wales (Fig. 5.4). This is a relatively recent situation as
prior to the privatisation of ADAS in April 1997, the majority of the POs/APOs implementing
MAFF's agri-environmental schemes were located within regional statutory ADAS centres
which were often situated away from MAFF's RSCs (Fig. 5.3). However, in light of the move
towards the pnvatisation of ADAS, MAFF decided to relocate many of the regional offices of
the newly fonned FRCA and provide office accommodation within their RSCs. In domg so,
MAFF and the FRCA believed that communication between the administrators and
implementers of the agri-environmental schemes would be simplified, in addition to creating a
distinct division between the statutory FRCA and ADAS who is no longer directly involved in
the implementation of MAFF's agri-environmental schemes (Baker, 1997). As one project
officer currently implementing the North Peak ESA outlined before the FRCA offices were
moved to MAFF's RSCs:
"It has been very confusing being in dWerent offices, sometimes we don 't know where
people are or how to contact them. The change will make everything easier for us
In some areas it has been more problematic in co-locating the FRCA POs and MAFF's RSCs,
as the Cotswold Hills ESA project officer explained:
"...you get some of the East Anglian ones you couldn '1 physically co-locate because
the RSC is at Cambridge, and with the Broads the project officer needs to be in Norwich
or somewhere like that, close to the Broads".
However, such cases are rare. Currently, the majority (96°c) of the FRCA POs/APOs are able
to be in direct contact with the RSC staff and thus enable the RSCs to follow MAFF's MoU
and liaise closely with the FRCA POs/APOs.
FRCA Project Officers and Assistant Project Officers
As employees of MAFF the FRCA POs/APOs, like the RSCs, are expected to operate in
accordance with MAFF's MoU. MAFF recognises that the precise role of the PUs may vary
from scheme to scheme, but within their MoU MAFF asserts that in all cases there are
responsibilities vis-ã-vis the implementation of agri-environmental schemes which the POs and
APOs should adhere to. These include:
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Fig. 5.3. ADAS Statutory Centres in England and Wales (Source: ADAS, 1992)
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Fig. 5.4. MAFF's Regional Service Centres and FRCA Offices in England and Wales
(Source: MAFF, 1992)
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• "promoting schemes among the farming community and providing advice to prospective
applicants,
• advising MAFF on the technical acceptability of individual applications;
• providing advice and guidance to agreement holders on the practical application of
scheme rules and procedures and on managing their land in the most effective way to
achieve the objectives of the scheme, in addition, they provide advice on any fanning,
conservation or public access issue which may arise through participation in the schemes,
• checking compliance with scheme rules during site visits;
• liaising with other bodies on possible conflicts of interest, avoidance of dual finding and
issues where speciality expertise would be of value, and
• providing initial advice to farmers and landowners on all environmental land management
schemes (including non-MAFF schemes) available to them" (MAFF, 1995.15).
It is evident from the postal questionnaire that this MoU has had a significant impact on how
the individual PO/APO define and interpret their role within the implementation of
agri-environmental schemes. Bound by statutoly and bureaucratic rules, it is evident from the
postal questionnaire that the POs/APOs define their work objectives in accordance with
MAFF's MoU. Within the postal questionnaire the POs/APOs were asked to state what their
main work objectives were in relation to their specific agri-environmental scheme. While some
answers were far more detailed than others, each of the POs/APOs commonly defined their
work objectives in tenns of establishing and administering management agreements; promoting
schemes; acting on behalf of MAFF; advising MAFF; liaising with other organisations;
maintaining and enhancing the wildlife value of the area; acting as an interface between MAFF
and the farmers; establishing a sound relationship with agreement holders and acting as a one
stop shop for advice (Table 5.7). With the exception of one or two of these objectives, such as
the 'maintenance and enhancement of the wildlife value', it is evident that the POs/APOs
simply reiterated the objectives outlined in MAFF's MoU. Further, as employees of MAFF, it
was not surpnslng to find that many of the POs/APOs defined their role primarily in terms of
an advisor and implementer of government policy (Table 5.8). In the postal questionnaire the
POs/APOs asserted that they see themselves as advisors operating on behalf of MAFF,
implementing MAFF's objectives and not their own personal interests. As the following quotes
from a number of the FRCA POs/APOs highlight:
"Essentially! am an advisor and implementer ofpolicy"
'Basically, I 'in wi implementer of government policy, but with afri endly face! We aim
to gain farmers co-operation not dictate to them ".
"[I am a] ... technical advisor encouraging beneficial environmental practices on
agricultural land in the countiyszde, on behalf ofMAFF".
"My first duty as project officer is to my client, MAFF'
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Work Objectives	 No. FRCA POs/APOs
(non-exclusive categories)
and administer management	 42
Scheme promotion	 40
To implement the schemes on behalf of MAFF 	 22
To advise MAFF	 21
To liaise with other organisations 	 21
Maintain and enhance the wildlife value of the 	 14
landscape
To act as an interface between MAFF and	 10
farmers
To ensure that dual funding of	 4
agri-environmental schemes does not occur
To establish a sound relationship with farmers 	 4
To act as a one stop shop for advice 	 3
Table 5.7 FRCA POs/APOs perceptions of their work objectives (Source: Postal
questionnaire, 1997)









Table 5.8 FRCA POs/APOs perceptions of their role title (Source: Postal questionnaire,
1997)
140
Essentially, the FRCA POs/APOs represent Weber's (1947) subordinate bureaucrat. Employed
by MAFF, they are expected to implement their superiors' objectives, and, through the MoU,
MAFF may ensure that the POs APOs understand and adhere to their responsibilities. In this
context, it is evident that the FRCA PO/APO does not follow the arguments of
political-economy theonsts, such as Barrett and Fudge (1981) and Cloke and Little (1990).
Where these analysts assert that actors will negotiate and bargain with one another in order to
further their own definitions, interests and objectives, little negotiation appears to take place
between the POs/APOs and MAFF. Rather, bound by the MoU, the POs/APOs accept the
objectives of their superiors and seek to implement the agri-environmental schemes within the
administrative and implementory system that has been defined by MAFF. According to Wirth
(1986), however, bureaucrats will be accountable to both internal and external sources of
authority. Indeed, while the POs/APOs are influenced and controlled by MAFF legislation.
they are additionally embedded within the bureaucracy and hierarchy of the FRCA which
seeks to control the activities of the POs/APOs and in turn assist MAFF by ensuring that their
MoU is met by the FRCA POs/APOs.
5.4 Influence of the FRCA
Like its predecessor ADAS, the FRCA is a relatively large bureaucratic and hierarchical
organisation (see Lowe et al., 1997). Currently, 480 people are employed within the agency, of
which 21 per cent are represented by the POs/APOs. Of the remaining employees the FRCA
provides a number of administrative positions, in addition to specialist posts within their
resource plaining groups which consist of, for example, cartographers, surveyors, biologists,
ecologists and hydrologists. In terms of implementing the agri-environmental schemes, the
majority of FRCA employees are involved by either providing specialist advice and support to
the POs/APOs or by occupying higher administrative positions from which the work of the
POs/APOs is monitored and assessed in accordance with MAFF's MoU. In order to gain a
clearer picture of how different actors within the FRCA are involved in the implementation of
agri-environmental schemes, the POs/APOs were asked in the postal questionnaire to indicate
on a scale of one to nine the level of contact which they have with specific individuals and/or
groups within the FRCA.
According to the POs/APOs surveyed, most contact is made between POs and APOs











Members of the FRCA
POs administering the same scheme
APOs administering the same scheme
Team Leader
Resource planning group
POs administering other schemes
APOs administering other schemes
Group Leader
Contract Manager -
9 - Least Contact	 Statutory Centre Manager
Table 5.9 Level of contact POs/APOs have with individuals in the FRCA (Source: Postal
questionnaire, 1997)
It is important to note that where a team of POs and APOs exists the officers will tend to work
alongside one another, but as one of the Cotswold Hills ESA APOs outlined, one P0 will
usually take on an authoritative position, co-ordinating and managing the work of the ground
level agn-environmental team. As the APO explained:
"... officially Richard [P0] is our group leader. He will often go out into the field on
his own and he does have some farmers who he manages, but usually he 's there to
oversee what we do and if we have any problems we can go to him as our
co-ordinator '
Following this, the POs/APOs are most frequently in contact with their FRCA Team Manager
for reasons related to progress reports, staff management, team co-ordination and, in
exchanging advice and information related to the specific agri-enviromnental schemes. Within
the regional offices of the FRCA, the Team Manager in effect acts as a 'boss' to the
POs/APOs. It is their role to oversee all agri-environniental schemes implemented from their
respective FRCA office, and, in particular, to advise the POs/APOs and ensure that they are
implementing the agri-environmental schemes in accordance with MAFF's MoU. As the
Cotswold Hills ESA project officer explained:
"... once the scheme is launched he [the Team Manager] has overall responsibility for
the ESAs and other agri-environmental schemes in his [sic] area; induthng resource
allocation and delivery of whatever is required by MAFF which has been agreed by the
MoU".
Additionally, the Team Manager acts as a link between the POs/APOs and the higher echelons
of the FRCA represented by the Group Leader, the individual FRCA Statutory Centre Manager
and the FRCA Contract Manager. As Table 5.9 outlines, the POs/APOs have little direct
contact with these individual policy actors. Where direct contact does occur with the Group
Leader, for example, it is usually at general meetings or sometimes in the absence of the Team
Manager. The Statutory Centre Manager, on the other hand, rarely comes into contact with the
POs/APOs and where he or she does, it is often at meetings concerning non agri-environinental
issues. Finally, at the 'top' of the FRCA hierarchy, the project officers are rarely in contact
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with the Contract Manager who is in charge of the overall co-ordination and resource
allocation of all agri-environmental schemes implemented by the FRCA. Wherever contact
occurs with the POs/APOs this is usually mediated through the individual Team Managers,
where the Contract Manager will seek to either pass on information from MAFF central office
or, m turn, receive information from the POs/APOs and the Team Managers, and where
necessary refer these to MAFF central office. For example, under the MoU the POs/APOs are
required to provide weekly statistics outlining the number of new applications which the
individual officers have recommended to their MAFF RSC. This information is given to the
Team Manager who will subsequently refer the statistics to the FRCA Contract Manager,
whereupon, they will be sent to MAFF central office to illustrate how well MAFF's schemes
are performing at the ground level and whether MAFF's MoU is being met by the FRCA. As
the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 outlined when discussing his relationship with his Team Manager:
I would speak to him at least once a week, usually see him at least once a wee& and
certainly during the critical periods of processing new applications, then he was ftd
with stats [statistics] every week in terms of where we had got to, and whether the MoU
objectives were being met ... when I say MoU objectives these were in terms of delivery
and when recommendations of new applications are made to the MAFF RSC. He [Team
Manager] would then pass the slats on to Guildford [where the Contract Manager is
located] '
Operating at the ground level environment the street-level bureaucrat, according to Lipsky
(1980), will be geographically distanced from their bureaucratic superiors and will, as a result,
operate in surroundings remote from any form of hierarchical authority (see section 2.4).
However, by receiving such statistical information the FRCA Contract Manager and MAFF
central office are, in effect, able to monitor and assess the work of the individual FRCA
PO/APO in terms of their ability to meet targets set by MAFF in relation to the number of
fanners enrolled into the agri-environmental schemes. Similarly, Lowe et al. (1997:147) have
recently found that within the commercial arm of ADAS, the effectiveness and efficiency of
pollution advisors were "typically measured in quantitative terms and displayed as
performance measures and targets achieved". Attempts by the FRCA to control and monitor
the work of the POs/APOs was clearly outhned by the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 who explained
that, although the FRCA POs/APOs do not have to fill out any official reports, there is a
performance appraisal system which currently operates within the FRCA and effectively
momtors the POs'IAPOs' work. As he outlined:
we don 'tfill out much. The way that FRCA operates in terms of staff management
is basically at the moment working on a system that ADAS developed which a sort of
performance appraisal and development system, so that every year you have agreed
objectives and your performance is assessed against those objectives '
Additionally, the FRCA POs/APOs are required under the MoU to compile and maintain
detailed reports and files on each individual agreement holder. Within these tiles the PO/APO
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must record any interaction which they have had with the farmers, why the contact took place,
and any decisions that were made by the P0 APO concerning the individual management
agreement. Such a routine of filling out reports is replicated in a number of organisations, such
as the former NRA, where Lowe Ct al. (1997:102) found, in relation to 'Bob', their pollution
inspector, that "for each report he [Bobi receives, a form has to be filled out in triplicate: one
for the computer, one for the filing system and one for himself'. In terms of the FRCA
P0 APO this routine of filling out reports on any decision that they make or any contact which
they have with agreement holders effectively hmits their level of autonomy within the field.
Concomitantly, the work of the FRCA POs/APOs may be indirectly momtored through the
FRCA's pay system, whereby the POs/APOs and other FRCA staff members involved in the
implementation of agri-environmental schemes are paid on an hourly basis. According to the
FRCA contract manager, this is a fair method of payment as it eliminates the possibility of
tensions arising between different POs/APOs whose level of work will naturally depend upon
the size of their respective agri-environmental schemes, and the number of farmers
participating in the scheme (White, 1996). In order to calculate their salaries, each staff
member involved in the implementation of the schemes must fill in a time sheet at the end of
each week, recording the number of hours spent working on their respective scheme(s). This
information is then placed in a large database which at the end of each quarter prints out a total
of the number of hours each individual has worked on the schemes, and they are paid
accordingly. However, if an individual PO/APO reduces the level of input which they would
normally put into the implementation of 'their' scheme(s) this will be identified within the
database and made known to their respective Team Managers, who oversee the performance
appraisals of the individual POs/APOs.
Thus, through controls such as performance measures, agreement holders' reports and the
FRCA pay system, the POs APOs appear to be tightly circumscribed within the bureaucracy of
the FRCA, and the overall agri-environmental implementation network defined by MAFF's
MoU. In this context, the FRCA POs/APOs acting as street-level bureaucrats evidently do not
possess as much autonomy and discretion as Prottas (1977), Hanf and Scherpf (1978) and
Lipsky (1980) postulate (see Chapter 2). Instead, as Sabatier (1986:322) recognises, "policy
makers can affect what happens on the ground by structuring the implementation process
through relatively clear directives and through affecting the number, the resources and to some
extent the preferences of street-level bureaucrats". Sabatier (1986) does not dispute Lipsky's
(1980) claim that street-level bureaucrats are extremely important in the implementation of
policies, but he stresses that often, official policy makers will possess legislative resources that
permit greater levels of influence and power over the street-level bureaucrat (see also Wirth,
1986). Indeed, the FRCA POs/APOs are not alone in experiencing such hierarchical authority.
In their study of social service deliveiy in Aber, North Wales, Grant and Black (1981) found
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that social workers, like the FRCA POs/APOs, operated within an environment that was
largely defined by their social services department, and their statutoly obligations to provide
social work and services to predefined groups of clients. According to one social worker, they
are permitted a relative degree of freedom in their day to day work, but while they are able to
make individual decisions, their actions are still accountable to their bureaucratic superiors
within the social services department. As the social worker went on to outline:
"there is always somebody looking over your shoulder oil the time, wanting to know
what's going on ... I am able to develop my own style, but I am not allowed to develop it
on my own" (in Grant and Black, 1981:6).
Sabatier (1986) did go on to argue, however, that any attempt to tightly circumscribe
street-level bureaucrats through the imposition of legislation, performance targets and policy
compliance measures, can be counter-productive (see also Elmore, 1978; Wirth, 1986). Thus,
while it is recognised that many street-level bureaucrats may not be permitted total autonomy
in their day to day work, Sabatier (1986) argues that a balance should be struck between the
totality and triviality of bureaucratic accountability. Indeed, in relation to the FRCA
POs/APOs, MAFF and the FRCA recognise that, despite their methods of accountability, the
POs/APOs must be afforded some degree of discretionaiy freedom when implementing
MAFF's agri-environmental objectives within the locality. This is clearly evident where MAFF
is increasingly taking on board the advice and recommendations of the individual PO/APO
when deciding to permit amendments to individual agri-environmental agreements.
5.5 Discretionary Freedom of the FRCA Project Officer
One of the criticisms of implementing national agri-environmental schemes is the fact that each
individual farm holding is distinct and a blanket approach to agri-environmental conservation,
as approached through the schemes, can not account for the intricacies and distinctiveness of
the individual farm ecosystem (see Countiyside Commission, 1996, Winter, 1996). At the
recent Agriculture Select Committees' enquiry into 'ESAS and other UK agri-environmental
schemes', the Countryside Commission (1996) and English Nature (1996) voiced their
concerns in relation to this issue and suggested that "agri-environment schemes must be able to
reflect and build upon regional diversity and local distinctiveness in the countryside" (English
Nature, 1996:7). MAFF recognises that often individual agreement holders may wish to amend
specific scheme rules in order to suit their individual circumstances, and, as a result, a degree
of flexibility has been written into the scheme rules, whereby an individual fanner in
consultation with their respective FRCA P0 APO may apply to the MAFF RSC for a
derogation to their individual agreement. This may include a derogation to cut their grass
before the date specified within the scheme rules, spraying weeds such as Ragwort where
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normally it is not permitted, or delaying the construction of walls, fences, hedgerows and
ponds.
Under MAFF's MoU, it is the duty of the FRCA PO/APO to administer the derogations by
consulting with the agreement holders and advising them where a derogation may be needed in
order to enhance the environmental quality of their land. As one of the APOs in the Cotswold
Hills ESA explained:
"Well the actual guidelines if you like are written down and that is part of their
agreement, but we can give derogalions to allow them to wvy one side or another. Well
put it this way, if they want to do something which the rules say they can'! we can
recommend a derogation if ii is in the best interest of the environmental objectives ".
Following consultation with the agreement holder, the FRCA PO/APO must, under the MoU,
recommend the derogation to the MAFF RSC before any changes are made on the individual
farm. Within the RSC, it is the responsibility of the Environmental Schemes Manager to assess
the proposed derogation and to sign the official letter from MAFF informing the agreement
holder whether their request for a derogation has been granted. According to the Cotswold
Hills ESA P0," .. derogations are rarely turned down". However, before any decision is
made the Environmental Schemes Manager will take into consideration a plurality of issues
such as seasonal variations, the environmental implications of the proposed derogation, and
how the derogation will relate to any other agri-environmental scheme or designation present
on the individual agreement holding. A lot of this infonnation is provided by the PO/APO who
recommended the derogation to the MAFF RSC. For the majority of the routine derogations,
such as amendments to cutting/grazing dates and weed control, the Environmental Schemes
Manager will take on board the advice of the PO/APO and sign the official letter of approval
without questioning the individual officer's judgement and recommendation. As the Cotswold
Hills ESA P0 went on to outline:
with the normal and straightforward variations, the project officer's
recommendations will stand Some of the situations with low precedence, it has never
been questioned or debated".
This was further supported by the Breckland ESA P0:
"Some things are fairly stra,gh(forward where precedence has been set, then it is more
or less a farmaliy to agree certain cIvinge and eramples of that would be weed
control on permanent grassland where in our ESA they are not allowed to use an
overall boom sprayer without permission '
Thus, while the PU APO must still operate in accordance with bureaucratic rules, their
knowledge of the local environment and their subsequent recommendations and advice are
recognised and accepted within the echelons of MAFF. Indeed, the Breckland and Cotswold
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Hills POs outlined that with many of the routine derogations they are confident in the
knowledge that MAFF's RSCs will accept their recommendations and, as a result, the POs will
often inform the farmers to go ahead with the derogation before any official letter is sent from
MAFF. According to a number of farmers interviewed within the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs, this action by the POs is imperative as often it is necessary to carry out the
derogation immediately following the P0's on site recommendation. As one farmer in the
Breckland ESA outlined:
"... when it comes to getting derogations to do things he [project officer] will come out
and say )'es, okay. You know its got to be done, do it. I'll rubber stamp it aivi the letter
due follows. Which is great, that's how it should be. There 's no good Bill coming out
and saymg yes I see what you mean, I'll have to refer it back other.vise it lakes weeks
and if you 'ye got a problem it needs sorting out straight away, it doesn't want to
disappear and come back in afew weeks time ".
This was supported by other agreement holders within the case study ESAs:
7 sometimes contact him, for permission to use herbicides ... we 'ye dthcussed it and
yea, no problems at all. He gave me verbal permission followed by a letter, so we just
got on with it" [BrecklandESA participant].
"We wanted to put afence around our new bit of grassland at the top so that we could
put our sheep in, because obviously its part of the agreement that you should graze the
field But before we could go ahead we had to wait for the official ministry go ahead
and it was on and on and on ... in the end we just went ahead and did it. ... I asked the
project officer what are we going to do and he said 'well, it will get approved, so I
wouldjust go on and do it'. Ii has lobe like that, if it warn '1, if it was run entirely by the
official then ii would be very irksome because its pretty ponderously slow" [Cotswold
Hills ESA, participant].
MAFF recognises that such decisions are taken on the spot by the POs/APOs and, as a result,
they are currently considering a possible system whereby the FRCA POs/APOs are given
greater powers of authority to issue the derogation on behalf of MAFF. According to the
Cotswold Hills ESA P0, "it would still have to be in some sort of written format. It could be
on some pad which you copied onto the file. It must be on file because basically it is a
variation of a legal agreement". However, despite these statutory requirements such a possible
system is indicative of the level of trust that MAFF places in the professionalism and
discretionary powers of the individual PO/APO.
The issue of trust, as Chapter 2 outlined, has been a central feature of many policy studies
which have in particular focused upon the relationship between street-level bureaucrats and
their hierarchical superiors (see Lipsky, 1980; Laffin., 1986). Breton and Wintrobe (1982)
argued, for example, that, if policy makers wish for their objectives to be implemented within
the locality, then they need to trust in the professionalism of the ground level implementers.
Laffin (1986) went as far as to argue that the implementation of policies is ultimately
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dependent upon the level of trust and respect that officials have for the professionalism of the
street-level bureaucrat. Indeed, while analysis has already indicated that the implementation of
UK agri-environmental schemes is, in part, shaped by the various methods of bureaucratic
accountability, MAFF trusts in the professionalism of the individual FRCA PO/APO to make
appropriate decisions and recommendations in the field, as evident in relation to the
administration of derogations. Additionally, however, this level of trust is exhibited by the fact
that MAFF has left it to the discretion of the individual P0 APO to adopt appropriate
methodologies and strategies in order to implement their respective agri-environmental
schemes. However, while pohtical-economy analysts, such as Barrett and Fudge (1981) and
Cloke and Little (1990) argue that individual bureaucrats will draw upon their professionalism
and utilise such trust and discretionary freedom in order to exert their own interests and
objectives, evidence from the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs indicates that, like the
coping strategies of Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucrat, the FRCA PO/APO will use their
own knowledge and judgement in order to adopt appropriate strategies that enable them to
implement MAFF's agri-environmental schemes as efficiently and effectively as possible
within specific local circumstances.
5.6	 Implementation Strategies Adopted by the FRCA Project Officer
As Chapter 4 outlined, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs are fundamentally different in
terms of scheme requirements, participation levels, and length of existence. The Breckland
ESA scheme targets specific habitats, most notably heathiand, while the Cotswold Hills ESA is
a whole farm scheme. Further, the Cotswold Hills ESA is a younger scheme with higher rates
of farmer participation than the Breckland ESA scheme. From interviews conducted with the
POs/APOs implementing the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, it is evident that these local
farm and scheme factors have greatly influenced the strategies adopted by the individual
POs/APOs when implementing the agri-environmental schemes in the locality.
In terms of initially promoting the ESAs, the POs/APOs revealed that in both the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESAs, the schemes were promoted through the use of promotional
literature and land holder meetings. A number of those farmers interviewed within the ESAs
outlined for example that:
there was a meeting in a local hotel where they [POs/APOs] explained it. I had
had the bumf before that literali5, about a month before that ... I went to the meeting
and they gave us some more details about ii" (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
"They [M4FFJ sent me on information pack telling me what 1 would have to do, or not
to do and then I went to this meeting that was held in a hotel in Andoversfor4 Just down
the road" (Cotswold Hills EA, participant).
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"... there was a meeting afew years ago in the Carmgee Rooms in The(ford There was
0101 offarmers there all within the ESA area, and general ESA problems/benefits were
explained and questions asked" (Breckland ESA, participant).
"Eve,ybody was sent a full information pack about ii" (Breck/and ESA,
non-participant).
However, following the launch of the ESA schemes, both the Breckland and the Cotswold
Hills ESA POs/APOs revealed that in light of local farm and scheme factors, different
implementation strategies where adopted, when, in accordance with MAFF's MoU the
POs/APOs sought to enrol farmers into individual ESA agreements.
Bre ckland ESA
The Breckland ESA is dominated by large landowners, such as the Forestry Commission, the
Ministry of Defence and the Elveden and Euston Estates. Owning approximately 52 per cent of
the land area covered by the Breckland ESA, it is not surprising that approximately 72 per cent
of the ESA habitat target areas (i.e. Heathland and wetlands) are situated on these large land
holdings. Accordingly, the Breckland ESA P0 outlined how he decided to initially target the
large landowners within the ESA in order to try to enrol extensive areas of vulnerable habitat
into the part-farm scheme. He asserted that:
as most of the heathlan which is the habitat which we are really targeting, as that
was mainly on areas such as the Stanford Training Ground [owned by the MoD] and
the two Estates, well it was obvious that I should try and get them into the scheme first '
In doing so, the Breckland ESA P0 went on to outline how he effectively adopted a
progressive farmer strategy that has been commonly applied by the P0's predecessors within
ADAS (see section 3.3). By targeting larger landowners in the Breckland ESA, the P0 felt that
other smaller farmers in the area may follow the example of the dominant local farmers and,
thus, participate in the ESA scheme. As the P0 outlined:
"... I targeted the big obvious ones [farmers] in the hope that they would encourage
other, smaller farmers to join '
A number of agri-environmental researchers have highlighted the importance and influence of
local farming networks, or, as Wilson (1996:72) describes, 'the dynamics within the farm
district', in terms of transferring information, knowledge and experience of agri-environmental
schemes to individual farmers. In particular, Wilson (1996) argues that factors such as whether
neighbours are participating in an agn-environmental scheme, the influential behaviour of
community leaders, or the pace of innovation diffusion within a local fanning community may
influence individual farmers' decisions to participate in an agri-environmental scheme (see also
Jones, 1963, Wilson, 1992). However, it was evident from those interviews conducted with
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farmers participating and not participating in the Breckland ESA scheme that the FRCA P0's
progressive fanner strategy was largely ineffectual in encouraging smaller farmers to join the
scheme. Asked if they ever discussed the ESA scheme with their neighbours three Breckland
farmers replied that:
"No, you just stick to fanning. We know what each other is spraying but not what we
are doing with the ESA strips of/he grassland"
"We talk at meetings occasionally. I think that each place has its own particular issues
and! 'ye never even thought of/a/king about it with them ".
"We don't talk about the ESA. Obviously we do see them but we don't dthcuss the
scheme ".
According to the Brecks Countryside Project officer, this lack of communication between
neighbouring farmers can partly be explained by the fact that the farming community within
the Brecklands is elitist, with the large estates and landowners not communicating with the
smaller farmers. In a recent interview he argued that:
"... the large landowners have good networks amongst one another, but they just don't
ta/k to the smaller farmers and so the experiences and knowledge of the large
landowners don '1 reach the smaller ones '
Such findings have been replicated within a number of other studies that have sought to
analyse the role and influence of farming networks on individuals' agri-environmental
decisions and actions. Within her study of agri-environmental participation within the North
and South Downs, Morris (1993:133) found, for example, that "both adopters and
non-adopters became aware of the scheme through similar channels (notably the farming press
and ADAS), with neighbouring farmers being of practically no importance in this respect".
Additionally, Wilson (1997), in relation to the Cambrian Mountains ESA, found that farmers
rarely discussed the ESA scheme with one another. Instead, typical responses from farmers he
interviewed included 'don't know how many neighbours joined' and 'never discussed it with
them'.
Since launching the scheme ten years ago, the Breckland ESA P0 has taken a re-active
approach to managing the ESA scheme. A number of those farmers interviewed within the
Breckland ESA outlined that, since participating within the scheme, the P0 has rarely
contacted them since their individual agreements were drawn up. Instead, it has been lefi to the
agreement holders to contact the P0 for advice or to request a derogation. As three farmers
explained:
"I'm in contact with him, I suppose once or twice a year, usually in June, just before the
prescri bed periodfor cutting the grass swara Just to check with him when I should cut
the grass ".
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"I contact him about once or twice a year ... I have a lot of weeds in the meadow -
thistles and nettles - if! want to spray them or do something with them I have to contact
him and get permission before I can do anything. That 's usually the main reason for
contacting him '
"Once or twice a year I see him, if that ... if! need him to come and look at a specific
problem or there's a specific problem which I think should be drawn to his attention
then obviously I ring him and he pops out to have a look '
Additionally, in terms of the non-participants situated within the Breckland ESA, the P0
appears to have little contact, if any with such individuals. Indeed, following those interviews
conducted with non-participants in the area it was revealed that, with the exception of two
fonner ESA participants, none of the non-participants had any contact with the ESA P0, with
one farmer not even realising that the ESA scheme existed. As the non-participants sought to
outline:
"No, I've had no contact from anyone promoting the scheme"
"We 'ye had no contactfrom anyone, apart from just general promotional literature"
"I 'in afraid I 'in rather ignorant about it all. I've never had any contact with anyone
about the scheme. Could you just explain to me what it is ".
"I've had contact with the project officer, but not in relation to the ESA scheme ".
Deciding to adopt such a reactive approach to managing the Breckland ESA has resulted in the
P0 becoming the focus of some criticism amongst a number of environmental groups with an
interest in the agri-enviromnental conservation of the Brecklands. According to the Brecks
Countiyside Project officer, for example, the ESA P0 needs to do more to encourage further
conservation practices within existing management agreements. Currently, "he may visit a
farmer and say 'yes you can put that field into tier H', but he will not look at the rest of the
farm and say 'in addition to that you could do that to the woodlands, put a fence here or a pond
there" (Hooton, 1997). Additionally, the Brecks Countryside Project officer went on to argue,
that the ESA P0 needs to make a greater effort to contact the smaller non-participants within
the area:
"The small landowners need to be contacted There wa a survey done in 1993 about
how many landowners knew about the ESA and it wa surprising that so many in the
area didn't know that it existed'
However, the reactive approach adopted by the Breckland ESA P0 is partly in reaction to the
limited amount of time that he can devote to the implementation of the scheme. In addition to
implementing the ESA scheme, the Breckland P0 is committed to implementing the Habitat
Scheme within Norfolk and Suffolk. Additionally, he is also involved with the implementation
of Nitrate Sensitive Areas within East Anglia, and is a member of vanous executive boards of
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groups such as Suffolk FWAG. In the light of such additional work commitments it is not
surprising, therefore, that, like Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucrat, the Breckland ESA P0
has had to adopt various coping strategies in order to implement MAFF's Breckland ESA
scheme as efficiently as possible.
Cotswold Hills ESA
With support from five APOs, the individual Cotswold Hills ESA P0 has been able to take a
more pro-active approach to implementing the Cotswold Hills ESA scheme compared to his
colleague in the Brecklands. hnplementing one of the youngest ESA schemes, the Cotswold
Hills ESA P0 and APOs were, at the time of the field survey, actively promoting the scheme
throughout the Cotswold farming community. As a whole farm scheme the P0 and APOs had
adopted a blanket approach and targeted all farmers eligible to participate in the Cotswold
Hills ESA scheme, irrespective of the habitats present on their farm or their position within the
local fanning community. As the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 explained:
'...the first year, when the scheme was launched MAFF sent a full information pack to
all known holdings over, I can't remember the exact size, but it was probably over five
hectares, the very small ones weren 't eligible to enter into the scheme. So, we basically
contacted everyone who would be eligible tojoin"
Since initially launching the ESA, the Cotswold Hills P0 and APOs have gone on to actively
promote the scheme to all farmers within the area. As more farmers have enrolled into the
scheme the P0 and APOs have, in accordance with MAFF's MOU, taken on greater
responsibilities to manage individual ESA agreements. However, the PO/APOs assert that they
are continuously contacting non-participants in order to persuade and encourage them to enrol
into MAFF's agri-enviromnental objectives, as the Cotswold Hills P0 went on to outline:
"...after the scheme had been running for iwo years and we had a payment review and
we actually produced a supplementary newsletter simply addressing the payment review
and what that meant, and we try to write it in such a way that ii informed the existing
landholders of the changes, but tried to engender some enthusiasm in the non
agreement holders and that had blanket circulation again ... this year we have decided
not to send anything out and what we are doing is looking at the uptake maps and
identifying the holes and then trying to ascertain who actually farms the holes and make
contact with them ".
Thus, with a greater number of officers implementing the Cotswold Hills ESA it is evident that
a more proactive approach has been facilitated. More farmers have been contacted throughout
the promotion of the scheme and subsequently the P0 and APOs have had the time to
frequently visit ESA agreement holders. As one farmer participating in the ESA helped to
outline:
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"... She [the APO] has come to see us quite regularly since we first joined Sometimes
its because I 'w called her out to look at something, but often she 'II Just phone up and
ask if she can come out and have a look and a chat, which is great, we never mind her
coming ".
5.7	 Conclusion.
It has been argued elsewhere that the local-level implementer is a highly autonomous policy
actor, whose personal decisions and actions may greatly detennine the outcome of an
individual policy (Prottas, 1977; Lipsky, 1980; Hudson, 1993). It is believed that policy
makers are highly dependent upon the individual implementer, and will, wherever possible,
seek to co-operate with the objectives of the policy implementer. The analysis here has shown,
however, that the agri-environmental implementer is permitted limited autonomous
decision-making powers in the implementation of individual agri-environmental schemes. In
accordance with bureaucratic rules imposed by MAFF and the FRCA, the individual PU is
forced to comply with an implementation process that is largely shaped and defined by their
bureaucratic superiors. The POs stated that they regard themselves as servants to the
agricultural ministry, and asserted that their primary objective is to implement the
agri-environmental schemes on behalf of MAFF and to ensure that MAFF's objectives are
enacted at the ground level.
The analysis went on to reveal, however, that the relationship between the individual P0 and
their bureaucratic superiors is not as subservient as outlined above. Officials withm MAFF and
the FRCA asserted that they trust in the professionalism of the FRCA POs/APOs and, within
the boundaries of legislation, they will permit the POs a relative degree of discretionary
freedom. This was primarily evident where the PO's/APO's recommendations for derogations
were generally accepted by MAFF. Further, MAFF asserted that the FRCA POs/APOs will
require a certain degree of autonomy in order to ensure that MAFF's own national
agn-environmental objectives will be efficiently and effectively implemented on individual
farm holdings. In this context, it was evident that the POs in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs were permitted the autonomy to decide upon the most appropriate implementation
strategies to adopt for their individual ESA schemes. However, where the POs were permitted
a relative degree of freedom from the powers of MAFF, any notion of an autonomous
agri-environmental implementer was eroded as it became evident that their implementomy
decisions and actions were further shaped and influenced by a number of local and scheme
factors, such as the size of their respective ESA scheme, the number of farmers in the schemes
and local farming community dynamics. In this context, the analysis has so far shown that the
agri-environmental implementer is part of an emerging agri-environmental implementation
network whose actors, most notably MAFF, have considerable power and control over the role
of the agri-environmental implementer (Fig. 5.5). In accordance with the actor-network
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methodology, however, the analysis of the role and influence of the agri-environmental
implementer has merely begun. In their interviews both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA
POs revealed that farmers are prominent actors in their agri-environmental implementation
network. In seeking to analyse the complexity and power relations in the agri-environmental
implementation process the following chapter seeks to examine the relationship of farmers with

































FRCA Project Officer-Farmer Relationship
6.1	 Introduction
As chapter 3 discussed, the voluntary nature of the UK's agri-environmental schemes has
meant that fanners have had to be persuaded and cajoled into agri-environmental participation.
Operating at the ground level and in direct contact with the farming community, it has been the
role of the FRCA POs/APOs to 'sell' the agri-environmental schemes to farming communities
and to try to encourage individual farmers to implement MAFF's agri-environmental
objectives. This chapter seeks to outline the relationship that the FRCA POs in the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESAs have with farmers eligible to participate in the ESA schemes.
It is widely acknowledged that farmers are powerful autonomous decision-makers. Many
farmers may wish to accept, reject or modify the POs'/APOs' arguments in accordance with
their individual lifeworids, which, as many researchers have highlighted, are comprised of a
network of factors such as a farmers' age, education, and income dependency (see Brotherton,
1989, 1991; Mon-is and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1996, 1997). Given the qualitative nature of this
research, the analysis does not seek to re-evaluate the number of factors influencing farmers'
decisions, however, the chapter will seek briefly to outline how the farmers interviewed in the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs support the findings of many research studies, by
revealing that the FRCA PO/APO is not the only factor influencing farmers' decisions to
participate in the ESA schemes. Following this, however, the main focus of the chapter is to
analyse how the FRCA POs/APOs operate in this complex network of factors influencing
farmers' decisions. In particular, attention is paid to the strategies adopted by the POs/APOs as
they attempt to persuade, convince and enrol as many fanners into the ESA schemes as
possible. Further, having secured the co-operation of farmers, the chapter seeks to demonstrate
how the FRCA POs/APOs ensure that individual agreement holders remain faithful to MAFF's
agri-environmental objectives. The second half of the chapter then turns to the attitudes of the
farmers participating and not-participating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA schemes.
Particular attention is paid to their views on the role of the FRCA P0, and the ideal
characteristics which farmers look for in a personal agri-environmental implementer.
156
6.2.	 Agri-Environmental Participation
As chapter 3 outlined, many agri-environmental researchers have recognised that the individual
on-farm conservation advisor plays a central role in influencing farmers decisions to adopt
general farm conservation practices. Westmacott and Worthington (1974) noted, for example,
that an enthusiastic advisor could facilitate the development of 'new' agri-environmental
policies, while Ward (1994:185) went so far as to argue that, for farmers situated in the Ouse
catchment area of Eastern England, "the risk of taking action ... [related to pesticide
applicationsi ... independent of ... [their] ... advisor was too great for most farmers". Although
this is less conclusive in the context of agri-environmental schemes, a few researchers have
drawn tentative conclusions, where the FRCA P0 is believed to be an influential actor in
farmers' decisions to participate in an agri-environmental scheme. hi his study of the Cambrian
Mountains ESA Wilson (1996, 1997) found, for example, that many farmers would receive and
implement the advice of the ESA P0. This was further supported by Moss (1994) and Skerratt
(1994). Reflecting these empirical studies, it is evident in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs that for many of those farmers interviewed, the FRCA POs/APOs occupy an influential
position in their decisions to participate in the ESA schemes. The majority of the farmers
surveyed spoke highly of their respective PO/APO, and some farmers argued that they would
not have participated in the schemes if it had not been for the advice and encouragement
disseminated by the individual POs/APOs. This was clearly expressed by two farmers
participating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs.
"... with what I'm doing, I just wouldn't have bothered if I hadn't had the lime and
respect for Bill Nickson [PD]" (BrecklandESA, participant).
"I am absolutely sure that we wouldi, 'I have been part of the scheme if it warn 'tfor Mr
Appleton [P0]" (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
However, it is widely acknowledged, and accepted, that farmers are powerful autonomous
decision makers who may accept or reject the advice of the FRCA P0 and will do so in
accordance with a network of micro and macro-structural factors, which have been identified
as shaping and influencing farmers' agri-environmental decision-making practices (see section
3.4.1). Providing further empirical evidence to support the existence of this network, the
farmers interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs revealed that, while the FRCA
P0 was, for some, an important and influential actor, most of the participants and
non-participants interviewed outlined how other factors proved to be more influential in
shaping their decisions to participate in the ESA schemes. One farmer currently not
participating in the Breckland ESA scheme supported Potter and Lobley's (1992) successor
factor when he outlined that, while he had received advice and encouragement from the FRCA
P0, his need to secure a profitable business for his son, who was to succeed him on the farm,
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proved to be more important than adhering to the POs recommendations of participatmg in the
ESA scheme. As the farmer explained:
"..oh yea, that chap came round from the ministry [the PU] to explain what 1 would
have to do if! went into the scheme. You see, I was quite interested in it at first. There
was so much initial publicity and I thought why not, lets see what it's all about, but
when !found out what would be involved I realised that! coukln '1 afford to go into it as
it would leave my son with too many restrictions when he takes over the farm ..."
(BrecklandESA, non-participant).
Further, another non-participant in the Breckland ESA asserted that, while contact was made
with the FRCA P0, the restnctions on the irrigation of land imposed under the Breckland ESA
scheme (see appendix 2), forced him to reject the advice of the P0 as constant irrigation is
needed on his land in order to facilitate the cultivation of any arable or horticultural crop.
"Well the Brecks is extremely thy, sandy soil and my farm is on one of the sandiest
parts of the area so you see I need to irrigate it constantly and the SA scheme
wouldn't let me do that, so I had no choice really ... it was either go into the scheme and
give up farming or continue to irrigate the land ... I'm a farmer that's what I do, so!
choose to farm".
For most of the farmers interviewed in the two ESAs, it was revealed that the primary reasons
for their adoption or non-adoption of the ESA schemes was routed in personal financial
motivations. The non-participants interviewed outlined how they felt that the scheme payments
were inadequate as a means of supporting their farm businesses, while many of the
participants, most notably in the Cotswold Hills ESA, spoke of the financial benefits of
entering into the ESA scheme especially where financial grants could be obtained for restoring
dry stone walls in the Cotswolds. As these various farmers outlined:
"We never intended joining because of financial reasons surprisingly enaugk The
payments were not good enough. They are only 10% of what we can do economically"
(BrecklandESA, non-participant).
"The PU did come round to discuss the scheme with me, but basically I haven 't got
enough capital to join the scheme" (BrecklandESA, non-participant).
"I did it for the money at the end of the day" (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant)
"The payments per acre were obviously rather tempting, that's why we did it I suppose"
(BrecklandESA, participant).
"Basically I joined because they were funding all the things that I was wanting to do
and couldn't really do beforehand" (Cotsivold Hills ESA, participant).
"Well the remuneration is worthwhile against any snags" (Colswold Hills ESA,
participant).
"... the ESA scheme pays me according to its scheme and I sit back and watch, its
better than farmmg" (Breck/and FSA, Jxirticlpant).
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"1 make no bones about ii, our biggest reason for going, or being keen about the ESA is
the walls " (Coiswold Hills ESA, participant).
"...the main reason for Joining the scheme was that well, really for getting the walling
grants " (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
"I was a bit ashamed of the dry stone walls, so as a scheme that eventually restores
them, not that they are useal but any scheme that would restore them would be great"
(CotswoldThlls ESA, participant).
In this context, it is evident that like many previous research studies, farmers' decisions to
participate in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs are taken within a complex network of
influencing factors. In this case study, the FRCA PO/APO was, for some farmers, an influential
actor, but ultimately farmers' personal financial situations and motivations influenced their
decisions to participate in the ESA schemes.
Analysing the P0 postal questionnaire, it is evident that the FRCA POs/APOs are not ignorant
of the fact that, for many farmers, their decisions to participate or not participate in an
agri-environmental scheme will be taken in response to a network of structural and agency
factors within which the POs themselves may be of little influence on farmers'
agn-environmental decisions. As Table 6.1 outlines, for example, the majority of POs/APOs
surveyed recognised that financial factors will be a driving force for many farmers
agri-environmental participatory decisions, while only 6 (1000) of the POs/APOs regarded
themselves as influential actors in farmers' decision-making processes.
Determinants	 NO. FRCA PO/APOs
(non-exclusive categories)	 _____________________________________
Economics	 53
How scheme fits in with farm business	 27
Conservation attitude of farmer	 19
Scheme flexibility 	 9
Relationship with P0 APO	 6
Successor factor	 4
Perceived bureaucracy 	 3
Scheme duration	 3
Influence of neighbouring farmers 	 3
Farmer's age	 3
Changes in fanner's personal circumstances	 3
Wider food markets	 3
Previous relationship with MAFF 	 2
Influence of environmental groups	 I
Agn-environmental eligibility 	 1
Table 6.1. FRCA POs'/APOs' perceptions of factors influencing farmers' agri-environmental
decisions (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
159
In this context, it is evident that the FRCA POsIAPOs are faced with a difficult task of
adhering to MAFF's MoU which, as Chapter 5 outlined, insists that the FRCA P0 must
persuade and encourage many farmers to enrol in MAFF's agri-environmental objectives.
Rather than simply promoting the agri-environmental schemes amongst the farming
communities, the FRCA POs/APOs must evidently compete with the network of factors which
have been identified to influence farmers' agri-environmental decisions. They must convince
farmers that whatever their personal circumstances are, participating in an agri-environmental
scheme will be of benefit to themselves as well as to the countryside. In a review of the UK's
ESA schemes, Jenkins (1990:30) argued that "the marketing of an ESA scheme and the 'image
created for it among farmers is important if farmers' innate conservatism and unwillingness to
be subject to outside restrictions on their fanning activities are to be overcome". The
agri-environmental schemes must be marketed, they must be sold to the farming community as
a worthwhile investment. According to the South Wessex Downs ESA P0, this marketing
strategy has become a central feature of the POs' role as an agri-environmental implementer.
He asserts that:
"... obviously farmers will react to a number of personal factors before deciding to
participate in an agn-environmental scheme. Naturally I respect the decisions made by
farmers, but I still have to work against this background of determinants in order to
encourage farmers to join in the scheme. Basically, I've got to sell the scheme to the
farmers. I've got to by and convince them that they would benefit by joining the
scheme '
But how does the individual FRCA P0/APO do this? How do they attempt to market the
scheme and persuade farmers to enrol into agri-environmental management agreements?
6.3. Enrolling Farmers into Individual Management Agreements.
As chapter 5 outlined, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs were forced, in the light of
local circumstances, to adopt different implementation strategies when initially launching their
respective ESA schemes. Given limited temporal resources, it was evident that the Breckland
ESA P0 adopted a progressive farmer strategy and sought to initially market the ESA scheme
to specific farmers in the area, while the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 and APOs were able to adopt
a more proactive approach and target all farmers in the ESA (see section 5.6). Despite
adopting different promotional strategies, however, it is evident that both the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESA POs have placed considerable emphasis on conducting individual farm
visits as a primary tool in which to persuade and enrol farmers into individual management
agreements. The Cotswold Hills ESA P0 outlined that whenever a fanner wishes to join the
ESA scheme, or simply requests information concerning the ESA, he will go out and visit the
individual farmer on his or her own farm before the individual agreement is drawn up and
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signed by all interested parties, notably MAFF and the farmer. According to the Cotswold Hills
ESA P0, an agn-environmental agreement is rarely drawn up and signed without a prior visit
from either himself or one of his five APOs.
"There are actually very, very few applications that come in out of the blue. Hardly any
we have nearly always been before the application comes in" (Appleton, 1997).
According to agricultural extension scientists, the individual farm visit is one of the most
appropriate and effective methodologies to use in the dissemination of 'new' advice and
information (Singh, 1981; Benor et al., 1984; Roling, 1988). On-farm visits give the advisor
the opportunity to view the individual farm holding and to assess how a policy or technology
may be integrated within the farmers' personal fann plan. Further, van den Ban and Hawkins
(1988) assert that individual farm visits enable the farmer to express their personal concerns or
objectives more easily within a non-threatening and familiar environment. As Chapter 5
discussed, the generality of the agri-environmental schemes can not account for the
distinctiveness of the individual farm holding, but by visiting the farmers and observing the
individual farm businesses and ecosystems the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 believes that he can
advise and assist the farmers to implement MAFF's agn-environmental objectives in relation to
their individual farm business plans. As the P0 explained:
"Well! think that with something like this [the ESA] it is not simply a sort of take it or
leave it thing. It has to be built around their farm business. They [the farmers] are
committing themselves for quite a long time. There are significant restrictions on what
they do ... but we can usually build an agreement around an existing farm system, but
the restrictions are there ".
Many of the participants interviewed outlined how they considered these farm visits to be
exiremely useful during the initial stages of deciding to participate in the ESA schemes. One
farmer currently participating in the Breckland ESA argued that:
"... imilally I was a bit unsure about the ESA. When it first came out there was loads of
publicity. MAFF sent me an information pack, but! thdn '1 know how it could apply to
my fann. So I called out the scheme manoger bloke and it was really useful as he
walked around the farm with me and we discussed how I couldjoin the scheme and what
Ishould do with it ...".
During these initial farm visits, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs went on to outline
that the level of advice given to the farmers can valy from one individual to another, depending
upon the farmers' own knowledge, experience and expertise with agri-environmental
conservation. Often the POs/APOs will just have to visit the farmers in order to discuss and
approve their ESA plans. A number of the farmers interviewed within the two ESAs outlined,
for example, that when they first decided to enter into their respective ESA scheme, they
already knew which tiers to enter specific areas of their farm land under and simply sought the
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POs'/APOs' reassurance that their plans would be applicable under MAFF legislation. As the
farmers explained:
"I decided which areas logo in, the project officer didn't tell me. One just picked a tier
and an area "(Breckland JSA, participant).
"Ijust told him what I wanted to do under the scheme and he saidfine" (Cotswold Hills
ESA, participant).
However, with the majority of farmers in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, the POs
outlined that many farmers require more detailed advice on general conservation issues and, in
particular, how they might implement the different ESA tiers on their individual farm holdings.
The Breckland ESA P0 explained that:
"... on the whole Ihave to go to the farmers and give them a lot of advice and help on
what the ESA scheme is trying to achieve and how they may help to contribute to the
schemes' objectives by entering relevant parts of their land into the specific ESA tiers.
I mean, most farmers have read through the information booklet that was sent to
them at the launch of the scheme, but they still need a lot of guidance as to how they
can apply the requirements of the scheme on their own farm ... ".
This was further supported by a number of those farmers interviewed in the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs who spoke of the level of detail that they received from their respective
PO/APOs when they were first considering to join the ESA schemes.
'7 do remember, I did have the four categories explarned to mein detail and I was able
to say no to three of them there and then" (BrecklandESA, participant).
"I got one of them [the P0 APOs] to come out and we went round the farm looking at
the walls, and! wanted to know more about it, what was the sort of tiers to put things in.
So they drew up a plan and suggested the tiers that I should go into winch seemed
sensible" (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
"... the people [P0 APOs] came round You rang them up and said 'bA; I'm
interested in this scheme ' and they caine round and talked to you ... they caine out and
discussed the restrictions and the benefits and then suggested what we could do"
(Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
However, while the initial farm visits provide a medium through which the FRCA POs/APOs
may advise and enrol farmers into the individual ESA schemes, a question often raised by
agri-environmental researchers is to what extent do farmers listen to and take on board the
advice of conservation advisors? In the context of this research, do farmers adhere to the
advice which the FRCA P0 provides during the farm visits or, as autonomous
decision-makers, do they attempt to follow their own agri-environmental objectives when
participating in an agn-environmental scheme?
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As Chapter 3 outlined, a number of researchers have expressed scepticism as to the level of
conservation advice which is actually implemented by farmers in the locality (Carr, 1988;
Lowe et al., 1990). In the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, however, little evidence
suggests that the farmers interviewed attempted to de!y the advice and recommendations that
the POs provided through their initial farm visits. All of the farmers outlined the tiers that were
recommended by the FRCA P0, and these were subsequently verified against the farmers'
individual ESA management agreements which were made available for observation during
many of the farmer interviews. In this context, it was evident that the FRCA POs/APOs had
succeeded in persuading farmers to adhere to their initial suggestions of how the farmers may
implement the ESA schemes on their individual farm holdings. But how did the POs achieve
this?
6.4.	 Gaining Farmers Trust and Co-Operation.
Recognising that farmers are autonomous decision-makers, agricultural extension scientists
argue that agricultural advisors and implementers have had to gain the co-operation and trust of
the individual farmer in order that they may have some influence over fanners' decisions and
actions. According to van den Ban and Hawkins (1988), it is only when the extension agent
has gained the trust and respect of the farmers that they may influence the strategic decisions of
the individual farmer. This has been further supported by Eldon (1988) who argues, in his
study of farm conservation advisors, that the adoption and implementation of
agri-environmental advice is dependent upon the level of trust between farmers and
conservation advisors. Likewise, Revill and Seymour (1996) found that 'Bob', their Pollution
Inspector, regarded a trusting relationship between himself and farmers as his main instrument
for improving water quality.
Emulating these research studies, it is evident from the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs
that, as the issue of trust emerged as a central feature of the relationship between MAFF and
the FRCA PO/APO (see section 5.5), the relationship that exists between the POs and farmers
in the two ESAs is primarily based upon mutual trust and respect. In their interviews, both the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs spoke of the importance of establishing a strong and
trusting relationship with farmers in order to facilitate the implementation of their respective
agri-environmental schemes. The Breckland ESA P0 noted, for example, that:
"...farmers are naturally sceptical individuak You din 't want to go in there like a
'bull in a china shop', selling the scheme hard As a project officer you need to build up
a gcxl rapport with the farmer. You need to try and gain their mist in you, otherwise
you aren '1 going to get anyvhere".
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Concomitantly, one farmer within the Cotswold Hills ESA explained that his relationship with
his APO, is "a bit like your vet or your machinery supplier you use 90 per cent of the time.
You know, you get quotes from others, but you build up a working relationship with these
people, you trust them and you welcome their ideas and suggestions".
According to the Breckland ESA P0, such a working relationship can take many years to build
and establish.
'1 think anybody going into an area cold, ii takes quite a long time to just build up
contacts and liaison ... u are talking about a couple ofyears at least to get properly
established'
Indeed, when asked if it took the POs/APOs a long time (i.e. over a year) to build up a rapport
with the farmers located in their area of work, 37 per cent of the POs/APOs surveyed through
the postal questionnaire revealed that often it can take many years to gain the trust of the
farming community. One P0 implementing the Pennine Dales ESA outhned, for example, that:
"... it took about three years to buildup a rapport with the farmers. It's understandable
as farmers are often waiy ofpeople coming on to their farms ...
Establishing Trust
In seeking to gain the trust and co-operation of the farmers eligible to participate in the ESA
schemes, it was evident that both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs sought to adopt
a conciliatory approach when attempting to enrol farmers into individual management
agreements. According to the Breckland ESA P0, whenever he first visits a potential
participant he will not seek to dictate to the farmer which land or ESA tiers he/she should enter
into the scheme. Instead, he will firstly seek to listen to the interests and objectives of the
individual fanner. He will attempt to understand the vision that the fanner has of his individual
farm. Having maintained this initial silent and objective role, the Breckland ESA P0 insists
that he will then seek to discuss, advise and suggest how the agreement holder may implement
the scheme in relation to their individual farm plans. As the Breckland ESA P0 explained:
"I talk through the requirements of the scheme and the management implications with
the farmer. ... I think that ifu persuade somebody against their will and then they find
m a couple of years down the line that its really causing a lot of management
difficulties, then I would rather awud i/wit from the outset, so! do tiyto talk through the
management imphcations and to get them to be happy with it so thai it fits in well with
the farming system ".
This was further supported by one of the farmers interviewed within the Breckland ESA who
explained that, when he first decided to join the scheme:
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"he [the PU] came out and we sort of looked at the maps ... and then we sat down to
discuss which tiers we would enter and why we thought that they [conserwilion
headlands] would be more suitable for the farm" (emphasis added).
In this context, the individual farmer is afforded some degree of autonomy in deciding how to
implement their individual management agreement. Participating in the schemes, farmers are
bound by MAFF's rules and regulations, but the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs seek
to maintain a non-dictatorial role and, instead, discuss farmers' own ideas as to how MAFF' s
objectives can be integrated with their current farming system. In doing so, the FRCA PO/APO
has succeeded in gaining the trust and co-operation of many of the farmers interviewed in the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. They recognise that the POs listen to their concerns and
objectives and will, where possible, seek to help them to implement these when participating in
the ESA schemes. Two farmers participating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs
explained:
"yea, he 's [P0] good. When he visits the farm he 'II always chat about general issues
and always seems ready to listen to what I've got to say, which is amazing for a civil
servant, usually they haven 't got a clue how to communicate with real people!"
(BreckiandESA, participant).
"Richard [P0] came round at the begrnning andjust went over the scheme with me. I
foundthazIwasabletotellhimexactywhatIwantedtodo... there seemedto be no
problems with it. He told me that, that would be fine - to be honest I was a bit shocked,
at first! was a bit reluctant about going in for any scheme as I always though that it'd
siop me from farming the way I want to, but so far I've had no problems..." (CoLswold
Hills FSA, participant)
Interestingly, two of the non-participants in the Cotswold Hills ESA also spoke of their respect
for the P0 and APOs. They asserted that, while personal financial circumstances prevented
them from participating in the schemes, they respected the fact that when the FRCA P0 visited
their fann to tiy and encourage them to join the scheme the P0 did not attempt to force or
pressunse them to participate. They outlined that, instead, the P0 took the time to listen to
their problems and evidently understood why, at that time, they could not afford to participate
in the scheme. One of the farmers interviewed went on to outline, however, that since the P0
visited him to promote the scheme, his circumstances have changed and he is currently
considering contacting the FRCA P0 to request another visit to discuss how he may participate
in the ESA.
In this context, therefore, it is evident that by mamtaining a non-dictatorial role and seeking to
understand farmers individual objectives the FRCA POs/APOs may gain the trust and
co-operation of both existing and future agri-environmental participants. Supporting these
findings, Lowe et a!. (1997) have recently found in relation to their study of farm pollution
regulation, that advisors will seek to enter into the world of the individual farmer. They will
attempt to understand farmers' personal interests and objectives so that they may work with
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the farmers, assistmg them to implement their objectives within the confines of regulatory
boundaries. As Lowe et al. (1997:207) observed
"... to satisj5 individual farmers it was important that the advice was tailored to their
specific circumstances and concerns ... ADAS advisors saw themselves as serving the
farmers' interest ... In seeing farmers first, as 'our clients ADAS staff assigned certain
interests to them. In particular, the farmer 's commercial interest were viewed as
predominant for example, in assessing what the farmer 'can realistically do".
By entering the world of the individual fanner and legitimising their interests in the official
policy process, Lowe et al. (1997) conclude that the advisors were able to gain the trust and
co-operation of many farmers as they became increasingly dependent on the advisors as a
means through which their personal interests could be implemented in the regulatory
framework of farm pollution.
Application Forms
Drawing upon the postal questionnaire and the interviews conducted in the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs, it is evident that the FRCA POs/APOs will attempt to adopt additional
methods in which to build and maintain farmers trust and co-operation. In particular, it is
evident that some FRCA POs/APOs will seek to assist farmers by filling out scheme
application forms on behalf of the farmers (Table 6.2).
__________________________ 	
No. FRCA PO/APO
Fanner fills out application form	 37
PO/APO fills out application form	 14
Environmental advisor fills out application form 	 6
No answer	 3
TOTAL	 60
Table 6.2. Number of FRCA POs/APOs filling out agri-environmental agreement application
forms (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Currently, there is no specific requirement under MAFF's MoU that the FRCA P0 APOs
should fill out the application forms on behalf of a prospective agreement holder, but,
according to the Cotswold Hills ESA P0, bureaucratic forms can often act as a deterrent for
many farmers when they are considering participation in any new voluntary scheme. Thus, by
assisting farmers to fill out their application forms, the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 beheves that
they can attempt to break down any bureaucratic barriers in order for the ESA scheme to be as
user friendly as possible. As the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 and APO outlined:
"I don't kw'.v, there is a barrier with forms so what we actually do is say 'well look
there is the first page of the form, put your hokbng number there, you name in there,
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your address in there and you are an owner occupier so put that in there'. So you sort
of talk them through U" (Cotswold Hills ESA project officer).
"We do have to be a bit careful, but I do a lot more than perhaps I should Yea, we try
to help them with that and then once we do the application fonn, it 's not too hard for
them" (Cotswold Hills ESA assistant project officer).
It was evident from the farmer interviews conducted in the Cotswold Hills ESA, that a number
of the farmers participating m the scheme greatly appreciated the assistance that the P0 and
APOs could provide m respect to scheme applications. Many of the thrmers interviewed spoke
of the relative ease of implementing the ESA scheme and, as one farmer outlined, this was due
in part, to the assistance provided by the FRCA P0 when filling out the ESA application
forms.
"It was just a case of crossing l's and dotting i 's and I've always thought that the ESA
out of all the schemes kis been the most straightforward and best scheme to work with
and it is important that you have an individual project officer that you can liaise with ".
6.5	 Securing Farmers Trust and Co-Operation
Having enrolled farmers into individual agri-environmental management agreements the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs revealed that under MAFF's MoU they are expected
to continue to visit and advise participants on the implementation of their individual
agri-environmental agreement. As Chapter 5 discussed, this may include the recommendation
of derogations or the provision of advice whenever a farmer wishes to amend the specificity's
of their individual agreement. Moreover, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs argued
that they must continue to visit participating farmers in order to secure their co-operation and
alliance to MAFF's agri-environmental requirements. "Basically, we've got to make sure that
the farmers stick with the scheme. There is a five year opt out clause when a farmer can pull
out of their agreement with MAFF, but obviously once we've got them into the scheme we
want to keep them there" (Nickson, 1997).
According to both the ESA POs, they will attempt, where possible, to visit existing agreement
holders to informally discuss with the farmers how they are getting on with implementing the
ESA scheme. The Breckland ESA P0 notes that, due to limited temporal resources, the
number of visits he makes is rather limited, but he insists that" .... I do try and keep in touch
with existing agreement holders. It is very important to keep an eye on them, just to be there if
they need help". As Chapter 5 discussed, the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 is, on the other hand,
able to utilise the resources of his APOs and thus conduct many more visits to participating
farmers. According to one of the Cotswold Hills ESA APOs, there will be no fixed period in
which they will visit agreement holders. Naturally, the farmers may contact them for
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information or advice concerning a derogation at any time of the year and, likewise, the APO
asserts that they may call upon a fanner wherever they have time. As one farmer interviewed in
the Cotswold Hills ESA supported:
"Aly SA period with regard to thscussing work plans and things tends to happen front
the autumn through to say March, so I know in a period of no project work I actually
have no course to meet [with the APO], although having said that she [APO] thd ring
to say that she was going to call in when she was passing one day, just for a chat and
that's always welcomed"
During such farm visits, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs assert that the fanners are
given an opportunity to voice their opinions and concerns vis-a-vis the scheme rules, its
applicability at the farm level and whether any improvements could be made to the scheme
prescriptions. "We tiy to maintain our objective view during the visits. We listen to the farmers
and often they will just tell us what they think of the scheme, you know, whether its working
for them or some farmers have suggested ways in which they think the scheme could be
improved" (Appleton, 1997). The Cotswold Hills ESA P0 went on to discuss one particular
ESA participant who was considered by MAFF and the local farming community to be
something of a leading light in the area concerning agri-environmental conservation. The
Cotswold Hills ESA P0 outlined that during a number of farm visits the farmer had suggested
to him that the introduction of a field margin tier in the Cotswold Hills ESA scheme would be
beneficial. "Whenever I'd see him, he'd mention the need for field margins. He had a strong
argument though, and in fact we are going to put forward that suggestion to the Ministsy when
the scheme is reviewed in '981'99" (Appleton, 1997). Indeed, in an independent interview with
the same farmer he reiterated the need for conservation headlands in the ESA scheme, but
perhaps more importantly, he outhned how the individual farm visits provided him with a
means through which his opinions could be heard by the FRCA P0 APO. He argued that:
"... the thing thai sackiens me currently about the ESA is that there is no arable field
margins prescriptions. I am very strong in my views about that, because we
implemented field margins back íA '92 '93 and they have been a tremendous succes.
Lots offarmers show interest in them, but its quite a turn off when there is no support
mechanism or scheme .... I've spoke to Richard Appleton [the P0] about it He came to
visits me a short while ago and that actually look up most of the visit. ... He assures me
i/wit he will put it forward to the Ministry when the scheme comes up for review next,
which would be great ... as with so many arable farms in the area, the best thing that
they can do is to develop field margins "
As Chapter 3 discussed, MAFF's (House of Commons, 1996) Rural White Paper has set
provisions to promote effective consultation on agri-environmental schemes at both national
and local levels (see section 3.4.2). The annual regional liaison meetings, for example, were
introduced to give agreement holders the opportunity to discuss the effectiveness of their
respective agri-environmental scheme with MAFF and various local environmental
organisations. However, according to one of the farmers interviewed in the Breckland ESA,
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the annual liaison meetings do not enable all of the voices to be heard within the local farming
community.
"It 's the same with most things. You only ever get the larger, more vocal farmers at
these sorts of meetings. They will always speak up while others will just sit quietly in a
corner, or not turn up at all '
Moreover, another farmer participating in the Breckland ESA outlined that, "often these
meetings are so structured and formal. You know, we've all got to stick to a framework of
what is to be discussed and usually there isn't enough time to be able to say what we really
want to".
This has been supported by agricultural extension scientists who critique the use of group
meetings as a means of disseminating advice and information. Giles (1983) notes that, on
occasion, the extension agent may learn a great deal from farmers attending group meetings.
"By listening to and talking to those in the industiy who accept the risks and take the
decisions", the extension agents may enrich their personal experience and knowledge systems
(Giles, 1983:324). However, Giles (1983) goes on to outline how smaller farmers may be
disproportionately represented at such meetmgs. This was further argued by Davies (1988)
who noted that often only the larger more dominant farmers in a district will attend group
meetings and, even then, only a small number of farmers may actually contribute to the
discussions. In this context, it was asserted by many of the farmers participating in the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA that the individual farm visits provide them with a greater
opportunity to voice their concerns to ministerial officials via the FRCA PO/APO. One farmer
interviewed within the Cotswold Hills ESA outlined that:
'it's always much easier when he [P0] comes out to the farm. We can walk arowKl and
actually see what needs to be done and I can ask spec/lc questions or often I'll chat to
him about how the scheme could be improvea especially with the introduction offield
margins".
Further, the individual farm visit provides a medium through which the FRCA PO/APO may
facilitate a bottom-up approach to agri-environmental policy. Under MAFF's MoU the FRCA
POs/APOs are required to report back to MAFF on how well their schemes are being
implemented at the ground level. The Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs/APOs assert
that they do take account of farmers opinions and transfer these to the policy makers within
MAFF. The Breckland ESA P0 argued, for example, that:
obviously, farmers are able to voice their opinions at the review meetings, but we
also take on board what they say andfeed thai into the policy process ".
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Further, the Cotswold Hills ESA PU insists that, as a link between the farmers and the policy
makers within MAFF, he will "always pass on what the farmers say ... often this is done during
infonnal discussions that I have with the people in the RSC, but I have also got to write an
official report to MAFF when the scheme is reviewed, and it is in such a report that I'll pass on
the farmers suggestions for the introduction of those conservation headlands". The degree to
which policy makers listen to, and enact farmers' opmions is debatable, however. The FRCA
PO/APO may pass on information, on behalf of the farmers, but the head of MAFF's
Conservation Po icy Division insists that:
"... farmers are less vigorous in influencing us ... we are very ready in principle to
improve the schemes [but] we don'i agree with eveiylhing that 'S put to us ".
In summary, the FRCA POs/APOs have been faced with a difficult task of enrolling farmers
into individual agri-environmental agreements, and, further, securing their co-operation and
alliance to MAFF's agri-environmental objectives. Operating within a network of influencing
factors, the FRCA POs/APOs in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs have sought to gain
the co-operation of farmers by adopting a non-dictatory role. Utilising farm visits as an
effective tool to gain access to participants and non-participants the FRCA POs/APOs have
visited farmers throughout the duration of their individual management agreements, whereupon
they have attempted to take on board farmers' interests and opinions and in turn feed these into
the policy implementation process.
Throughout this chapter, the analysis has so far advocated a one way relationship between the
farmers and FRCA POs APOs. The POs/APOs have had to gain the trust and co-operation of
the powerful autonomous farming community, and have attempted to do this by adopting a
non-dictatorial role throughout the duration of the farmers' individual agri-environmental
agreements. However, it is evident that as the POs/APOs listen to the farmers and seek to
transfer their concerns and opinions back to MAFF, the POs/APOs are empowering
themselves as important and influential actors in the world of the agri-environmental
participant. They are the gatekeeper through which farmers' objectives and interests may be
implemented within the official agri-environmental policy process. Moreover, it is evident that
it has been the individual P0 APO who has effectively brought together the different worlds of
MAFF and the individual farmer under the same umbrella of the ESA schemes. Where Callon
(1986) and Latour (1987) assert that actors will only become enrolled into a network when all
actors align themselves to the same objectives, the Breckland and Cotswold Hifis ESA POs
have evidently situated themselves at the interface of two different actor-networks, whereupon,
they have assisted both actors to implement their individual objectives within the wider
agri-environmental implementation process (Fig. 6.1) (see Chapter 9 for further discussion).
Expanding upon this argument, the following section will contmue to draw upon the interviews
















Hills ESAs, in order to outline how the farmers regard the FRCA POs/APOs as important
actors in their agn-environmental implementation network - a position of importance and
influence which has been furthered by the agricultural background and characteristics of the
individual PO/APO.
6.6	 Farmers' Attitudes Towards the FRCA Project Officer
The majority of farmers interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs appeared to
greatly appreciate the help and advice given to them by the FRCA POs/APOs when
implementing their individual ESA agreements. They spoke of the need for individuals such as
the POs to be located at the ground level, to help farmers make sense of government schemes,
and, to advise them on how best to implement MAFF's rules in relation to their own farm
business objectives. Four agreement holders within the Breckland ESA explained, for example,
that:
"... once you take it beyond the local level it becomes too much of a headless monster.
You know, you w got Whitehall and Brussels. But ... you need people like Bill [the P0]
to actually be able to be there and shed some sense into it"
"They [the POs] are wiy importanL They've got to have someone like that on the
ground who understands our way of thinking as well as the ministry and what they
wan!".
"There 's a need for project officers working at the grouna' acting as trouble shooters
for the scheme ".
"Project officers provide an important interface between the ministiy and the fanners.
Their presence reduces the unpersonahiy of the schemes '
Even many of the non-participants interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs
expressed their opinions that there is a need for a P0 to operate at the ground level
environment, to act as a link to government officials and to assist farmers to adjust to 'new'
political objectives. As one non-participant in the Cotswold Hills ESA argued:
"obviously I 'in not in the scheme, but I have met the bloke who runs it wound here and
he was great. He explained the scheme to me, but it just warn 'tfor me .... but I do think
that the scheme needs somebody like him, Just to explain it to us in laymen's terms
really '
However, while the farmers expounded upon the importance of a P0 within the
implementation of the UK's agri-environmental schemes, many of the farmers interviewed
went on to assert that it is essential that the POs employed to advise farmers and to implement
the schemes possess knowledge and experience of general agricultural issues. As four farmers
participating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs explained:
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"It is very important in my mind that the project officer comes from an agricultural
background otherwise it is definitely going to be a no, no, because the last thing you
want is people who are ignorant of farming practices, and I believe that this is one
reason why the Cotswold Hills ESA has been so successfiul, because Richard Appleton I
mean, he came from afairly strong agricultural background... and! think that farmers
set up a good rapport with him which means that they will work better than if say we
were dealing with someone who could not answer all the questions about the scheme ..."
(Cotswold Hills ESA particqxznt).
"They [FRCA and MAFF] have had the history with implementing government policy
and with contact with the farming community ... they know that farmers have a business
to run and that conservation must be integrated with this" (Breckland ESA participant).
"... he's [PU] got a ve,y good grasp offarming. Yes, I think you could easily get into
a lot of trouble if you had someone who had no concept offarming, but no he is very
good" (Cotswold Hills ESA, participant).
as far as' I'm concerned there is only one organisation Ideal with - MAFF. That's
what I'm used to. I trust their project officers, put it like that. They've got the
agricultural background I don't know what other people are after" (Breckland EM,
participant).
This was further supported by the farmers when it was suggested that environmental groups
may wish to implement the agri-environmental schemes on behalf of MAFF. The majority of
the participants and non-participants interviewed expressed their fears of such a situation
arising and asserted that local environmental groups should remain peripheral to the
agri-enviromnental implementation process. As the following quotes from a number of the
farmers interviewed highlight:
"I wouldn 't want some long tailed twit in sandals telling me what I should do. They are
busy bodks who don't listen to the fullfacts" (BrecklandESA participant).
"The main problem with all these orgamsations is that they are so ill informed on
farming mallers They think that by knowing 20% they are able to iifonn people who
live on the land, how to manage it ... no way, I wouldn 't want them getting involved"
(BrecklandESA participant).
'i'm extremely nervous about wildlife groups getting involved, very very nervous. I
think its really bad news" (Cots'wold Hills ESA partkirxazl).
"I don't think we want to get outside bodies really telling us what to do. I would fight
against that. " (Cotswold Hills ESA particijxznl).
"They [wildlife groups] would want to get involved, but I mean once that happens I'm
sure that people fanning would pull out of it pretty quick" (Cotswold Hills ESA
participant).
As Chapter 5 outlined, the majority of the FRCA POs/APOs have a strong background in
agricultural related issues. Many of the POs/APOs possess a degree or diploma in an
agricultural related issue and have received formal training in farm business management.
Concomitantly, many have been employed within ADAS for a number of years during which
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time they have built up a knowledge and experience of communicating and working with
farmers (see section 5.2). According to the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs, this
background in agncultiire has greatly facilitated their work in implementing the ESA schemes.
They believe that it has enabled them to develop a strong rapport with the farmers/landowners,
gaining their trust and co-operation when implementing the individual ESA agreements As the
Cotswold Hills ESA P0 outlined:
"... it has helped, having an agricultural background as it means that you can go onto
a farm an well basically, help the farmers understand the scheme in relation to their
farming system. I mean, you've got to be able to talk to the farmers in a way that they
am understand and relate to you, otherwise its going to be no good".
This was further supported by Lowe et at. (1997) who found that when their farm pollution
advisors sought to gain the co-operation and trust of the farming community, their efforts were
facilitated by the fact that several of the advisors possessed strong agricultural connections and
training.
However, while the agricultural background of many of the FRCA P0 APOs is favoured by
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills' farming communities, Davies (1988.159) argues that, "in
addition to having good scientific and technical knowledge, advisors must have the ability to
communicate effectively with people". Indeed, a number of researchers have argued that the
advice given by agricultural advisors can not be divorced from the individuals involved, their
personalities, approaches and the way in which advice is communicated. Lowe et at. (1997)
found, for example, that in their study of farm pollution regulation, the manners and approaches
adopted by the pollution inspectors influenced farmers perceptions of the advice disseminated
by the inspectors. One farmer interviewed within Devon outlined that:
"There is one bloke, you couldn't meet a nicer bloke. He advises you and is helpful in
any way he can be ... He 's somebody you could take to straight away ... But the other
bloke is a right one ... He was ignorant beyond wards and wiy unhelpful ... They've all
got a job to do, I suppose, but if they could just be nice about it. It makes a lot of
difference" (in Lowe et aL, 1997:139).
Lowe et at. (1997:139) went on to conclude that "the farmers preferred a co-operative and
understanding relationship with NRA officials and were put out by what they regarded as
officiousness ... they found it demeaning to be treated brusquely. At such times NRA staff
were seen as unyielding and punitive officialdom". Within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs a couple of the farmers interviewed criticised their respective POs in terms of their
approach and attitudes which the farmers felt to be unnecessarily brusque and bureaucratic.
One farmer interviewed within the Breckland ESA described the P0 as "quite an efficient httle
man ...", but went on to argue that:
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when he caine out to see me he wasn 't exactly enthusiastic about the scheme or
what I wanted to do on the farm. In fact it was as though he couldn't give a monkey's ".
Likewise, one Cotswold Hills ESA participant believed that 'his' FRCA P0 made no effort to
listen to his objectives and to help him implement these within the scheme.
"Have you ever kid any dealings with these government qfficers? In certain directions
they are very good, but in other directions they are just appalling ... on the one hand I
think that they do understand our situation; but sometimes it certainly doe.sn 'I seem i/wit
way. Often they can be really offhand".
However, in general these were two isolated opinions amongst the farmers interviewed in the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. Many of the farmers recognised that often the PO/APOs
are placed under pressure in terms of financial and temporal constraints and that, as a result,
they may sometimes appear unyielding and brusque, but the majority of the farmers spoke
highly of the individual PO/APOs. They outlined that they are approachable individuals,
always willing to listen to the farmers' ideas and to converse with them often as friends, rather
than faces of officialdom. Indeed, the term 'good chap' was often voiced by many of the
farmers describing their PO/APO and one farmer participating in the Cotswold Hills ESA
described his P0 as "a sort of chum". Any criticism voiced by the farmers was primarily
directed at the bureaucracy of MAFF, rather than the individual FRCA PO/APO. As one
fanner not participating in the Breckland ESA helped to illustrate:
"I'm afraid! have a haired of all government bodies and civil servants, whether its the
project officer or not. These schemes are just too bureaucratic and basically I can 'I be
bothered with ii all".
6.7	 Conclusion
In conclusion, therefore, it is evident that the FRCA POs APOs in the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs have emerged as relatively important actors in the agri-environmental
decision-making nexus of the individual participant and non-participant. It is widely
recognised amongst the FRCA POs/APOs that in seeking to enrol farmers into
agri-environmental schemes they are competing against a number of structural and agency
factors who have been shown to influence farmers' agri-environmental decisions (see Chapter
3). In doing so, the FRCA POs/APOs in the two case study ESAs evidently sought to gain the
co-operation and trust of the farmers by working with them to implement their own objectives
within MAFF's agri-environmental network. The PUs recognised that any attempt to adopt an
official approach to policy implementation would be met with extreme resistance from the
farmers. Thus, adopting a 'friendly face' of officialdom, they sought to listen to the farmers'
views and to assist them to implement these within MAFF's legislative boundaries. By
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legitiniising the individual objectives of farmers the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA
POs/APOs have effectively reinforced the notion of farmers as powerful autonomous actors m
the agri-environmental policy process.
However, while the POs/APOs evidently assist in empowering the individual farmer as a key
agri-environmental decision-maker, the analysis went on to reveal that in legitimising fanners
personal agri-environmental objectives the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs have
established themselves as important and influential actors m farmers' individual
agri-environmental implementation networks. Acting as a gatekeeper of information between
the world of the farmer and MAFF, it is the FRCA PO/APO who farmers look towards to
transfer their ideas and suggestions into the official implementation process. Further, it is the
FRCA PO/APO who assists the farmers to make sense of MAFF's rules and regulations and to
advise them on how their objectives may be implemented at the ground level.
In this context, the analysis has shown that the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs have
effectively brought two different actor-networks together within the wider agri-environmental
implementation process. As Chapter 5 revealed, the FRCA PO/APO is part of MAFF's
powerful bureaucratic actor-network. The POs operate on behalf of MAFF and seek to
implement MAFF's objectives in the locality. However, as has been revealed here, the FRCA
PO/APO is also enrolled in the autonomous decision-making networks of individual farmers
where they assist farmers to implement their personal objectives within the confines of wider
legislative boundaries. Thus, in effect the POs act as primary facilitator to the individual
agri-environmental objectives of MAFF and many farmers.
Although farmers evidently occupy a central position within the actor-network of the FRCA
P0, Chapter 3 outlined how a number of 'new' actors may be enrolled into the
agri-enviromnental implementation process. Existing research studies have highlighted that
many of these 'new' environmental actors have gained increasing support from farmers who
often prefer to seek and receive advice from groups, such as FWAG, rather than from the state
agricultural advisor. In this context, it was argued that to fully understand the level of power
and influence that the FRCA P0 exerts in the agn-environmental implementation process, their
relations with these new actors should be analysed. Drawing upon the research's empirical
data, such an analysis is conducted in the following chapter.
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Chapter 7
Relationship of FRCA Project Officer with
'New' Agri-Environmental Actors
7.1	 Introduction
As Chapter 3 discussed, it is widely acknowledged amongst researchers that as
agn-enviromnental concerns and pohcies have evolved in recent years the traditional elitism of
the agricultural policy community has declined as new pressure groups enter the sphere of
agricultural decision-making at both national and local levels. Paying particular attention to the
involvement of 'interest groups' 10 at the local-level, Chapter 3 went on to outline that a
number of on-farm conservation advisors have emerged within the locality, providing general
conservation advice to farming communities, and, in some cases, eroding the monopolistic
control that the state advisory service has traditionally enjoyed. It was noted, however, that
while a plethora of empirical evidence supports the emergence and influence of these 'new'
environmental advisors in the British countryside, little is known of their direct involvement
and influence in the implementation of individual agri-environmental schemes. Addressing this
research gap, this chapter seeks to analyse the extent to which these 'new' agri-environmental
actors are involved in the implementation of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs.
First, the chapter will examine the nature of the groups that are involved in the two case study
ESA schemes. Following this, analysis will focus on the extent to which these local interest
groups have been internalised in the agri-environmental policy process. In particular, their
involvement in the formulation of policy at the local-level will be examined, before analysis
turns to examine the level of involvement and influence that the interest groups have in the
implementation of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs.
7.2	 Nature of Interest Groups
According to the FRCA POs/APOs surveyed through the postal questionnaire, a plethora of
'interest groups' are involved in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes at the
10The use of the term 'interest groups' throughout this thesis relates to any pubhc, private or voluntary
organisation that possesses a keen interest in the local rural environment, and, is actively involved in
promoting the conservation and sustainabihty of specific local habitats species and the wider countryside.
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regional and local level. Among the groups identified by the POs/APOs, English Nature,
County Archaeologists, the NFU, FWAG and County Wildlife Trusts are believed to be
actively involved with all agri-environmental schemes implemented in the UK (Table 7.1).
Interest Group	 No. FRCA POs/APOs	 % FRCA POsIAPOs
English Nature	 53	 88
County Archaeologists	 50	 83
NFU	 48	 80
FWAG	 47	 78
County Wildlife Trusts	 46	 77
CLA	 43	 72
RSPB	 42	 70
Environment Agency 	 41	 68
Countryside Commission	 40	 67
County Councils 	 40	 67
National Trust	 40	 67
District Councils	 39	 65
English Heritage	 37	 62
Forestry Authority	 37	 62
National Parks Authority 	 21	 35
Parish Councils	 21	 35
Ramblers Association	 16	 27
Commoners' Association 	 16	 27
MmistryofDefence	 11	 18
CPRE	 10	 17
Countryside Management Group	 9	 15
Moorland Group	 3	 5
Table 7.1. Interest groups FRCA POs/APOs are in contact with during the implementation of
agri-environmental schemes in England and Wales (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Analysing the involvement of the interest groups on an individual scheme basis, however, it is
evident that while some similarities exist between the national schemes, the composition of
local interest networks will vazy widely from one agri-environmental scheme to another,
depending on the objectives and prescriptions of the individual schemes, whether any
environmental designations are present in the schemes' physical boundaries, and, whether a
group possesses an institutional interest in any part of the flora and fauna encapsulated within
MAFF's agri-environmental scheme(s) (Table 7.2).
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% FRCA PO/APO Implementing Individual Scheme
Interest Group	 ESA CSS NSA Habitat Scheme Moorland Scheme Countryside Access
English Nature
	
95 100 40	 75	 100	 50
County Archaeologists	 92 100 40	 25	 0	 100
NFU	 81 91 100	 25	 100	 50
FWAG	 81 100 60	 50	 0	 50
County Wildlife Trusts	 89 100 20	 25	 0	 50
CLA	 73 82 100	 25	 0	 50
RSPB	 78 100 0	 50	 0	 0
Environment Agency	 68 91 100	 25	 0	 0
Countryside Commission	 68 9! 40	 25	 0	 100
County Councils	 70 91 40	 0	 0	 100
National Trust
	
78 72 20	 25	 0	 50
District Councils	 68	 82 40	 25	 0	 100
English Heritage	 62 100 0	 25	 0	 100
Forestry Authority	 86 27 20	 25	 0	 0
National Parks Authority 	 41	 36	 0	 25	 100	 0
Parish Councils	 30	 55 20	 25	 0	 100
Ramblers Association	 19 45 20	 25	 0	 100
Commoners' Association 	 35	 9	 0	 25	 100	 0
Ministry of Defence	 27	 0 20	 0	 0	 0
CPRE	 22 9	 0	 25	 0	 0
Countryside Management 	 11 36 0	 25	 0	 0
Group______________ _______________ _________________
Moorland Group	 5	 9	 0	 0	 100	 0
Table 7.2. Interest groups FRCA POs/APOs are in contact with in different agri-environmental
schemes (Source: Postal questionnaire, 1997)
Scheme Prescriptions
The POs/APOs implementing the Countiyside Access scheme revealed, for example, that in
seeking to implement the schemes' objectives - that is, the creation of new access routes on
Britain's farmland, the POs/APOs are more likely to be in contact with groups, such as the
Ramblers Association and the highway departments of County Councils, who are actively
involved in the use and administration of public footpaths in the UK. Further, it is not
surprising to find that the POs/APOs implementing the NSAs are primarily in contact with the
Environment Agency who, under govenunent legislation, are responsible for regulatmg farm
pollution (see Lowe Ct al., 1997). Thus, as Table 7.2 outlines, it is evident that for many of the
agri-environmental schemes implemented in the UK, the nature of the interest groups who the
FRCA PO/APO may be in contact with will be greatly determined by the nature of the scheme
itself
This was further evident in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs where differences were
observed in terms of the specific interest groups involved with the formulation and


















AONB Joint Advisory Committee
Table 73. Local interest groups operating within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs
(Source: Qualitative interviews, 1997)
Supporting their contemporaries in other areas of the UK, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESA POs revealed that in the course of implementing their respective ESAs they are in contact
with local representatives from English Nature, FWAG, County Archaeologists and County
Wildlife Trusts. Interestingly, both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs made no
reference to any contact with their local NFU office. Following the actor-network methodology
(see Chapter 4) it was, thus, assumed that the NFU had no involvement with implementing the
two ESA schemes. However, as Chapter 9 discusses in its critique of the actor-network
methodology, this assumption must be treated with caution in future research.
Supporting their contemporaries further, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs went on
to reveal that with the exception of the above similarities they are in contact with a number of
specific interest groups as a direct result of the nature and requirements of their individual ESA
schemes (Table. 7.2). The Breckland ESA P0 revealed, for example, that implementing a
scheme that does not target farm woodland habitats (see appendix 2), he has had no recourse
to be in contact with any institution or individual with a specific interest in woodlands. "Its just
one of these things. The Forestry Commission is our largest landowner in the area. They own
almost 20 per cent of the land covered by the ESA, but 'cause the ESA scheme doesn't include
any Forestry land in its prescriptions, I don't have any need to be in contact with the
Commission" (Nickson, 1997). The Cotswold Hills ESA P0 revealed, on the other hand, that
he is in frequent contact with his local Forestry Authority office in relation to the legislative
requirements of the Cotswold Hills ESA, where it is stipulated that all agreement holders are
required to obtam written advice on woodland management within the first two years of their
ESA contract (see appendix 2). According to the Cotswold Hills ESA P0, the FRCA can not
provide expert advice on woodland management, but will recommend that the agreement
holder contacts the local Forestry Authority woodland officer where they may receive free
advice in addition to obtaining grants for the maintenance of any new or existing woodland on
their land. This was further supported in an interview with Gloucestershire's Forestiy
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Authority woodland officer, where it was outlined that the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 and APOs
will frequently advise agreement holders to contact the Forestiy office:
"They [PU APO] will advise them [agreement holders] to get in touch with us to get
advice and to go into one of the woodland schemes, or if they want to do some planting
to get in touch with us ... Occasionally you get people phoning up and saying 'we have
been in the scheme for a couple of pars, we ' ye just had a letter from the ESA
reminding us that we need these management plans, can you help 7 '".
Environmental Designations
It was hypothesised in Chapter 4 that, wherever additional designations such as SSSIs, NNRs
and County Wildlife Sites are present within the physical boundaries of an agn-environmental
scheme, groups such as English Nature and County Wildlife Trusts - who administer these
environmental designations - may be actively involved in the implementation of the individual
agri-enviromnental schemes. As Figures 4.4 and 4.5 highlight, there are a number of SSSIs,
NNRs and County Wildlife Sites situated within both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA
boundaries. In addition, the Cotswold Hills ESA is part of the wider Cotswold AONB.
Supporting the hypothesis outlined in Chapter 4, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs
revealed that they are frequently in contact with English Nature wherever an individual ESA
agreement coincides with a SSSI or NNR. This was further emphasised by the EN
conservation officer for Norfolk who outlined that:
"Basically we [EN! are the statutory body in charge of administering the NNR and
SSSI .system in England. So naturally, wherever an ESA agreement will coincide with
these then we would expect to be consulted by the project officer".
Likewise, the ESA POs asserted that they are in contact with the various local Wildlife Trusts
in relation to the county wildlife sites present in the ESAs. Concomitantly, the Cotswold Hills
ESA P0 went on to reveal that, on occasion, he will be in contact with the AONB's Joint
Advisory Committee 11 to ensure that the objectives of the ESA and AONB do not contradict
one another. "I meet them occasionally. They aren't one of my regular contacts if you like, but
it's important every now and again just to meet up with them and chat over how our work is
going, whether we can help each other in any way or perhaps where we need to work together
a bit more to make sure that we don't overlap and interfere with one another's work"
(Appleton, 1997).
"The Cotswold AONB Joint Advisoiy Committee is formed from the 17 local authorities covering the
AONB The local authorities and the Countryside Commission contribute to the budget which funds an
AONB officer and a Countryside Service made up of six rangers, three administrative staff and nearly 250
voluntaiy wardens (Cotswold AONB Joint Advisory Committee, 1997)
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Local Interests
It is further evident in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs that the nature of the interest
group networks involved with the various agri-environmental schemes is often directly related
to the specific interests and objectives of the individual 'interest group'. The Breckland ESA
P0 revealed, for example, that since 1991 the RSPB has undertaken a survey of stone curlew
populations which has often brought them into direct contact with the P0. The primary aim of
this RSPB project has been to locate, mark and protect stone curlew nests, which by the nature
of the bird species are situated on either bare, agricultural ground or on heathiands reminiscent
of the Breckland habitat. Throughout their monitoring of the bird populations, the RSPB field
officer co-ordinating the project outlined that they are frequently m contact with farmers in
order to gain access on to their land and additionally to inform them where stone curlews are
nesting. Often this has brought them into contact with the ESA P0 as many of the farmers
approached by the RSPB are ESA agreement holders. The RSPB field officer explained:
"... sometimes the ESA officer will come out with us to see what we are doing and to
look at the nests on some of his' fanners' land ... in particular we [RSPBJ are
interested in the reversion to heathiand option in the ESA scheme as that is where the
stone curlews prefer to nest, but when the ESA peopk want to look at the heathlands, to
monitor it, then they have to liaise closely with us a to where the nests are because
otherwise they may dthturb the stone curlews ".
Drawing together this section, therefore, it is evident from the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs that, as the FRCA PO/APO implements their respective schemes, contact will be made
with a variety of local interest groups, many of whom have already been shown in Chapter 3 to
have established an influential role in the 'new' agri-environinental advisory network.
However, while this empirical data has confirmed that 'new' agri-environmental actors are
involved in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes, their level of involvement and
influence within MAFF's policy implementation process is yet to be fully analysed. In an
attempt to further a holistic understanding of the FRCA P0's role and relative influence,
therefore, the following section turns to the issue of agri-environmental power relations and, in
particular, seeks to analyse how powerful and influential local interest groups have been in the
implementation of the individual agri-environmental schemes.
7.3	 Influence of Interest Groups.
As Chapter 3 outlined, many environmental agencies and ENGOs have become integrated at
the national level in the official process of revising and formulating the UK's
agn-enviromnental policy programme. Groups, such as the CoCo, EN, the Wildlife Trusts, and
the CPRE, are invited by MAFF to comment on the current and future state of the national
agn-environmental programme during official review meetings, and, through the NAEF.
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Further, in recent years, groups such as the RSPB and Game Conservancy Trust have become
active policy formulators, developing and administering schemes such as the new Arable
Stewardship Scheme (see section 3.4.2). Despite some concern that MAFF is exploiting the
environmental expertise of the conservation agencies and ENGOs (see Hart and Wilson, in
press), it is widely acknowledged that never before have environmental pressure groups
enjoyed such close working relations with the traditionally elite agricultural policy community
But is this reflected at the local level of agri-environmental policy formulation and
implementation? Have the local interest groups followed their national colleagues and become
internalised in the implementation process?
7.3.1 Local-Level Policy Formulation
Emulating their national colleagues it is evident that many of the local interest groups operating
alongside the FRCA PO/APO have become enrolled into the process of formulating and
reviewing individual agri-environmental schemes. In addition to the NAEF (see section 3.4.2),
MAFF has established a regional agri-environmental consultation group in all of their eight
regions (see Fig. 5.4), in order to facilitate discussions between MAFF, the FRCA and regional
interest groups. According to MAFF (House of Commons, 1996), these groups review the
operation of schemes at the regional level and oversee the work of local Countryside
Stewardship Targeting Groups and ESA liaison groups who, respectively, focus specifically
upon one county or ESA scheme. It is evident that in both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs, biannual liaison groups are in place, providing an arena for both local statutory agencies
and ENGOs to come together with MAFF and the FRCA to discuss the nature of the ESA
schemes, their successes, failures and future amendments. As the Cotswold Hills ESA P0
explained:
"Twice a year we have a meeting with many of the local environmental groups who
have a vested interest in what the ESA scheme can do for the area. .... J7 meetings are
part of MAFF 's statutory requirements, so we must hold them ".
The local interest groups which are invited to attend these biannual meetings by MAFF are
listed in Table 7.4.
Further, MAFF (1996a) asserts that the local interest groups attending biannual liaison
meetings are formally invited to comment on the current and future state of individual
agri-environmental schemes when the schemes are reviewed on a five year interim basis
Indeed, at the time of the field survey, the Brecidand ESA was undergoing its second review
phase within which local
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Regional Agri-Environmental Consultation Group
MAFF Regional Service Centres







Royal Society for the Protection of Birds
Wildlife Trusts
Council for the Protection of Rural England
National Trust
County Archaeologists




arming and Wildlife Advisory Group
Table 7.4. Groups invited by MAFF to attend Regional Agri-Environmental
Consultation Groups (Source: House of Commons, 1996)
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environmental agencies and ENGOs were actively involved in discussions with MAFF
concerning the future development of the Breckland ESA scheme. At the onset of the review
period, MAFF called upon local environmental organisations to submit comments and
suggestions as to how they felt that the Breckland ESA scheme could be improved. During the
field survey, the representatives of these environmental groups outlined how they welcomed
this invitation and readily submitted their comments and suggestions to MAFF. In doing so,
they went on to reveal how, collaboratively, the various environmental agencies and ENGOs
within the Brecklands decided that, within the review process, they would attempt to act as one
cohesive environmental network and, thus, submit their comments and suggestions to MAFF in
the form of one joint report. According to the FWAG advisor for Norfolk, such a system
appeared to work well in the case of the Broads ESA:
"When the Broads was rewewed last year [1996] along with the other first round KS'As,
Chris Knights up in the RSPB office thought that it would be much better if we
[conservationists] all collated our thoughts and ideas and presented them as one
submission. Afierall, our aims are generally the same, and it was felt that MAFF would
be more responsive to us if they only had to 'deal', effectively with one environmental
report, rather than lots of little ones. ... It certainly added strength to our arguments ".
Given the experiences of their colleagues involved with the Broads ESA, EN's conservation
officer for Norfolk outlined that during the Breckland ESA review period he took on the task
of liaising with the local environmental organisations, discussing their opinions and future
visions for the ESA scheme, in order to ensure that the individual objectives of each
environmental group would be encapsulated in the final report to MAFF. According to the
conservation officer, "it did take quite a bit of time phoning around and getting ideas and then
getting down to putting together a paper to show MAFF", but he asserted that his task had
been greatly facilitated by the close working relations that already existed between the various
environmental agencies and ENGOs operating within the Brecklands. Following funding
through the EU's Linking Farming and Environment (LWE) Project, for example, the Norfolk
and Suffolk Wildlife Trusts had come together with the RSPB in 1991 to form the Breckland
Wildlife Partnership. The partnership sought to co-ordinate the activities of the three groups. It
enabled the Norfolk and Suffolk Wildlife Trust Breckland field officers to be employed, and
assisted the RSPB in the administration of its stone curlew project (see section 7.2). Although
funding ceased in 1995 the partnership continues to function and has recently grown as English
Nature have joined the wildlife trusts and RSPB to extend nature conservation work within the
Brecklands, and to liaise closely with one another over the ESA scheme. Additionally, the
Brecks Countiyside Project, part funded by the Countryside Commission and local authorities
has sought to bring the individual concerns of the various interest groups together, and, in
doing so, represent the social, economic and ecological environment of the Brecklands as a
whole. As the Brecks Countryside Project officer helped to explain:
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"... basically the Breck.s Countiyszde Project enables all of the groups to have their
say and to ensure that they all work together to achieve a holistic objective. The way
that we do it is not to suggest solutions, instead we will pose questions to the different
groups as to how they would tackle x, y and z ...we play devils advocate in a way, just
to gel all the groups talking lo one another, considering each others individual
objectives and trying to reach one un/1ed objective that is the conservation and
preservation of the Brecks landscape as a whole".
Indeed, in recent years, it has become increasingly evident that where the UK's nature
conservation movement was traditionally characterised by fragmented groups pursuing
individual interests and objectives, efforts have been made, both at the national and local level,
to pull together the resources of environmental groups and, in doing so, construct a cohesive
environmental movement that may lobby against the might of European and UK agriculturists
(Lowe and Goyder, 1983; Micklewright, 1993; Winter, 1996). This was particularly evident in
the formation of the Wildlife and Countryside Link's working group on agriculture, which has
subsequently brought together many enviromnentalists, such as the RSPB, Friends of the Earth
and the WWF, to collectively discuss the current and future position of agri-environmental
policies. According to a representative of the WWF, this working group has been particularly
useful for the environmental groups to liaise with one another prior to NAEF meetings:
"We try to present a united front at the forum, so have these meetings beforehaivi
because it would be very easy for MAFF to pounce on differences between
environmental orgamsations, so we meet and decide who's going to push what point, so
that the environmental lobby can appear united - I think that it gives us more strength
really ".
At the local level this was further supported by the Brecks Countryside Project Officer who
argued that, when the joint report to MAFF was drawn up:
"of course we had as an environmental movement, already discussed what we thought
needed to be done, so it wasn't that difficult putting in a joint report this time and
hopefully it'll give us greater strength ... I mean, we have shown MAFF that we work
well together and that we oil want to achieve the best for the Breckland environment, I
just hope that MAFF will now take on board some of the things that we ' ye said".
According to the head of MAFF's conservation policy division, all efforts are made by policy
officials to incorporate the ideas and suggestions of the environmental lobby. "We [MAFFI are
very ready, in principle, to improve the schemes ... we welcome their ideas"(Boyling, 1997).
This was supported by Norfolk's FWAG advisor who outlined that, during the Broads ESA
review, MAFF listened to his suggestions and subsequently altered the ESA boundaries m
accordance with his recommendations:
"During the review period of the Broads 1 put through a faxed copy of suggested
boundary changes to cartography with a letter of recommendation from FWAG and it
came through on the revised ESA maps so it can happen '
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However, while Norfolk's FWAG advisor supported MAFF's assurances that they listen to the
opinions and ideas of local interest groups, many of the groups in the Breckland ESA
expressed their scepticism as to MAFF's willingness to implement any of their suggestions
made in the recent ESA review. They welcome the fact that MAFF will consult with them on
the future of the scheme, but they believe that, at the end of the day, very little of what they say
in the review meetings will be taken on board by MAFF. According to EN's conservation
officer for Norfolk, this evidently occurred in the first review of the Breckland ESA scheme.
"One did feel that a great deal of what was said [by the local environmental groups] was not
picked up by MAFF ... we suggested ways of improving the environmental quality of the area,
but to a certain extent they [MAFF] seemed more concerned about securing the well-being of
the farmers" - a fact which was identified by O'Canoll (1994) who noted that, following the
revision of the Breckland ESA scheme in 1993, MAFF introduced higher tier payments in an
effort to appease the local farming community.
At the time of writing, MAFF's response to the second review of the Breckland ESA has not
been published and, thus, analysis is unable to ascertain whether, during this second review
period, the local environmental organisations have been able to influence the formulation of the
Breckland ESA scheme. Likewise, the analysis has gained little information concerning the
level of influence that local environmental groups have had on the formulation of the Cotswold
Hills ESA scheme. Formulated and introduced in 1994, the Cotswold Hills ESA is due to
embark on its first review period. According to the Cotswold Hills ESA P0, MAFF and the
FRCA will make every effort to listen to the local interest groups and to take on board their
suggestions, where financially feasible. However, whether they do will be interesting to
analyse in future research.
Although the influence of the local environmental network in the formulation of
agri-environmental policy remains questionable, Dwyer and Hedge (1996) have asserted that
there is a central role for local environmental groups in the implementation of
agri-environmental schemes. They argue that many environmental agencies and ENGOs have
an in-depth knowledge of the local countryside that may facilitate the FRCA PO/APO. Indeed,
Dwyer and Hedge (1996:278) go as far as to suggest that:
"some ENGOs might develop a role as agents for government programmes, perhaps in
the identification and implementation of habitat restoration offarmers' land which is
entered into long-term set-aside or similar schemes. This opportunity would allow them
to influence threctly the management of countryside beyond their oin reserves and to
operate more pro.-aclively and entrepreneurial than can most government departments
and agencies '
As Chapter 6 outlined, however, many of the farmers interviewed in the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs fiercely critiqued such a proposal. They claimed that environmentalists
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would seek to impose their own personal objectives onto the individual farmer and would
make no effort to consider the state of the fanner's livelihood as an agricultural producer. As
the following section will highlight, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs have
continued to defend the interests of the farming community. Although local interest groups are
evidently involved in the implementation process, the FRCA POs/APOs currently uphold a
confidentiality clause imposed by MAFF which has effectively limited the opportunities in
which local environmental groups may influence the implementation and enactment of MAFF's
agri-environmental schemes.
7.3.2 Local-Level Policy Implementation.
According to the FRCA POs/APOs surveyed through the postal questionnaire, statutory and
non-statutory organisations are actively involved in the implementation of individual
agri-environmental schemes, predominantly as advisors to the POs/APOs, promoters of the
schemes, and often, as individual agreement holders (Table 7.5).
Reasons for Contact With Interest 	 No. FRCA PO/APO	 % FRCA PO/APO
Groups
(non-exclusive cateories	 ________________________ ________________________
Statutory Consultation	 70	 100
Technical Advice	 66	 94
Scheme Promotion 	 54	 77
Scheme Administration	 23	 33
Open Days/Farm Walks	 11	 16
Agreement Holders	 10	 14
Table. 7.5. Primary reasons FRCA POs/APOs are in contact with local interest groups (Source:
Postal questionnaire, 1997)
This was further evident in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs where both the POs and
local environmentalists revealed that many local interest groups participate in the
implementation of the individual ESA schemes, as ESA agreement holders, advisors and
scheme promoters.
Agreement Holders
Initially, it was evident in the Breckland ESA, that as dominant landowners and mangers of
many of the environmental designations situated within the ESA boundary (see Fig. 4.4), EN
and the local Wildlife Trusts have taken advantage of the financial payments on offer through
the ESA scheme, and have participated in individual ESA management agreements. In relation
to the four NNRs in the Brecklands, the EN conservation officer outlined, for example, that
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they have entered into ESA agreements with MAFF on two of the reserves - Cavenham Heath
and Thompson Common NNRs (see Fig. 4.4). Of the following two reserves - Weeting Heath
and Thetford Heath - it was revealed that, ESA agreements have been developed, but the land
is owned and managed by the NWT who further possess a network of smaller reserves and
sites currently entered into the Breckland ESA scheme (see Fig. 4.4).
In terms of implementing their individual agreements the Wildlife Trusts and English Nature
recognise that they do not require the same level of advice that the FRCA P0 may give to
other agreement holders. Initial discussions concerning individual ESA agreements on NNRs
will tend to only involve EN and the Wildlife Trusts, as the Breckland field officer for the
NWT explained:
"The discussion about what to do is largely between the Trusts and English Nature and
I think that Bill [P0] is quite happy with that. I mean anything that is approved by
English Nature, he is quite happy with the Trust to go in and to have the expertise to
decide what to do '
However, he went on to note that while ESA management discussions initially take place
between the Trust and EN, their ideas and plans must still be discussed and sanctioned by the
FRCA P0.
"... All he [P0] needs to do is to know what's going on and to sanction it ... largely the
decisions about what we do is made between the Trust and Enghsh Nature, but we
would always go on to discuss it with the project officer as any pnvate landowners
might '
In the Cotswold Hills ESA it was evident that unlike their contemporaries in the Brecklands
the local interest groups were less actively involved in the ESA scheme as individual
agreement holders. As Chapter 4 outlined, the landownership of the Cotswolds is far less
complex than that of the Brecklands. The majority of land is owned and managed by pnvate
individuals, with fewer nature reserves and wildlife sites occupying areas of the Cotswolds
(Fig. 4.3). Where wildlife sites are owned and/or managed by the local Wildlife Trust, the
conservation officer for the GWT asserted that as the ESA scheme is a relatively recent
introduction into the area the majority of the sites eligible to be entered into ESA agreements
are already participating in the CS scheme.
Environmental Advisors to the FRCA P0 APO
While there are apparent differences in the level of involvement that local interest groups have
as ESA agreement holders, it was evident in both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs that
many environmentalists have been enrolled into the agri-environmental implementation process
as advisors to the FRCA P0 APO As Chapter 5 outhned, the FRCA POs/APOs have access
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to 'in house' specialists such as ecologists, biologists, engineers and surveyors whenever the
P0 APO requires specific information to assist them in implementing individual management
agreements. As the P0 APO postal questionnaire revealed, however, the majority (94° o) of
POs will, on occasion, seek the advice and expertise of local interest groups (Table 7.5).
Indeed, within both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs it was evident that the POs/APOs
often approach local organisations to discuss specific ESA problems or issues which the FRCA
P0 APO feels unable to resolve independently. In the Breckland ESA, for example, the FRCA
project officer explained that:
"...we [P0 APOs] have access to in-house expertise ... [but] there are aspects of ESA
work where ills useflul to talk to the Wildlife Trusts or English Nature ".
This was further supported by one farmer interviewed within the Breckland ESA who outlined
that, on one occasion, the FRCA P0 visited his farm with a representative from the SWT in
order to discuss the ramifications of spraying a specific species of grassland.
"He [P0] caine down with; I can't remember their name now, it was someone from the
Suffolk Wildlife Trust. They came and looked at some hard rush which I wanted 'o spray
with weed killer and I needed a derogation to do it. I applied for one [a derogation]
and Bill [P0] came down with this bloke to discuss it '
Likewise, within the Cotswold Hills ESA, one farmer interviewed revealed that an FRCA APO
once visited his farm with a county archaeologist in order to look at a specific outcrop of
ancient rocks on his land, and, to discuss possible management strategies that he could adopt
under his ESA agreement.
"We [fanner and County Archaeologist] had a meeting out here with Nicki Freke
[FRCA APO] one day 'cause there was some sort of outcrop of ancient rocks on the
farm and we discussed about it. They wanted me to put the land it was on, back to
grassland... We talked about it and! said that I would think about it, but I haven't done
anything yet ".
According to both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs, however, generally they will
only seek advice from the local interest groups in relation to those ESA agreements that
coincide with, for example, SSSIs, County Wildlife sites or sites of archaeol gical interest.
Whenever the P0 APO requires specific information on an ESA agreement that does not
encapsulate such designations, the POs/APOs assert that they will tend to refer to their 'in
house' specialists, rather, than one of the interest groups.
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Operating as Scheme Promoters
According to a number of the local interest groups interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs, they will, wherever possible, seek to promote the ESA schemes to non-agreement
holders, as the following quotes outline:
"...obviously we will promote the ESA scheme wherever it is relevant" (GWT)
"... I'll suggest the ESA as a tool to any landowner wishing to manage their land n an
environmentally friendly way" (SW7).
"..one time I did actually put a bit more time into actually going to visit farmers and
talking to them about the ESA in the hope that some more would cqply" (RSPB in
Breckland).
However, the interest groups went on to outline that, having informed farmers of the schemes'
existence, they will retract from the implementation process in order that the FRCA PO/APO
may continue to enrol the farmers into individual ESA agreements. According to one of
Suffolk's FWAG advisors:
"I'll do a brief sell of the ESA to them [FWAG members], but then I'll say that your
next point of contact is Bill [P0]... basically! wouldn't want to step on Bill 'spatch '
Likewise, the Breckland field officer for the SWT explained that, in terms of drawing up ESA
applications:
"I let Bill [P0] do that. When you get to that level you are talking money then and if
you get that wrong, people tend to get very upset ... so Its Just better to have sonone
there who has the, f you like the red hot information and thai 's what he's there for
really'
While Suffolk's FWAG and Wildlife Trust officers spoke of their diplomatic withdrawal from
the development and implementation of individual ESA agreements, the Breckland field officer
for the NWT argued that, rather than choosing to step back from the implementation process,
MAFF and the FRCA POs/APOs have actively discouraged local interest groups from
establishing and managing individual ESA agreements. He asserted that:
"We [NWT] are very mvolved at a sort ofpohcy level, refining prescriptions, advising
the project officer ... [but] on the groun4 we don't implement the ESA. We don't advise
apphcantc, in fact 're not pamculariy encouraged to ... 1 think that they /MAFF] see
that as very much their preserve '
Early on in the development of agri-environmental schemes many researchers, such as Cox et
al. (1985a), O'Riordan (1987), and, Blunden and Curry (1988), commented upon MAFF's
reluctance to enrol environmental organisations into the elite agricultural policy community.
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Cox et al. (1986:186-187) argued, for example, that "m responding to enviromnental criticisms
of modern fanning, agricultural interests have been determined to preserve ... the autonomy of
the Mimstiy and of the farming community in the administration and implementation of
agricultural policy .. .the most compelling has been the desire to sustain the integrity of the
policy community". In recent years, it is widely recognised that the agricultural policy
community has had to readjust to increasing forms of externalisation (see Ward et aL, 1995).
As Chapter 3 discussed, demands from Europe, national consumers and the environmental
lobby have forced MAFF to open up the agri-environmental policy process, illustrated most
recently in the development of the NAESG and NAEF which have enabled environmental
organisations to take a more pro-active role in fonnulating agn-enviromnental schemes (see
section 3.4.2). In terms of implementation, however, it appears from the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs that MAFF and the FRCA POs/APOs have sought to maintain their
authoritative control on the implementation of individual agri-environmental agreements.
Although they are involved in the implementation of the ESAs as agreement holders,
environmental advisors and scheme promoters, the local interest groups assert that, much to
their disappointment, their role as agri-environmental implementers has been limited by
MAFF's reluctance to permit them to assist the POs in developing and managing individual
ESA agreements. This is further evident where MAFF have refused to financially assist the
local environmental groups whenever they provide information and advice to the FRCA
POs/APOs.
7.3.3 Marginalised from the Implementation Process
As discussed, the local Wildlife Trusts operating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs
revealed that they were willing to exchange information with the FRCA POs/APOs whenever
they requested specific information or advice concerning County Wildlife Sites. In doing so,
the Wildlife Trusts outlined that there is an opportunity for MAFF to provide financial
assistance to the Trusts in return for any information that they may provide. Currently, the
FRCA POs in both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs have approached the local Wildlife
Trusts for maps of their County Wildlife Sites in order to ascertain where existing and potential
ESA agreements may coincide with these environmental designations. The Wildlife Trusts
recognise that such co-ordination is essential for the effective conservation of the Breckland
and Cotswold environments, but they argue that as charitable organisations their resources are
limited and the production of such maps utilises a large proportion of their limited financial and
temporal resources. As a result, the conservation officers for the local Trusts asserted that, if
the FRCA POs require such information, then MAFF should recompense the Wildlife Trusts
accordingly. The conservation officer for GWT argued, for example, that:
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"... One of the reasons that MAFF hasn't had this information about our wildlife sites
earlier is that the Wildlife Trusts nationally have had this policy that we didn '1 feel
initially that it was appropriate for us to actually give away this data. We actually
thought that they [MAFFJ ought to pay for it. Some Trusts have been lucky in getting
some money out ofM4FF, but it isn 'I available, we have been told that ".
Indeed, at the recent Agriculture Select Conurnttee enquiry on 'ESAs and other UK
agri-environinental schemes', the national representative for the Wildlife Trusts argued that,
"MAFF should pay for data which is essential for the success of ESA schemes ... this is an
important test of working in partnership with local organisations to deliver the best value for
money" (Wildlife Tnists, 1997:5). However, so far MAFF have appeared largely unwilling to
provide any financial assistance to local interest groups involved with the ESA schemes. In
Somerset, for example, the local Wildlife Trust is a major partner in the Somerset
Environmental Records Centre which collates a wide range of environmental data. Any
organisation wishing to gain access to such data has to pay a nominal fee. However, when
MAFF approached the Trust for information on their Wildlife Sites, they initially refused to
pay the Trust for such information and only did so after a considerable level of lobbying by the
Somerset Wildlife Trust (see Wildlife Trusts, 1997).
MAFF's reluctance to admit environmental organisations into the ESA implementation process
was further evident during the recent review of the Breckland ESA. Both farmers and interest
groups recognise that the Breckland ESA P0 has a number of additional work commitments
which immobilise him from taking a more pro-active role in promoting and managing the ESA
scheme. One of the farmers interviewed outlined that:
some people have said that Bill [P0] should get out more often and tell people that
theycandothis,oritsokay,ftheydothai...buthe'sgotahellofalottodo.Okay,
sometimes I think that a bit more project officer input would help, especially with the
conservation plan, but we 're getting on afrigh! ".
However, while many of the other farmers interviewed asserted that they were also 'getting on
airight' with the present level of contact that they have with the FRCA P0, it was suggested by
the environmental lobby that, like the CS scheme, MAFF could provide a professional fee for
the local interest groups to assist the ESA P0 by establishing and managing individual
management agreements. In their report to MAFF on the future of the Breckland ESA, EN
stated that:
"We [the local environmental lobb;j believe that there could be benefit to the efficient
handling of E5A applications if a realistic fee iszs available to landowners to
encourage them to use the expertise of countryside advisors in drawing up proposals for
the scheme" (English Nature, 1996:12).
Indeed, when asked, a number of the interest groups expressed their approval of such a fee and
believed that this would not only assist MAFF and the FRCA P0, but additionally, provide
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long term benefits for Breckland's natural environment. During the second review of the
Breckland ESA, however, it was observed that MAFF were very reluctant to take on board the
idea of providing a professional fee for local interest groups. In fact it was observed at one of
the review meetmgs that MAFF refused to discuss the proposal made by the local
environmental lobby, preferring instead to focus upon the specificities of the ESA tiers and
how the interest groups proposed that these could be improved. According to the Breckland
field officer for the NWT, MAFF simply do not want other individuals or organisations to
implement the ESA agreements.
"There has been a discussion about the implementation of a professional fee, but that
hasn't been broadly welcomed as far as I know by MIFF itself... I mean they [MIFF]
are very happy for us to promote their schemes for them, but obviously they don t want
us to have anything more to do with it '
Indeed, this is increasingly evident at both the national and local level of agri-environmental
policy. At the recent Agriculture Select Committee enquiry, the government's own
environmental agencies joined forces with national ENGOs and called for a greater transfer of
agii-environmental information between MAFF and all interested parties. They argued that
MAFF currently upholds a system of confidentiality whereby any information concerning
agreement holders will not be released to any individual or organisation outside of MAFF or
the FRCA. According to the environmental agencies and ENGOs, such confidentiality is
preventing them from taking a more pro-active approach in the agri-environmental policy
process. The Countryside Commission (1996:5) argued that:
"we were told early on in the review process that maps showing the agreement uptake
by tier for each ESA would be available, but we have so far only obtained one such
map. We would welcome a commitment by the Ministry to supply the agencies with such
maps for all the ESAs under review, in advance of releasing monitoring reports. It is
clear that they make a valuable addthon to our underslan'Jing of scheme performance ".
Concomitantly, English Nature (1996:2) stated that:
"Consultation and liaison with the project officers is good but there are some problems
over the ease of access to information which has restricted our capacity as a statutory
body to give advice to the required level of detail and accuracy".
According to Wirth (1986:602), the ability of interest groups to 'look in from the outside'
"depends heavily on the co-operation of the 'insiders'. [However] many studies (e g. Oyen,,
1982) have shown that the principles and practice of secrecy and confidentiality frequently
impede access to internal information for outsiders and may defend or protect administrative
bodies from unpopular external control". At the local level, within both the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs, similar arguments were expressed by interest groups when discussing
MAFF's system of confidentiality. The inability of the Breckland ESA P0 to adopt a
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pro-active approach to implementation was re-emphasised, but as the field officer for the
Brecks Countiyside Project (BCP) argued:
"We can not help him even though he needs ii. ... Basically we haven 't tackled some
areas of work because we know that the confidentiality exist.t For example, we don t
know where there is a gap on the river valley grassland where we can approach a
landowner and suggest what he [sic] can do, because we don't know who is in the
scheme, what land is in it, or where more promotion is needed'
Concomitantly, in the Cotswold Hills ESA, EN argued that MAFF's confidentiality clause has
seriously impeded their attempts to ensure that the Cotswold species rich grasslands are being
successfully protected by existing ESA agreements. According to EN's conservation officer for
Gloucestershire:
"The ESA team [PU APOs] have told us that we are to receive a map but we are still
waiting for it. In the meantime we don't know the distribution of ESA agreements and as
a result we can 't see what areas of species rich grasslands are being protectea how
they are being protected or where areas are still left outside of an ESA agreement ".
In this context, it is evident that it is MAFF, rather than the individual FRCA PO/APO, which
is effectively marginalising local interest groups from the agri-environmental implementation
process. As Chapter 5 outlined, the FRCA PO/APO is tightly controlled by the legislative and
bureaucratic boundaries of MAFF. They are expected to operate in accordance with MAFF's
rules and regulations, which evidently include the imposition of a confidentiality clause
preventing interest groups from gaining access to individual agri-environmental participants. In
discussions with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs APOs they did not reveal any
strong sentiments concerning the imposition of MAFF's confidentiality clause. They accepted
that as employees of MAFF they are bound to uphold the notion of confidentiality, thus,
limiting the level of contact that many local interest groups may have with ESA agreement
holders. As the Cotswold Hills ESA P0 explained:
"... MAFF have this confidentiality clause which we implement. When MAFF and the
farmers sign the ESA agreement ills written in that the farmers iwines and status as an
ESA agreement holder will not be disclosed to any other organisation unless the
farmers are consultedfirst. It's our duty to uphold that ".
Given the imposition of this confidentiality clause, many of the environmental interest groups
interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs went on to outline how they have
turned to their respective FRCA P0 as their primary link with MAFF's agri-environmental
implementation network.
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7.3.4 Looking Towards the FRCA Project Officer
As discussed earlier, it is evident that individuals and groups such as EN, the Forestry
Authority and County Wildlife Trusts advise the FRCA POs/APOs and, on occasion, are
invited by the POs/APOs to attend site visits and farm walks (see section 7.4.2). The Cotswold
Hills ESA P0 outlined, for example, that:
"we [FRCAJ have had a number ofjomt events with other orgwnsations for agreement
holders. Last summer we invited all existing agreement holders to join English Nature
and ourselves, to discuss appropriate management of traditional limestone grassland. It
was a great success, a lot offarmers and landowners turned up and I think that they
found the input that English Nature gave very useful, I know I did".
Rarely in direct contact with existing agreement holders as a result of MAFF's confidentiality
clause, English Nature's conservation officer for Gloucestershire outlined how these events and
farm visits are one of the only opportunities that they and other local environmental groups
may have any influence over the decisions and actions of individual ESA agreement holders.
As the conservation officer outlined:
"Its a wonderful opportunity for us [EN]. We actually get to meet the landowners and
managers of the grassland and are able to give them practical advice on how they may
manage these vulnerable areas, whose fate is really in the hands of modern fanning
practices '
As the conservation officer went on to explain, however," ... such site visits and joint events
are fairly infrequent. They tend to occur once every two years, if that". This was further
supported by the Breckland field officer for the Norfolk Wildlife Trust who outlined how "we
[NW!] haven't been to an open day for along time, in fact I can't remember when the last one
was". Given such limited opportunity in which to directly advise and influence ESA agreement
holders, therefore, many of the environmental interest groups interviewed in the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs outlined how they are currently reliant upon the FRCA POs/APOs to
transfer information and advice, which they frequently give to the POs, down to the ESA
agreement holders. The Breckland field officer for the SWT explained that:
"whenever Bill's [P0] not too sure about some specific ecological mailer, he might call
me for some advice as he knows I've got an ecological training and good knowledge of
the local environment, and of coune, I'm always willing to give him any advice, as
hopefully through him it'll reach the agreement holder who normally I wouldn't be able
to advise directy So, j I'm always w,lhng to help BilL 'cause ii helps us [SWT] as
well".
Likewise, in the Cotswold Hills ESA, the conservation officer for the GWT bluntly outlined:
"he 's [P0] our main link with those farmers in the scheme. We just hope that what we
tell him gets passed on..."
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According to Lipsky' s (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy, local-level unpiementers are
powerful and influential gatekeepers of information. As interest groups are dependent on the
FRCA P0 APO, Lipsky (1980) outlines how policy makers are reliant on street-level
bureaucrats to pass on relevant infonnation to recipients of policy in order that they may
implement policy makers' objectives efficiently and effectively. As Lipsky went on to outline,
however, local-level implementers are highly autonomous decision-makers. In the light of their
immediate working environment they may accept, reject or modify policy maker interests.
Consequently, recipients of policy may seek to implement a policy that is more reflective of the
street-level bureaucrat's professional decisions and action, rather than those of the policy
makers'.
According to the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs every effort will be made to try to
integrate local environmental objectives into the advice and infonnation that they give to the
ESA agreement holders, but, as Lipsky (1980) proposed, the Breckland field officer for the
NWT questioned:
"how can we be sure that he passes on our information in the way that we [i e
environmental lobby] would want it to be conveyed?"
In the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, it was very difficult to ascertain the extent to
which the FRCA POs had, or had not, incorporated the objectives of local environmentalists
into their discussions with ESA agreement holders. As chapter 6 outlined, the POs/APOs
adopted a fanner friendly approach when implementing their respective schemes They sought
to communicate with farmers using a discourse with which the farmers felt comfortable and
familiar. Invariably this involved discussing the farmers' own objectives and establishing how
these could be implemented in relation to MAFF's agri-enviromnental interests. As such, it
may be speculated that, in these discussions, the POs/APOs did not give high pnorityto the
objectives of local environmental groups. They sought to assist farmers to further their own
objectives and may have thus neglected, whether consciously or unconsciously, to further the
objectives of environmental groups. It should be noted, however, that this is by no means a
definite conclusion. Further research that focuses specifically on the discourses used by the
POs, and, the origins of that discourse is needed to substantiate this line of argument.
Although little firm evidence may be gained concerning the extent to which the FRCA
POs/APOs incorporate the objectives of environmentalists into discussions with farmers, many
of the environmental groups in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs recognised the
disadvantages in relying upon the PO/APO to transfer their advice down to ESA agreement
holders. The Breckland field officer for the SWT argued, for example, that:
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"...we [SWT] do advise him [P0], but its always very difficult to know if what we have
advised will be used At the end of the &Jy we are in a situation where there are a
number ofpeople all interested in the scheme, but our interests may not all be the same.
We just have to hope that Bill is sympathetic to ours and will try and get them across to
the farmers '
Indeed, while many of the local environmental groups remain marginalised from MAFF's
agri-environmental implementation network it would appear that they have little alternative but
to rely on the FRCA POs'/APOs' goodwill and discretion to transfer their objectives down to
the ESA agreement holders (see Fig. 7.1).
While MAFF's reluctance to admit many of the local interest groups into the implementation
process has forced many of the groups to look towards the FRCA PO/APO, it was evident in
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs that, in the case of two particular interest groups -
county archaeologists and local FWAG groups, MAFF have permitted the FRCA P0 to
actively enrol the organisations into the official implementation process.
7.3.5 County Archaeologists
Prior to 1997, Norfolk and Suffolk county archaeologists had little direct involvement with the
Breckland ESA scheme. The FRCA P0 would approach them whenever he required their
advice, but according to the archaeologists this was often a rare occurrence. As one of the
Suffolk county archaeologists outlined:
"When we [archaeologists] first came in we were very much on the outside and I think
that they [FRCA] obviously Iw.u1 very little experience dealing directly with
archaeologists ... in fact they rarely approached us '
Recognising that archaeological interests were a central feature of the ESA scheme (see
appendix 2), the Suffolk County Council's archaeological unit devised detailed guidelines for
the Breckland ESA P0, outlining basic defimtions of archaeological sites and appropnate
management for their protection. According to the archaeologists, it was hoped that such
guidelines would assist the P0 in identifying archaeological sites when they visited prospective
agreement holders and to subsequently advise farmers on how best to manage their land in
order to maintain and conserve the archaeological remains. In recent years, however, it is
evident that the Breckland ESA P0 has sought to forge more intimate working hnks with the
county archaeologists. Where previously the P0 would infrequently seek the advice of the
archaeologists, it was revealed that the P0 currently submits ESA application fonns to the
county archaeology unit enabling them to identify archaeological sites on prospective
agreement holders' land and, in addition, to comment on appropriate management techniques








Fig. 7.1. The FRCA Project Officer-Interest Group Relationship (Source: author)
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"Now, they [P0] have a different way of approaching it [the ESAJ They started to send
us application areas for direct comment. I iww have a map showing what area is
involved and I reply back saying ... what archaeology is involved".
Emulating the Breckland ESA, the Cotswold Hills ESA PO/APOs have adopted a similar
approach to implementing MAFF's archaeological requirements (see appendix 2). When the
ESA was first established the Cotswold I-Tills ESA P0 sent all the new ESA applications to the
county archaeologists, whereupon they assisted the P0 by identif'ing any recorded sites of
historic and archaeological interest which were known to be present on the applicants' land.
The archaeologists would then provide comments on how the archaeological sites could be
effectively managed under the ESA requirements. According to one of Gloucestershire's
county archaeologists, however:
"in the first year of the ESA, the FRCA forwarded on 350 applications to us and we
had to go through the sites and monuments records here and identify all the recorded
sites that were present on the land entered into the ESA scheme ... It was just so over
whelming. We were absolutely swamped They [FRCAJ promoted their scheme almost
too well in the first year. Most of the Estates were signed up then and some are huge,
covering Iwo or three parishei Trying to identify and map all the sites and monuments
for just one Estate often took me two to three days. In total I worked on the applications
for six months which was madness as! had so many other commitments '
In an attempt to assist the archaeologists, a member of the FRCA has now been trained by the
county archaeology team, to identif' archaeological sites and monuments on ESA applications.
The county archaeologists simply comment on their appropriate management, as one of
Gloucestershire's county archaeologists outlined:
"... It 's changed a bit now. We still comment on any new proposed agreement, but
someone from FRCA comes down and marks on the archaeological sites, they are then
passed to us and we send them back to the project officer with comments on
Although the archaeologist interviewed in Gloucestershire asserted that this change in the
administration of the ESAs has enabled her to focus on other aspects of her work within the
county, she went on to argue that by altering the administrative system in such a way the
FRCA have, whether intentionally or not, marginalised the county archaeology team from the
ESA implementation process. Once the archaeological sites have been identified by one of the
FRCA APOs, the county archaeologists are still asked to comment on appropriate management
practices to preserve the sites, but by actively entering the offices of the archaeologists and
using their techniques and skills to identify sites and monuments the FRCA have effectively
retained an active role in the archaeological network. Indeed, both Suffolk and Gloucestershire
county archaeologists argued that, despite being increasingly involved m the ESA
implementation process, they are only able to assist the FRCA P0 APO m a limited
administrational capacity. While they value this involvement, they believe that they may assist
the P0 APOs further by conducting more on site visits and directly advising the farming
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community on how they may positively manage their land for the protection of archaeological
remains. One of Suffolk's county archaeologists exclaimed, for example, that:
"... the poor project officer has got so much other stuff to worry about ... that we've
said to him that we are always willing, you know after we have *)ne these things [ESA
applications], if the farmers want to talk to us directly that's fine ... but so far none
have come back to us and we haven't done any site visits ... inflict we are a bit isolated
up here. Its great that we are doing more than before, but we Just feel that we could
offer more beyond meetings and policy documents ".
Likewise, the county archaeologist interviewed in Gloucestershire expressed her
disappointment that they have not been enrolled into the core of the agri-environmental
implementation process.
"... It would be great to cany out more site visits and also to have some feedback from
the project officer on whether my comments and advice have been implemented by the
farmers. At the movement I've got no idea if the ESA agreement holders are helping to
preserve the archaeological sites in the county. Obviously I hope that they are after
acting on my advice, but we haven't been given any of that information from the ESA
leant ... ".
Thus, while the county archaeologists have, in comparison to other local interest groups
succeeded in becoming enrolled into the official ESA implementation process, their level of
contact with ESA agreement holders is evidently controlled and often discouraged by the
FRCA and MAFF.
7.3.6 FWAG
In comparison, it was evident in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs that the FRCA
POs/APOs willingly exchange information with local FWAG groups concerning the location of
ESA agreements, the names and addresses of the individual participants, and, further, what
ESA tiers the participant has agreed to implement on his/her land. As the Norfolk FWAG
advisor outlined:
'we [Norfolk FWAG] have extremely good working relations with him [P0]. There is
always free flow of information, maps, assistance, Joint site meetings if necessary, yea
there are no problems, ... we both help each other out. ... MAFF do hold confidentiality
seriously but if! go and see the project officer he will usually help me out by telling me
if the farm I'm due to visit is in an ESA or not '
Like MAFF, FWAG possess a confidentiality approach within their day to day work. They do
not release names of farmers whom they advise and, yet, with the security of MAFF's
confidentiality clause Gloucestershire's FWAG advisor argues that FWAG will readily submit
information to their contemporaries within the FRCA.
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confidentiality is important in FWAG. Everything is a/was done with the
landowners consent ... but they know that we frequently talk to the FRCA project
officers and they [landowners] are always happy about that ... there is a pretty free
exchange of information between us and the ESA team, which helps us when we are
working on the ESA agreements".
Historically, FWAG have enjoyed close working relations with MAFF As Chapter 3 outlined
MAFF readily supported the development of FWAG in the early 1970s They saw the
opportunity to use FWAG as a means of staving off cnticism from the environmental lobby,
and acted as a primary financial and administrative supporter of local FWAG groups. Over the
years FWAG has become synonymous with providing general on-farm conservation advice for
the farming community They have assiduously avoided acting as a pressure group for
conservation interests and have, instead, focused upon the provision of agn-environmental
advice, with greater emphasis on the agricultural interests of their farming members (Cox et al.,
1 985a, 1 985b, 1 990 Blunden and Curty, 1 9X8; Winter, 1996) As such, FWAG has often been
viewed as another agency of MAFF They are believed to work for the agricultural industry,
helping farmers to meet political and public demand for environmentally sensitive farming.
In this context it was not surprising to find that within the Rreckland and ('otswold Hills
ESAS, the local FWAG advisors within both areas have become actively involved in the
implementation of individual ESA management agreements. Within the two case study ESAs it
was evident that FWAG will actively promote the ESA schemes throughout their day to day
work "It's now become a natural part of our job, to mention the FSA scheme to any farmer
we're in contact with who is eligible to join the scheme" (Gloucestershire FWAG advisor)
Further, Gloucestershire's FWAG advisor spoke of his role as an assistant to the FRCA P0
and APOs.
"On occasion I have helped farmers to draw up their plans for the ESA application
forms. We go over what they want to do, or what I think they should do and then we
submit the proposal to the FRCA
According to the Cotswold Hills ESA P0, he is extremely happy for FWAG to assist the ESA
team in such a way He explains that
"IThe FRCA/ have a very good working relationship with Gloucestershire FWAG. In
fact wherever a prospective agreement holder is a FWAG member, then we will always
suggest that FWAG are brought in to assist us
This was further supported by one Cotswold Hills ESA agreement holder As a FWAG
member he explained that he currently implements the FSA scheme with the help and
assistance of the FWAG advisor, as reconunended by the FRCA P0
"... he [FRCA P0] chdco,ne out. The chap [FWAG advisor] was he was the fellow
that instigated it ... well sometimes it was Richard Appleton [P0] and other times ii was
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Rob Mac/din [FWAG advisor]. Rob has stuck with us longer and he has sort of turned
into a chum now, so as we had such a good rapport, Richard Appleton said that 'I've
got other things to do, so I'll leave you with Rob looking after you'and its not been a
choppy ride at all".
Historically, Gloucestershire's local FWAG advisor has played a prominent role in developing
farmers interest in conservation. Fonned in 1979, Gloucestershire's FWAG advisoiy group is
one of the oldest FWAG groups in the country. It currently supports a membership of 400
farmers and landowners, additionally establishing itself as one of the largest local FWAG
groups within England (Macklin, 1997). Throughout the field survey, both farmers and interest
groups continuously referred to the FWAG advisor. They spoke of his prominent position
within the county and the considerable level of respect that the FWAG advisor has gained from
the Cotswold farming community. Three of the farmers inteiviewed in the Cotswold Hills
outlined, for example, that:
"FWAG are vely good. Actually FWAG are the most useful of the lot".
"The FWAG advisor is very good ... if ever you have a problem he is out there straight
away, always willing to help".
"If there ever had to be an independent body to MAFF implementing the ESA, I think
that our local FWAG would be better than any other group. They have got their feet on
the ground. they are realistic".
FWAG's popularity within the Cotswolds can primarily be attributed to John Hughes, the first
FWAG advisor within the county. As a prominent local farmer, John Hughes was welcomed
by the farming community. They believed that with his agricultural background he understood
their objectives and sought to advise them on practical measures to integrate environmental
concerns with their productivist objectives. According to one of the ESA participants
interviewed:
"John Hughes is always so much liked because he has been a fanner. He wasn 't a stop
everything man. He was like you kwv, for example he was qNote in favour of stubble
burning, something these environmentalists put a stop to "
Concomitantly, a Gloucestershire farmer located outside of the ESA boundary praised the
FWAG advisor and spoke of his impact upon Gloucestershire's farming community.
'tlohn Hughes had been a very good pubhc relations man. He went arid spoke at WI12
meetings, schools, Mother's Unions, to explain to them about farming and the
environment ... he was ertremely practical and a very charismatic man with great
experience and enthusiasm which rubbed off on others. He had a very high public
profile in Gloucestershire and was highly regarded by farmers and conservationists ".
12Women's Institute.
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As a FWAG advisor, John Hughes succeeded in enrolling many farmers into the notion of
agri-environmental conservation. Indeed, before the ESA was established, it was evident that a
number of farmers within the Cotswolds had taken on board the advice of the FWAG advisor
and were increasingly adopting environmentally sensitive farming practices. According to the
Cotswold Hills ESA P0:
"we [MAFFFRCAJ had a relatively easy start to the ESA. Many farmers in the
Cotswolds are iwilurally conserwition minckd The steep landscape to the south st of
the area ham 't enabled them to farm really intensively ... but FWAG has been very
influential rn the area. They have a long association with many farms here and have
helped to change a lot of opinions "
When the Cotswold Hills ESA was established in 1994, MAFF recognised the influential
position that FWAG had developed within the farming community and subsequently sought
their assistance in the formulation and implementation of the ESA scheme. Accordmg to the
Cotswold Hills ESA P0:
"FWAG had what, fifteen years contact on the ground in the Cotswolds so they were
one of the key bodies initially to estabhsh links with ".
John Hughes has recently retired from his advisory role within FWAG, but his successor has
already continued to gain the respect of both MAFF and the Cotswold farming community.
One farmer participating in the ESA scheme outlined that:
"Rob is a great bloke. He can't sit still in an office. He hates paperwork and only ever
wants to be out on farm visits, which is great for us [farmers] ".
Concomitantly, as discussed above, he continues to assist the FRCA PO/APO in the
implementation of individual ESA agreements and has effectively secured a position for
himself at the core of the ESA implementation process where, operating alongside the FRCA
P0, FWAG have been able to directly influence how a large proportion of the rural landscape
is managed and conserved.
7.4	 Conclusion.
It has been argued that, in recent years, the traditional elitism of the agricultural policy
community has broken down as new pressure groups gain a foothold in the agricultural
decision making nexus (see Chapter 3). Indeed, it is recognised that in terms of
agn-environmental policy, environmental interest groups, such as EN, RSPB, CoCo and CWTs
have become increasingly involved in the formulation of UK agri-enviromnental schemes
(Winter, 1996; Flart and Wilson, in press). Following EU legislation, for example, MAFF
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consults widely with their statutory enviromnental agencies and ENGOs. According to the
Head of MAFF's conservation policy division the channels of conununication between MAFF
and the environmental groups are continuously open. He argued that MAFF welcomes the
advice of the environmental agencies and ENGOs, and, believes that they provide the
necessaiy expertise to inform MAFF on the practical application of their agri-environmental
objectives.
"The ENGOs seem to be able to make contact with us [A'L4FFJ easily and ck so all the
time ... I also think that they have the particular expertise which one needs to be able to
reconcile the objectives with the practical mechanisms" (Boyhng, 1997).
This analysis revealed, however, that within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, MAFF
have attempted to retain control on the administration and implementation of agricultural
policy, at the local level. It was shown that local environmental agencies and ENGOs are
involved in the formulation and implementation of agri-environmental schemes. On occasion
they participate in open days organised by the FRCA PO/APO and are often called on by the
PO/APO for specific advice and information related to individual agri-environmental
agreements. However, the FRCA POs/APOs have been forced, under MAFF's bureaucratic
rules and regulations, to uphold a confidentiality clause imposed by MAFF which effectively
limits the level of direct contact that the majority of interest groups may have with
agri-environmental agreement holders. The only exception here is FWAG. Historically and
politically aligned with MAFF, FWAG has been permitted into the sanctum of MAFF's
agri-environmental implementation process. It was evident that MAFF are often ready to listen
to the views and suggestions of FWAG during the review stages of individual
agn-environmental schemes, and will permit the FRCA PO/APO to share information with
local FWAG groups, concerning individual agri-environmental holders. In the case of the
Cotswold Hills ESA, it was observed that the local FWAG officer was permitted to go as far
as to act as an ESA P0, directly advising ESA participants, and often drawing up ESA
management plans on behalf of the individual farmer and the FRCA P0.
Further, it was evident that as many of the local interest groups became marginalised from the
agn-environmental implementation process, they were forced to look towards the individual
FRCA P0 as the primary gatekeeper through which their ideas and objectives could be
transferred down to agri-environmental participants. As discussed, the interest groups, such as
the county archaeologists and Wildlife Trusts often provided advice and information to the
individual P0. The county archaeologists identified sites of histonc mterest on ESA application
forms and commented on suitable management practices to ensure their protection. At the time
of the field survey, the local Wildlife Trust in Gloucestershire, was in the process of preparing
a map of County Wildlife Sites for the P0, whereupon they hoped to provide further
knowledge on how such sites should be effectively managed by any ESA agreement holder.
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However, as on-farm conservation advisors are reliant on the willingness of farmers to take up
their advice, so the implementation of local interest group objectives was seen to be dependent
on the co-operation and goodwill of the individual ESA P0. According to the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESA POs, every effort would be made by them to integrate the environmental
knowledge and expertise of interest groups into the wider agri-environmental implementation
process, yet, as Chapters 5 and 6 outlined, the agri-environmental decisions and actions of the
individual FRCA PO/APO are shaped and influenced by a network of actors, such as MAFF,
the FRCA, farmers and local scheme factors. Thus, in this context, the extent to which the
interest groups' objectives will be implemented in the locality will be mediated and influenced
by the plethora of actors that constitute the POs' individual actor-network.
Drawing together the analytical findings of Chapters 5, 6 and 7, it is thus evident that, as Fig.
7.2 summaries, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs effectively exist at the interface of
a number of individual actor-networks involved in the wider agri-environmental
implementation process. Controlled by MAFF legislation and bureaucratic expectations, the
P0 is enrolled in MAFF's agn-environinental network. They operate to further MAFF's
objectives and attempt to ensure that these are implemented in the locality, yet, in turn, the P0
is enrolled in the networks of individual farmers. The Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs
were shown to co-operate with farmers and to assist them to implement their individual
agri-environmental objectives within the locality. Finally, as discussed the individual P0 has
evolved as an important and influential actor in the agn-environmental networks of many
interest groups operating in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. The local interest groups
look towards the P0 as the key to gain access into the actor-networks of MAFF and individual
agri-environmental participants and non-participants. In this context, the empirical analysis of
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs has revealed that the FRCA POs/APOs are relatively
important and influential actors in the implementation of the ESA schemes. As conceptualised
within agricultural extension science, they act as pivotal gatekeepers to many actors who wish
to implement their individual objectives within the wider agri-environmental policy process
(see section 3.2). In light of this analytical discussion, the following section seeks to analyse
what implications these research findings have for theoretical and conceptual understandings of
the role and influence of local-level implementers. Chapter 8 will return to analyse the
applicability of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy, before Chapter 9 analyses the






















One of the primary aims of this thesis was to revive interest in Lipsky's theoty of street-level
bureaucracy by analysing how applicable this 'universal' theoiy is in providing a detailed and
accurate understanding of any local-level implementer, such as the agri-environmental
implementer. Throughout Part II the applicability of Lipsky's theoiy, in relation to the
agri-enviromnental implementer, was brought into question as previous research studies
highlighted a complex network of actors that may be involved in the implementation of the
UK's agri-environmental policy. In this context, it was suggested that Lipsky's detailed
micro-sociological analysis of the street-level bureaucrat may not provide a holistic
understanding of the role and relative influence of the agn-environmental unplementer. As an
alternative conceptual and methodological approach, the actor-network approach was
suggested as an appropriate analytical framework to employ. This section of the thesis seeks to
draw upon the qualitative data outlined in Part IV in order to analyse, in the light of empirical
evidence, whether the actor-network approach has provided a more holistic understanding of
the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer. In doing so, Chapter 8 will firstly
analyse the applicability of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy, before Chapter 9
returns to the actor-network approach and analyses its utility in providing a detailed
understanding of the agri-environmental implementer.
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Chapter 8
The Applicability of Lipsky's Theory
of Street-Level Bureaucracy
8.1	 Introduction
As analysts of policy implementation have increasingly turned their attention to the role of
actors implementing policy, Part H outlined how Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy
provides one of the most detailed expositions of the role and influence of local-level
implementers. Addressing such policy actors as a generic group, under the rubric of
'street-level bureaucrats', Lipsky outlines the general behavioural characteristics of local-level
implementers, their relationship with other policy actors, namely bureaucratic superiors and
recipients of policy, and their relationship with their immediate working environment. To date,
no known attempt has been made to explicitly apply Lipsky's 'universal' theory to an analysis
of any one specific local-level implementer. In an attempt to address this gap, this thesis has
sought to analyse how applicable Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy is in an analysis
of the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer.
Early on in the thesis, Chapter 3 set out to challenge the applicability of Lipsky's theory in
relation to the FRCA PU. The chapter drew upon previous research studies to highlight that
UK agri-environmental schemes are currently implemented in a complex network of actors
who are involved, either directly or indirectly, in influencing the outcome of the UK's
agri-environmental policy. In this context, it was argued that the micro-sociological approach
adopted by Lipsky in his theory of street-level bureaucracy may provide a limited
understanding of the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer in relation to
their macro-social contexts. Having completed the empirical analysis of the role and influence
of the FRCA P0, this chapter seeks to look back at Lipsky's theory and analyse whether it is
as limiting as was initially proposed.
8.2	 Relationship of Agri-Environmental Implementer with Hierarchical Superiors
As chapter two outlined, Lipsky (1980) asserts that the 'street-level bureaucrat' possesses a
relatively high level of control over their bureaucratic superiors. According to Lipsky, policy
officials at the 'top' of an implementation hierarchy will invariably be geographically distanced
from recipients of policy and will, as a result, be reliant on the local-level implementer for any
information pertaining to the enactment of policy at the ground level. In relation to the
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agri-environmental iniplementer, it was evident that, like Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat, the
FRCA P0 did occupy a powerful position as a gatekeeper of knowledge and information
concerning the recipients of policy. As Chapter 5 outlined, MAFF officials drew upon the
information provided by the P0, in order to review existing agri-environmental schemes and to
provide knowledge for the formulation of future agri-environmental policies. However, while
the FRCA P0 was recognised as a pnmazy source of information for agricultural policy
makers, it was evident that the P0 was not the sole informant in the agri-environmental
implementation network. As Chapter 5 went on to outline, both the Breckland and Cotswold
Hills ESAs are monitored by an independent team of 'inspectors', employed within MAFF.
Periodically, inspections are made on individual farms, where it is checked that each agreement
holder is adhering to the individual scheme requirements. These reports are then transferred
back to MAFF officials where they are used to assess the applicability of national
agri-environmental objectives in the locality. In addition, MAFF has commissioned
'independent consultants', as part of a monitoring programme of agri-environmental schemes,
to carry out detailed studies of the environmental and socio-economic effectiveness of
individual schemes (see Froud, 1994; O'Carroll, 1994; Moss, 1994; Whitby, 1994). Further, it
was evident that while the farm visits conducted by the FRCA P0 provide a platform from
which farmers can voice their concerns and interests, agri-environmental agreement holders are
given the opportunity in annual liaison meetings to talk directly to MAFF officials, whereupon
they may inform the policy makers of how the schemes are being received by the recipients of
policy. The extent to which MAFF listens to these farmers' and takes on board their
suggestions remains debatable, but it is evident that such liaison meetings, along with farm
inspections provide alternative routes to the FRCA P0, through which local knowledge and
experience may be transferred to policy makers. As Chapter 3 outlined, such routes are not
accounted for in Lipsky' s theory of street-level bureaucracy.
Analysing the role and influence of the FRCA P0, it is further evident that Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy is limited in providing a detailed and realistic understanding of the
agri-environmental implementer. In his theory, Lipsky insists that the local-level implementer
will exercise a considerable level of autonomy from their bureaucratic superiors. Through fear
of alienating their implementers, Lipsky asserts that bureaucratic superiors will resist imposing
strict controls on the local-level implementer, and will, instead, encourage them to exercise
autonomous decision-making strategies that will enable policies to be implemented in the
locality as efficiently and effectively as possible. However, as Chapter 5 outlined, it is evident
from the postal questionnaire and with specific reference to the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs, that MAFF and the FRCA impose many more controls on the P0 than hypothesised by
Lipsky. As discussed, MAFF has attempted to implement the UK's agri-environmental policy
in a centralised bureaucratic network. Following a hierarchical system of administration, the
UK's agri-environmental schemes are fonnulated, administered and implemented by three
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distinct levels of policy whose role and work objectives have been defined by MAFF central
office. in terms of implementation, MAFF has employed a number of resources, such as
statutory legislation and performance appraisal systems, in order to define, control and monitor
the role of the individual FRCA P0. Under MAFF's MoU, for example, FRCA POs are
expected to implement their individual agri-environmental schemes in accordance with MAFF
objectives and recommendations. Unlike Lipsky' street-level bureaucrat, it was clearly evident
that the FRCA POs comply with MAFF objectives. They accept their role as advisors and
implementers of government policy, as asserted by MAFF, and will seek to implement
MAFF's objectives in the locality.
Further to this, it was evident that the POs are embedded within the bureaucracy and hierarchy
of their own agency - the FRCA.. Like MAFF, the FRCA has employed a number of control
mechanisms in order to define the role of the POs and to ensure that they implement MAFF's
agri-environmental objectives. Through a performance appraisal system for example, the P0
must return statistical information to their superiors within the FRCA. Additionally, it was
evident that the P0 compiles and maintains detailed reports of their interaction with each
agreement holder, outlining why they were in contact with the farmers and what decisions were
made by the P0 concerning the individual agri-environmental agreement. These reports are
then transferred to the FRCA Team Manager, whereupon, they will inspect the work and
progress of the individual P0, thus, limiting the P0 from conducting wholly autonomous
decision-making practices.
In this context, therefore, it is evident that the FRCA POs do not possess all the autonomous
characteristics of Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat. They operate in an environment of
legislative controls and audits which, reminiscent of Weberian bureaucratic concepts of power
(see section 2.2), control and monitor the POs' work. Such findings are replicated in the
arguments of top-down theorists such as Hogwood and Gunn (1984), Sabatier (1986) and
Gordon et al., (1993). It is generally accepted that conceptual interpretations of policy
implementation have progressed considerably since Pressman and Wildavsky's (1973) seminal
thesis on the top-down implementation of the Oakland programme (see Palumbo and Calista,
1990). Scholars recognise that implementation deficits can not simply be attributed to
inconsistent and incomprehensible policy objectives. Rather, it is agreed that local-level
implementers play a significant role in implementing and shaping the outcome of policy.
However, where Lipsky asserts that the street-level bureaucrat is an autonomous actor whose
decisions and actions will determine the implementation process, a number of scholars have
returned to the top-down approach and have critically analysed the level of autonomy and
power that Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat is believed to possess.
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Drawing upon classical political theories (Wilson, 1887; Weber, 1947), Sabatier (1986) argues
that street-level bureaucrats will generally operate in accordance with bureaucratic norms,
expectations and legislative controls. Sabatier (1986) recognises that the implementers may
possess some autonomous decision-making powers, but he insists that the decisions and
actions of the street-level bureaucrat, like that of the FRCA P0, will be taken within legislative
and bureaucratic boundaries. According to Hogwood and Gunn (1984), the street-level
bureaucrat is particularly limited by legal and constitutional niling. As individual members of
society they must comply with statutory legal requirements and, thus, implement official policy
maker objectives. Recently, these arguments have been further supported with reference to the
British teaching profession (see Tomlinson, 1993; Moon and Hayes, 1994). It is evident that
under the government's National Curriculum British teachers are legally bound to implement
their specialist subject in accordance with governmental requirements, which outline the
specific topics that must be taught within each discipline. While teachers may still maintain a
degree of autonomy in terms of the methods they choose to implement the National
Curriculum, Calderhead (1994) argues that current Ofsted inspections, coupled with national
examination league tables, are additionally acting as mechanisms to monitor and control the
work of the individual teacher. Thus, both legal and bureaucratic sources are increasingly
limiting the autonomy of the teaching profession. This was further evident in Cerych and
Sabatier's (1985) study of the British Open University where legal and political mechanisms
were found to control the preferences and behaviour of University lecturers (see also, Roders
and Bullock, 1976; Sabatier and Mazmanian, 1983). Summarising his critique of Lipsky's
theory, therefore, Sabatier (1986:317) asserts that, "while street-level implementers are always
important, official policy makers are not always as impotent to affect the outcome of local
[decisions] .... as ... [has been suggested]". Street-level bureaucrats can not escape legislative
ruling. They are bound by legal requirements which, in some contexts, are evidently reinforced
by bureaucratic regulatory mechanisms. In short, Sabatier (1986) argues that Lipsky's
conception of an autonomous street-level bureaucrat must be treated with caution. "Any
assessment of the (in)capacity of official policy makers to guide local implementers ... requires
a more careful analyses of... official policy decisions" (Sabatier, 1986:3 16).
Indeed, when analysing the level of autonomy possessed by the FRCA POs in the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESAs, it was initially observed that MAFF permitted the individual P0
some discretionary powers in order to administer derogations that enable national
agri-environmental policy objectives to be implemented on individual farm holdings. However,
as the analysis continued to follow the construction of the POs' actor-networks it became
evident that before a derogation could be implemented by an agreement holder the
recommendations and decisions of the P0 had to be legally verified and passed by an official
within the higher echelons of MAFF. Thus, upon further analysis of official policy decisions it
was evident that Lipsky's conception of the powerful autonomous local-level implementer
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needs to be questioned in reference to the agri-environmental implementer. Despite increasing
evidence as to the inapplicability of Lipsky's theoiy in an agri-environmental context, however,
Chapter 5 did go on to present qualitative data that outlined how the FRCA POs are permitted
autonomous decision-making powers to decide upon the most appropriate implementation
strategies to adopt within the locality.
8.3	 Coping Strategies Adopted by the Agri-Environmental Implementer
As discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs are highly
differentiated case study areas. The Breckland ESA scheme is a part-farm scheme, targeting
specific heathiand habitats. The Cotswold Hills ESA, on the other hand, seeks to enrol whole
farms into agri-environmental agreements. Further, the Breckland ESA is larger in area than the
Cotswold Hills ESA. There are fewer farmers participating in the Breckland scheme which is
implemented by one FRCA P0, compared to the Cotswold Hills ESA which is currently
implemented by one P0 and five APOs. In Chapter 4 it was proposed that such differences
between the two case study areas may have a profound influence on the implementation of the
individual ESA schemes. In chapters 5 and 6, this hypothesis was validated as empirical
evidence revealed that, given some autonomous decision-making powers, the POs within the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs sought to adopt different implementation strategies in
order to implement their respective schemes as efficiently and effectively as possible within the
context of the schemes' requirements and additional local circumstances.
It was evident, for example, that the Breckland ESA P0 had many work commitments outside
of the ESA scheme which limited his level of temporal resources and, subsequently, forced him
to adopt a progressive farmer strategy where the P0 sought to limit the number of farmers he
had to visit by targeting the larger more dominant farmers in the hope that their actions would
influence smaller farmers to participate in the ESA scheme. The Cotswold Hills ESA P0, on
the other hand, evidently adopted a more pro-active approach in promoting and implementing
the ESA. Implementing a whole farm scheme, the P0 did not have to initially target specific
farmers in the area and, with the assistance of five APOs, all of those farms eligible to enter
into the ESA scheme were directly contacted by the P0 APOs.
In seeking to understand and explain why the POs adopted such different implementation
sirategies, Lipsky's theomy of street-level bureaucracy provides the research with a useful
analytical framework in which to understand this particular role of the agri-enviromnental
implementer. Like the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs, Lipsky asserts that street-level
bureaucrats will not seek to refonnulate policy in order to seffishly advantage their own
mterests and objectives. Instead, they will draw upon their personal knowledge, experience
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and overall professionalism in order to achieve what is best for their superiors within a specific
socio-economic and political enviromnent As Hudson (1993:387) argues, "street-level
bureaucrats end up making policy in circumstances which are not of their own choosing and
which impel them to devise strategies to protect their working environment". Faced with
inadequate resources, for example, Lipsky (1980) outlines that the street-level bureaucrat may
determine the outcome of policy through the adoption of a set of coping strategies that enable
them to deliver policy to a proportion, if not all of the target group. These coping strategies, as
chapter two outlined, may include the simplification of information given to a member of the
target group, a rationalisation of time spent directly with the recipients of policy, preferential
targeting as the Breckland ESA P0 adopted, and a process of 'creaming off' whereby only
those recipients of policy are approached by the street-level bureaucrat in the belief that they
will respond positively to the policy stipulations (Lipsky, 1980). This is not to say that the
street-level bureaucrat does not enter their work with some ideals and personal objectives
vis-à-vis the implementation of policy. According to Lipsky (1980), the adoption of coping
strategies is simply indicative of the prevailing structural constraints within which the
street-level bureaucrat must operate.
Other studies have found Lipsky's (1980) conception of coping strategies a useful analytical
framework to use when seeking to understand and explain the decisions and actions of
front-line workers (see Weatherley et al., 1980; Satyamurti, 1981; Cooper, 1985). Lowe Ct al.
(1997), for example, referred to Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy during their
analysis of the working lives of pollution inspectors. Like the FRCA P0, Lowe et al. (1997)
identified that, where pollution inspectors are permitted discretion from centrally devised rules,
they will seek to define farmers in terms of 'persuadable' individuals willing to comply with
farm pollution regulation, or 'problem' farmers who will require greater persuasion to adopt
non-polluting agricultural practices. In doing so, Lowe et at. (1997) argued that the pollution
inspectors conform to Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucrat. "Lipsky explains that
'[street-level bureaucrats] ... develop conceptions of their work and of their clients that narrow
the gap between their personal and work limitations and the service ideal' (Lipsky, 1980:xii).
The field-level bureaucrats we studied conformed to this model" (Lowe Ct at., 1997:203).
However, while Lipsky's (1980) theory of street-level bureaucracy is evidently useful in
explaining the individual decisions and actions of the 'field-level bureaucrat' (Ward and Lowe,
1997), its applicability as a primary theory to understand the role and influence of the
agri-environmental implementer is brought back into question as analysis turns to the
P0-farmer relationship.
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8.4	 Relationship of Agri-Environmental Implementer with Policy Recipients
Drawing upon previous agri-environmental research studies, Chapter 3 argued that one of the
major limitations of Lipsky's theoiy of street-level bureaucracy in an analysis of the
agn-environmental implementer is Lipsky's failure to recognise the power and influence of
policy recipients. According to Lipsky, individuals receiving policy are relatively powerless
actors whom the street-level bureaucrat may manipulate and control through the strategies that
they adopt to cope with uncertainties and work pressures. Lipsky argues, for example, that the
street-level bureaucrat will 'box' and stereotype recipients of policy, which, in turn, control the
level of involvement that the recipients may exercise in the policy implementation process.
However, Chapter 3 set out to outline how farmers are regarded as extremely powerful actors
in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes. The voluntary nature of the schemes
ensures that farmers may possess the autonomous decision-making powers to accept or reject
MAFF's agri-environmental objectives, as implemented by the FRCA POs. Further, it was
revealed that a complex network of factors exist to influence farmers' agri-environmental
participatory motivations and decisions. Amongst these factors a few research studies revealed
that the FRCA P0 was a relatively influential actor in encouraging farmers to participate in an
agri-environmental scheme, although they were often secondary to financial motivations (see
Moss, 1994; Skerratt, 1994; Wilson, 1996, 1997).
In the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, empirical evidence adds further support to the
argument postulated in Chapter 3 - that Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy provides an
inadequate explanation of the power and influence that farmers may possess in the
agri-environmental implementation process. As Chapter 6 outlined, farmers are key actors in
the implementation of the two case study ESAs. They have decided whether to participate or
not participate in the ESA schemes and, as many farmers revealed, these decisions have been
taken in relation to a number of factors relevant to the individual farmer. These included, a
personal interest in conservation, a need to consider the preferences of the farm's successor
and, for the majority of fanners interviewed, an interest in the financial payments on offer by
the schemes. It was evident from the farmer interviews, however, that the FRCA P0 did play
an important role in the implementation of individual agn-environmental agreements. Many
farmers regarded the P0 as a friendly face of government and as a key actor transferring
information from MAFF officials down to the farmers at the ground level. In this context, some
may argue that Lipsky's theory emulates the relationship of the agri-environmental
implementer and the farmers. According to Lipsky, the local-level implementer acts as a
gatekeeper transferring important information down to the recipients of policy. However, as
Chapter 6 went on to reveal, the relationship that exists between the FRCA P0 and the
recipients of agri-environmental schemes is far more complex than Lipsky's theory of
street-level bureaucracy can account for.
215
It was evident from the POs and farmers interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESAs that their relationship, when implementing the ESA schemes, is one which is primarily
based upon trust and respect. In the light of the voluntaiy nature of the ESAs, the FRCA POs
have had to gain the trust and co-operation of the farmers in order to persuade and cajole them
into participating in the schemes. In doing so, it was evident that, like Lowe Ct al.'s (1997)
pollution inspectors, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs would listen to farmers' ideas
and objectives, and subsequently advise them on how they could implement these within the
confines of the scheme rules and MAFF's legislative boundaries (see section 5.4). In essence,
the POs would seek to compromise with the farmers, to find a middle ground within which
both MAFF's and fanners' individual agri-environmental objectives could be implemented.
This non-dictatorial role, adopted by the POs, was evidently appreciated by those farmers
surveyed. A number of the farmers interviewed spoke of their trust and respect for their
individual P0 and expressed their willingness to work with them to implement the ESA
schemes.
In terms of analysing and understanding policy relationships based on trust little can be learnt
with reference to Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy. As Chapter 2 outlined, Lipsky
briefly notes that, in light of autonomous powers held by the street-level bureaucrat, policy
makers will have to trust in the professionalism of the individual bureaucrat to implement
policy objectives. However, beyond this discussion Lipsky neglects to consider the issue of
trust in relationships that exist between street-level bureaucrats and policy target groups.
Filling this gap within Lipsky's theory, reference has been made to agricultural extension
literature throughout the research as it has proved to provide an informative insight into the
world of the P0-farmer relationship.
Rooted within rural sociology and social psychology, agricultural extension 'science' has been
primarily concerned with the dissemination of advice and information to assist farmers in the
intensification and specialisation of agricultural production. To date, little reference has been
made to agricultural extension within contemporary agri-environmental research studies, and
yet Roling (1993) asserts that the concepts of extension science have considerable significance
for the introduction and implementation of any new agricultural policy, including contemporary
agri-environmental schemes. Indeed, within this research the concepts of agricultural extension
have proved to be useful in understanding the relationship that often exists between farmers
and advisors/policy implementers. At the heart of agricultural extension science is the issue of
communication and, in particular, the assertion that effective communication is the key to the
effectiveness of agricultural policies which state policy makers have entrusted extension agents
to implement (see Giles, 1983; Davies, 1988; Roling, 1988; van den Ban and Hawkins, 1988;
Cary, 1993). To facilitate effective communication, however, agricultural extension science
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advocates that advisors must gain the trust of those farmers with whom they are in contact
with. Without the trust and respect of the fanning community, extension agents, such as the
FRCA P0 and FWAG advisors, are thought to possess limited power and influence over the
strategic decisions of individual farmers (van den Ban and Hawkins, 1988). Further,
agricultural extension science has provided additional information on the methodologies
adopted by agricultural advisors and policy implementers. Where Lipsky outlines how the
local-level implementer adopts strategies to cope with uncertainties and work pressures,
agricultural extension science complements Lipsky's theory by providing a detailed
understanding of the methodologies that agricultural implementers will generally adopt when
seeking to persuade and enrol farmers into new innovations, whether these are technologies or
policies. As Chapter 6 revealed, agricultural extension scientists generally advocate that the
individual farm visit is the most appropriate implementation strategy in which to disseminate
advice, and, it is one which is used by both Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs. Thus,
where Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy fails to provide a detailed understanding of
all aspects of the agri-environmental iinplementer, agricultural extension 'science' has proved
to be a useful complimentary analytical tool to adopt within analysis of this one specific
local-level implementer.
8.5	 Relationship of Agri-Environmental Implementer with 'New' Agri-
Environmental Actors
In Chapter 3 it was suggested that a plethora of agri-environmental actors may operate
alongside the FRCA P0 and be actively involved in the implementation of agri-environmental
schemes in England and Wales. Previous research studies had indicated that there were a
number of advisory sources operating at the ground level and it was postulated that Lipsky's
theory of street-level bureaucracy could not provide a detailed understanding of the
relationship that a local-level implementer may have with many policy actors (see Chapter 3).
Throughout his theory, Lipsky primarily focuses upon three policy actors - policy makers, the
street-level bureaucrat and the recipients of policy (see Fig. 2.2). Beyond these three policy
actors, Lipsky does not attempt to consider the relationship between the street-level bureaucrat
and any other policy actor. As Chapter 7 outlined, however, it is evident from the postal
questionnaire and interviews conducted in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, that there
are a plethora of actors actively operating within the policy implementation process. These
include: English Nature, FWAG, county archaeologists and County Wildlife Trusts. Moreover,
as Chapter 7 went on to outline, the FRCA P0 is at the centre of this interest group network.
Constrained by MAFF's bureaucratic and legislative ruling, many of the local interest groups
were unable to gain access to existing ESA agreement holders and to provide advice and
information to them, thus, the interest groups looked towards the FRCA P0 as a gatekeeper
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through which their environmental objectives could be transferred down to the farming
community. Evidently, however, Lipsky's theoiy of street-level bureaucracy provides little
explanation of any such relationship occurring between local-level implementers and other
policy actors. Lipsky recognises that the street-level bureaucrat occupies an influential position
as a gatekeeper for policy makers and recipients of policy, but negates to consider the fact that
the local-level implementer may occupy such an mfluential role when in contact with other
policy actors.
8.6	 Conclusion
Throughout Chapter 3, Lipsky's theoiy of street-level bureaucracy was exposed to critical
analysis. A detailed review of the theoiy was provided, along with policy studies that have
supported some of Lipsky's conceptions. However, as previous agri-environmental research
studies were drawn upon, the applicability of Lipsky's theory in an agn-enviroiunental context
was increasingly questioned. Following a detailed analytical review of the empirical evidence
derived from the P0 postal questionnaire and from interviews conducted in the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESAs, it is evident that the research's initial suppositions are largely confirmed.
In his theory of street-level bureaucracy, Lipsky asserts that the local-level implementer is a
powerful autonomous policy actor, whose decisions to cope with uncertainties and work
pressures will force the individual bureaucrat to adopt specific strategies which will ultimately
influence the policies that are enacted at the ground level. On the one hand, Lipsky's
conceptions evidently provide a useful understanding of the implementation strategies adopted
by the agri-enviromnental implementer. As discussed, empirical analysis revealed that the
strategies adopted by the FRCA POs to implement their respective ESA schemes were greatly
influenced by their immediate working environment. However, beyond this conceptualisation it
is evident that Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy offers a limited understanding of the
FRCA P0 and, in particular, their relationship with other agri-environmental policy actors.
Most notably Lipsky does not consider the autocratic relationship that exists between MAFF,
the FRCA and the individual P0. Further, Lipsky provides little understanding of the complex
relationships that form between both the P0 and farmers, and the P0 and local interest groups.
Early on in the thesis it was suggested that, in the light of a complex network of actors being
involved in the agri-environmental implementation process, the actor-network approach may
provide a more holistic understanding of the role and relative influence of the
agri-environmental implementer. As a non-deterministic approach to social science analysis it
was argued that the actor-network approach may enable analysis to strip away any predefined
concepts of local-level implementers' interests, relationships and influence, and, instead,
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enable implementers to reveal how they interact with one another, how they define and
interpret others' interests and objectives, and how they make decisions, and, subsequently,
how they influence the implementation of the individual agri-environinental schemes. But how
useful has the actor-network approach been in an analysis of the role and influence of the
agri-environmental iinplementer? Has the non-deterministic methodological approach assisted
the analysis in moving beyond Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis to gain a more holistic
understanding of the inter-actor relations shaping and influencing the agri-environmental
implementation process? Drawing upon the empirical analysis (Part IV), the following chapter
will seek to analyse the extent to which the actor-network approach has assisted in providing a




The Applicability of the Actor-Network Approach
9.1	 Introduction
Developed primarily in response to the determinism of existing micro and macro
sociological theories, the actor-network approach, as Chapter 3 outlined, seeks to offer
the social scientist a non-deterministic, epistemological and methodological framework in
which to analyse the inter-relations of a myriad of actors spanning traditional
dichotomous entities, such as the social, political, scientific, and natural (Murdoch and
Clark, 1994). At the heart of the actor-network approach is the concept of what Latour
(1986) describes as the 'performative definition of society' - that is where society is the
consequence of actors' decisions and actions, rather than a cause of actors' views and
behaviour. Accordingly, actor-network theorists assert that individual actors should not
be treated as passive recipients of external structural or agency forces. Rather, they are
autonomous entities who may accept, reject or modify externalities in accordance with
their personal lifeworid. In this context, the actor-network approach goes on to advocate
that analyses should, at the outset, seek to abandon predefined concepts and theories of
society, as often expressed in the form of class, power, economies and institutional
interests. Actor-network theorists are keen to assert that this does not deny that society
exists, or that existing theories may provide a useful interpretation of the interactions and
social relations between actors. However, they maintain that by adopting an objective and
neutral stance to society analysts may discern how individual actors interpret and react to
external agency and structural factors, how they construct networks of association with
other actors, and, how these relations are maintained or contested. It is only by analysing
how actors interact with one another that analysts are believed to be able to gain a greater
understanding of how power and society are constituted and maintained (Latour, 1987).
Adopting these conceptual and methodological principles in the agri-environmental
context of this research it was hoped that, by maintaining a non-deterministic stance to
analysis and observing how the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs interact and
define the objectives of other agri-environmental actors, analysis may be able to move
beyond the micro-sociological boundaries of Lipsky's theoiy of street-level bureaucracy
(see Chapter 8) and gain a greater understanding of the role and relative influence of the
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FRCA P0 in relation to their micro and macro social contexts. Having completed the
empirical data collection and analysis, this chapter seeks to analyse how useful the
actor-network approach has been in providing an epistemological and methodological
framework in which to holistically analyse the role and relative influence of the
agri-environmental implementer. Firstly, the benefits of the actor-network approach are
discussed. Particular attention is paid to the way in which the approach enabled the
agri-environmental implementer to speak out and to reveal the complexities of the
implementation process in which they operate. Secondly, the limitations of the
actor-network approach are addressed. Concerns are raised over the methodological
constraints of understanding nondecision-making, and the question of network boundaries
raised in Chapter 4 is discussed in detail.
9.2	 Identifying Agri-Environmental Actors and Networks
As Part ifi outhned, actor-network theorists have promulgated an appropriate
methodology to accompany the non-deterministic analysis of the actor-network approach.
Having abandoned a priori theories and models of inter-actor relations, Callon (1986),
Latour (1986, 1987) and Murdoch (1995) assert that, to understand how power and
society are constructed through social action, researchers should, methodologically,
follow actors as they construct definitions, linkages and associations with other actors. In
doing so, Callon (1986) maintains that the individual researcher should remain agnostic
throughout the process of empirical data collection. They should refrain from judging the
way in which actors will operate and should, instead, leave actors to 'speak for
themselves', and, in particular, to reveal their own definitions, objectives, actions and
associations with other actors (see section 4.2). Through such a methodology it is
asserted that analysis may gain a greater understanding of how actors operate in their
world, rather, than that imposed upon them by the academic community. As Ackroyd and
Hughes (1992:132) assert, after all it is the "point of view of the actor concerned
which shapes his or her course of action".
Adopting such a methodology in the agri-environmental context of this research, it is
evident from the empirical analysis (see Part IV) that the non-detennmistic stance of the
actor-network approach has proven to be useful in enabling analysis to identify and
analyse the agri-environmental implementer in relation to a network of actors not
previously accounted for in existing theories and conceptuahsations of policy
implementers. Maintaining an agnostic and neutral position within the empirical process,
the research essentially left the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAS POs to speak for
themselves and to define the network of actors within which they operate to implement
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their individual agri-environmental schemes. Initially, as Chapter 8 outlined, the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs supported Lipsky's theoiy of street-level
bureaucracy by revealmg that they are in contact with their superiors in MAFF and the
FRCA, and, in addition, with recipients of policy (i.e. farmers). However, where Lipsky
limits his theory to these three policy actors (i e. superiors, street-level bureaucrats and
recipients of policy), the FRCA POs went on to further reveal that, during the
implementation of their respective ESA schemes, they have developed a working
relationship with a number of external environmental pressure groups - a relationship
which can not be explained through Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis.
Given these empirical findings, therefore, it may be argued that if analysis had sought to
adopt a structured methodological approach, based upon Lipsky's theory of street-level
bureaucracy, little, if any, information may have been gained concerning the role of
environmental groups within the agri-environmental implementation process. Invariably
the interviews with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs would have been
structured in order to elicit particular information related to Lipsky's hypotheses, leaving
little opportunity for the POs to discuss the actors who they regard as significant within
the implementation of their respective agri-environmental schemes. Adopting the
non-deterministic actor-network approach, however, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESA POs were left to speak freely and to reveal which actors they are in contact with
during the agri-environmental implementation process. Thus, adopting this
methodological approach, analysis has been able to gain a greater and more realistic
understanding of the social contexts in which the agri-environmental implementer
operates.
Identifying Agri-Environmental Networks
Developing further an understanding of the agri-environmental implementer's
macro-social contexts, it is evident from the empirical analysis that the actor-network
methodology has further assisted the research by widening the boundaries of its analysis
and, thus, enabling examination of the breadth and complexity of the macro-social
contexts in which the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs operate. As Parts II and ifi
detailed, the actor-network approach asserts that, in seeking to analyse the power
relations between actors, analysts should continuously seek to trace the construction of
linkages and associations between actors. In doing so, actor-network theorists (e.g.
CaIlon, 1986; Latour, 1986, 1987 and Law, 1995) suggest that analysts may adopt a
snowball technique and analyse how those actors revealed by, for example, the
Brecldand and Cotswold Hills ESA POs, define their own involvement in the
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agri-environmental implementation process, in particular, how they describe their
interaction with the POs and whether they are in contact with any other actor during their
involvement in the implementation of the agri-environmental schemes. Adopting such an
approach, it is argued that analysis may gain a greater understanding of the macro-social
contexts in which actors such as the agri-environmental implementer operates (see
Callon, 1986).
Indeed, following such a 'snowball methodology', it is evident from the empirical
analysis that actors revealed by the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs were able to
confirm their contact with the respective POs, and to further reveal that, throughout their
involvement in the implementation of agri-environmental schemes, they are in contact
with a number of different actors who may be considered as active participants within the
agri-environmental implementation process. As Chapter 6 outlined, many of the farmers
interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs confirmed that they are in contact
with the FRCA POs and with other actors, such as FWAG, who they consider to be an
important and influential source of advice in their agn-environmental decision-making
processes. Concomitantly, as discussed in Chapter 7, when many of the field officers
working for the local interest groups were interviewed, they discussed their contact with
the ESA POs, but further revealed how their involvement in the implementation of the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA schemes is greatly influenced and shaped by the
objectives of their parent orgamsation and the local environmental network as a whole.
Thus, as Fig. 4.7 summarised, by tracing the linkages and associations that exist between
agri-environmental actors the analysis has been able to identify a number of actors from
varying political and institutional levels who are involved in the agri-environmental
implementation process.
It is of particular interest to note, however, that while the actor-network methodology has
enabled analysis to identify a myriad of actors involved in the agri-environmental
implementation process, it was evident that these actors do not exist as one unified
actor-network. Rather, tracing the linkages and associations between the
agri-environmental actors, the analysis identified that the agri-environmental implenienter
exists at the interface of three distinct actor-networks where differential objectives and
interests are promulgated and where actors construct unique associations with others.
Initially, as Chapter 5 detailed, an official agri-environmental implementation network
evidently emerged amongst the agri-environmental actors. Constructed by agricultural
policy makers, this network is largely comprised of MAFF and the FRCA. As a network
they are relatively insular from other agri-environmental actors. MAFF has evidently
constructed few tangible links with, for example, local farming communities and
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environmental interest groups, preferring, instead, to utilise the FRCA P0 as a gatekeeper
through which their individual objectives may be transferred to other agri-environmental
actors. Consequently, it was further identified that, where other autonomous
actor-networks have been constructed in the agri-enviromnental implementation process,
they have been brought together by the P0 during their day to day administration and
implementation of the agn-environmental schemes. First, as Chapter 6 detailed, farmers
are highly autonomous actors whose agri-environmental decisions and actions are shaped
and influenced by a number of personal, economic and natural factors. Within the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, it was evident, however, that in order to implement
their own objectives within MAFF's legislative boundaries, the fanners were reliant on
the FRCA P0 for advice and assistance. Second, quite separate from the actor-networks
created by MAFF and individual farmers, it was evident that the local environmental
interest groups operating within the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs had constructed
a network of their own. As Chapter 7 outlined, the ESA POs revealed how they are in
contact with local environmental interest groups who are often agreement holders and
may, on occasion, provide the P0 with environmental infonnation and advice. However,
as members of MAFF's agri-environmental network the POs uphold a confidentiality
clause imposed by MAFF which, with the exception of FWAG, effectively marginalises
the interest groups from having any direct contact with agri-environmental participants. In
this context, the local interest group network went on to outline how they look towards
the FRCA P0 as their primaiy route into the agri-environmental implementation process.
It is only through direct discussions with the P0 that the interest groups believe that they
may have any significant impact on how farmers implement the environmental objectives
of the schemes (see Fig. 7.1).
As a methodological approach, therefore, it is clearly evident from this empirical analysis
that where traditional conceptualisations of local-level implementers have treated the
policy implementer as an actor within a linear process of implementation (see Fig. 2.2),
the actor-network approach has assisted the research in identifying and analysing the
complexity of the macro-social environment in which the agri-environmental implementer
operates (see Fig. 7.2). Supporting this empirical analysis, Lowe et al. (1997) recently
revealed in their study of farm pollution regulation that the actor-network approach
provided a useful methodological framework in which to identify and analyse the
networks of actors involved in the regulation of farm pollution. Abandoning theoretically
pre-defined relations, Lowe et al. (1997) sought to trace the linkages and associations
between actors, whereupon they discovered that a number of individual networks had
been created, drawing together a variety of actors from the political and public sphere of
farm pollution decision-making.
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However, while the actor-network approach offers the analyst a methodology in which to
identify the complexities of inter-actor relations, how is the analyst to interpret these
networks of actors? How, for example, are the agri-environmental networks constructed?
Why were they constructed? Can the agri-environmental networks provide any insight
into the role and influence that the agri-environrnental implementer has on the
implementation of the UK's agri-environmental schemes?
9.3	 Understanding the Construction of Agri-Environmental Networks
In seeking to understand how networks of actors are constructed and maintained,
actor-network theorists have frequently drawn upon Callon's (1986) 'moments of
translation' as an 'insightful exemplar' of how actors are persuaded and enrolled into
networks of association (see Marsden et al., 1993; Ahson, 1997; Lowe et al., 1997). As
chapter 3 outlined, Callon (1986) asserts that there are four main stages in the
construction of networks. During the first stage, problematisation, actors will attempt to
make their own ideas and objectives indispensable to other actors. According to Callon,
they may adopt different modes of discourse and construct their arguments in accordance
with other actors' lifeworids, in order to persuade them of the personal benefits that may
be gained if they comply to the lead actors' objectives. Having procured some alliance to
their arguments and objectives, Callon (1986) maintains that the lead actor will seek to
strengthen these initial associations by drawing upon intermediaries, such as empirical
data and legislation (i.e. the second stage, interressment). As Law (1992:387) asserts, it
is only "when we start to perform relations - and in particular when we embody them in
inanimate materials such as texts and buildings - [that] ... they may last longer". Hence,
the key to building stable and durable actor-networks is believed to involve the
embodiment of a set of resources that assure actors' compliance to the network's primary
objectives and interests. As intermediaries strengthen inter-actor relations, Callon goes on
to outline how the construction of networks enter their third stage, enrollment, where the
identities and objectives of actors are redefined in accordance with the perceptions and
ideologies of the lead actor. In this context, Callon asserts that the lead actor will
successfully turn themselves into the spokesperson for the actor-network. Their ideas and
objectives will permeate throughout the network and will be advocated whenever
external actors and networks are encountered (i.e. mobdisation).
Drawing upon this conceptualisation of inter-actor relations, it is evident from the
empirical analysis that Callon's moments of translation offers the research an informative
understanding of how the different agri-environmental networks were constructed, and,
further, the power relations that are present within the agri-environmental implementation
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process. Referring to the empirical discussion in Chapter 5, for example, it is evident that
the FRCA P0 has been actively enrolled into MAFF's agri-environmental
implementation network through a process reminiscent of Callon's (1986) four stages of
network construction. As implementers of MAFF's agri-environmental schemes it was
not surprising to discover that the POs were in frequent contact with MAFF and, in
particular, MAFF's RSCs. However, such contact has not been left to the discretion and
goodwill of the individual P0. Rather, emulating Callon's scientists in St Bneuc Bay,
MAFF has sought to secure the co-operation of the FRCA P0 by placing considerable
emphasis on a MoU which has effectively acted as a regulatory intennediaiy, determining
and controlling the role and objectives of the individual P0. Under this MoU, MAFF
stipulates when the P0 must have contact with the RSCs and further outlines specific
responsibilities which the P0 is expected to fulfil when implementing their individual
agri-enviromnental schemes. As Chapter 5 went on to outline, the POs are permitted
some discretionary powers, such as in the implementation of derogations, but it was
evident that even then the POs are given guidelines on which derogations may be
permitted and how best these may be implemented. Utilising official documentation,
therefore, MAFF has effectively exerted a level of power and influence over the FRCA
P0. Through the MoU, the individual P0 is compelled to act as an envoy to MAFF,
implementing policy maker objectives whenever they are in contact with any other
agri-environmental actor. Indeed, such is the apparent influence of MAFF over the FRCA
POs that a number of agri-environmental actors have defined the P0 as 'MAFF'. Many
of the farmers interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, for example, did
not distinguish between MAFF and the FRCA. They viewed the P0 as an official from
MAFF, operating at the ground level and solely implementing MAFF's objectives (see
Chapter 6).
As Chapter 6 detailed, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs did adhere to MAFF
and the MoU as they attempted to enrol farmers into MAFF's agri-environmental policy
network. In doing so, it was evident that the ESA POs adopted a process of enrollment,
reminiscent of Callon's first stage of translation - problematisation. Recognising that
farmers are invariably a central actor within their own autonomous actor-networks, the
ESA POs revealed how they attempted to gain the co-operation of individual farmers by
adopting a non-dictatory role, whereby they sought to draw upon their personal
agricultural experiences and knowledge in order to present MAFF's agri-environmental
objectives to farmers using a discourse which the farmers could relate to. Having gained
the co-operation of many fanners, the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs went on
to reveal how they sought to secure farmers' alliance to MAFF's agri-environmental
objectives by frequently returning to the farmers throughout the period of their
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agri-environmental agreement. As Chapter 6 outlined, these individual farm visits proved
to be important for both the ESA POs and for the agreement holders Effectively acting as
what Callon (1986) terms an 'intermediaiy', the farm visits gave the POs the opportunity
to strengthen farmers' associations with MAFF's agri-environmental objectives, while
additionally providing farmers with a medium through which their individual interests and
objectives could be voiced to the 'official' agri-environmental policy network (see
section 6.3).
Concomitanfly, as Callon's (1986) intermediaries played a central role in the construction
of MAFF's and farmers' actor-networks, it is evident from the empirical analysis that the
development of the local environmental interest group network was determined, in part,
by the utilisation and strength of an 'inanimate intermediary' (Law, 1992). As previously
discussed (see Chapter 7 and section 9.2), many of the local environmental interest
groups interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs outlined how they are
involved in the agri-environmental implementation process, through the provision of
advice and information to the ESA POs. However, beyond this, it was revealed that their
active involvement in the implementation process has been markedly limited by a
confidentiality clause imposed by MAFF and upheld by the POs - a clause which has
effectively reduced the level of direct contact that local interest groups may have with
agri-environmental agreement holders. Interestingly, in this context, it may be seen that,
as a slight variant to Callon's moments of translation, MAFF have employed a
confidentiality clause to act as an intennediary to marginalise and discourage the
enrolment of one set of actors in an attempt to strengthen the exclusivity of their own
network. Thus, where intennediaries have assisted agri-environmental actors to enrol
others into their individual networks, they have, in turn, been used to discourage
co-operation and alliance to one set of agri-environmental objectives - in this case
MAFF's.
According to Marsden et al. (1993), analysts should be careful when using Callon's
sociology of translation. "It is difficult to know to what degree ... [Callon's] ... particular
moments of translation are specific to his research; and neither ... [should] ... we accept,
other than an ideal type, his sequence of moments. In practice they almost certainly
merge into each other and any pre-ordained sequence would introduce a rigidity that is
contrary to the whole approach" (Marsden et aL, 1993: 145). As such, Marsden Ct al.
(1993) go on to assert that Callon's conceptualisation of network construction should
primarily be treated as a useful exemplar. It is not in itself a theory, but rather an
informative framework in which to understand how actors forge and maintain links with
one another. Indeed, as an exemplar of network construction, Callon's sociology of
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translation has evidently provided an original and infonnative understanding of how
agn-environmental actor relations are established. Having identified the FRCA P0 as an
actor within a complex network of agri-environmental actors, it has helped the analysis to
deconstruct these networks and to understand the inter-actor relations shaping and
influencing the agri-environmental implementation process. The fact that, for example,
the decisions and actions of the FRCA P0 are largely controlled and determined by
MAFF, while inanimate entities, such as farm visits and bureaucratic documentation, play
a central role in shaping and maintaining the social and political relations between
agri-environmental actors. Despite such an apparent utility of the actor-network
approach, however, it is evident from the research that the non-deterministic
methodological and conceptual approach has not been without some limitations. In the
following section, these limitations are discussed and some suggestions for a revised
actor-network approach are tentatively made.
9.4	 Limitations of the Actor-Network Approach.
As a relatively new conceptual and methodological approach within the social sciences,
the actor-network approach has been applied and critically analysed by few researchers
(Ward, 1994; Munton, 1995; Ahson, 1997; Lowe et al., 1997). Studies have primarily
presented the approach as a potentially useful alternative to the structural determinism of
political-economy theories, but few have drawn upon empirical analysis to support their
prognostications. In an attempt to address this gap in the burgeoning literature on the
actor-network approach, this chapter has, so far, illustrated the applicability of the
actor-network approach within an analysis of the agri-environmental implementer.
However, as this section details, two particular limitations of the approach have emerged
within the context of this research, and which further actor-network analyses may need to
consider. These are the issues of nondecision-making and boundary emplacement.
9.4.1 Non-Decision-Making
As discussed earlier in the chapter, the actor-network approach offers the social scientist
a non-deterministic methodology where actors are left to speak for themselves and to
reveal their own definitions, objectives and associations with actors from a spectrum of
traditionally fixed dichotomies, such as the social, natural and political. Adopting such a
neutral and objective methodological approach, it was evident within the research that
analysis was able to take a step beyond existing theories of local-level implementers by
identifying and examining the complexity of the inter-actor relationships in which the
agn-environmental implementer operates (see sections 9.2 and 9.3). However, while an
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inductive methodology has evidently been one of the major strengths of the actor-network
approach, it may be argued that the methodology has, paradoxically, limited the research
in gaining a holistic understanding of the agri-environmental implementer in relation to
their macro-social contexts.
As a methodological approach that relies on the researched to speak freely and to reveal
the structure of the world in which they operate, it is evident that the actor-network
approach is highly dependent upon the interviewee speaking out and telling the 'truth'.
The empirical analysis and conclusions are based solely on the information provided by
the researched and from any subsequent interviews with actors, who, throughout the
course of the data collection, are revealed by others to be involved in the subject under
investigation. But can the analysis be certain that the respondent has revealed their 'true'
definitions, objectives and inter-actor relations? Given the infonnation provided by the
respondents, will analysis be able to provide an accurate representation of how actors
interact and how power relations are constructed and contested?
Throughout analysis of the agri-environmental implementer these questions were often
asked, particularly in relation to the level of involvement and influence that the local NFU
has within the implementation of the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs. As Chapter 7
outlined, both the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs stipulated within the postal
questionnaire that, throughout their day to day work as implementers of the ESA
schemes, they are in contact with their respective local NFU offices. However, when the
research sought to apply the actor-network methodology and thus conduct in-depth
discussions with the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs, no reference was made by
the POs to any contact that they may have with their local NFU. While this apparent
contradiction may have been an interesting issue to analyse further, the actor-network
methodology adopted throughout the research limited any such investigation from taking
place. In accordance with the snowball methodology advocated by actor-network
theorists, the research was committed to tracing the development of actor-networks by
interviewing and analysing those actors revealed to be in contact with the
agri-enviromnental implementer (see Chapter 4). If an actor such as the NFU was not
mentioned by the respondent, the actor-network methodology effectively forced the
research to assume that they would not be enrolled into the lifeworids of the Breckland
and Cotswold Hills ESA POs. Essentially, only those actors mentioned by the POs were
further analysed.
According to Sabatier (1986), however, methodologies adopting a snowball technique,
such as that encapsulated within the actor-network approach, often neglect to consider a
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number of basic principles involved in social science surveys. It is widely acknowledged
amongst researchers that with quantitative and qualitative interviews the responses given
by the interviewees may be greatly influenced by a number of factors, such as the
memoiy of an individual, their perceptions of the interviewer, and the location and time
of the interview. While reflexive accounts may provide some contextual background to
actors' responses, the snowball methodologies advocated by actor-network theorists are
believed to provide little opportunity to deconstruct actors' responses and analyse "the
factors indirectly affecting their ... [responses] ... or even the factors directly affecting
such behaviour which the participants do not recognise" (Sabatier, 1993:280 - original
emphasis).
Moreover, there is an established body of theoiy which raises questions as to the
motivations underlying the issues which actors wish to reveal and discuss with others.
Pioneered by Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963), this theory concerns the role that
'non-decision-making' may have in the distribution of power relations amongst actors.
According to Bachrach and Baratz (1962:948), power does not simply involve examining
key decisions and actual behaviour, "power is also exercised when A devotes his [sic]
energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices
that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues
which are comparatively innocuous to A". In other words, Bachrach and Baratz assert
that actors may seek to manipulate the process of political decision-making in order to
ensure that only specific 'safe' issues are raised within the policy arena which reinforce
their own political and social objectives. Thus, where the objectives of one actor look set
to provoke certain grievances amongst others, Bachrach and Baratz (1962, 1963) argue
that an actor will seek to protect their own interests by adopting a non-committal
approach and choosing not to voice their interests in the decision-making process. This is
not directly to infer that the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs were experiencing
conflict with their local NFU offices, and thus sought to direct the interview to issues
which strengthened the P0's own agri-environmental interests and objectives. Rather, as
Ham and Hill (1993:67) outlined, "the implication of Bachrach and Baratz's analysis is
that the methodology adopted by [many] researchers ... is inadequate, or at least partial.
A more complete analysis needs to examine what does not happen as well as what does
happen". After all, as Crenson (1971) argues, analysing the inaction and
non-decision-making of actors, analysts may gain a greater understanding of the political
relations influencing the wider policy process.
However, if, as Crenson (1971) asserts, non-decision-making is a reflection of the power
relations between policy actors, how can analysis study political relationships that are
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created and maintained through non-decision-making practices? In short, how can
non-decisions be identified and analysed? According to Bachrach and Baratz (1970), a
non-decision may be defined as "a decision that results in suppression or thwarting of a
latent or manifest challenge to the values and interests of the decision-maker" (p44). In
this context, Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue that non-decisions may be investigated
through the identification of covert grievances and the existence of conflicts that do not
enter the political arena. If no grievances or conflicts are identified then a consensus
exists and non-decision-making has not occurred (see Ham and Hill, 1993). Applying this
methodological approach in a study of air pollution policies in the United States, Crenson
(1971) outlined that, in seeking to analyse the existence of conflicts between political
actors, analysis may find assistance in existing theones, concepts and empirical studies.
Essentially, by drawing upon a priori theories and empirical knowledge, Crenson (1971)
believes that analysts may gain some clue as to where certain conflicts may arise.
Consequently, analysts may focus on these areas of potential conflict and examine
whether any grievances have led to processes of non-decision-making.
Drawing upon Crenson's (1971) methodology, therefore, it is evident that in order to
follow Bachrach and Baratz's (1962, 1970) thesis - that is, the importance of analysing
non-decision-making - the non-deterministic actor-network methodology may actually
benefit from existing theories and concepts. As Crenson (1971) outlined, they may assist
analysis to identify non-decisions and the covert political relations otherwise undetected
by the non-deterministic actor-network methodology. Thus, rather than seeking to
promote an inductive and non-deterministic approach to analysis, perhaps analysts
should, in future, seek to combine the non-deterministic attributes of the actor-network
approach with utilisation of predefined theories and concepts. In doing so, they may
generate an all encompassing methodological and analytical approach in which to study
the power relations between a myriad of actors from the social, political, economic and
natural.
Developing this notion of a paradoxical approach, where the non-deterministic principles
of the actor-network approach are combined with the rigidity of existing theories and
concepts, the following section focuses on the issue of network boundaries and discusses




As discussed throughout Part 111 and earlier in this chapter, the actor-network approach
advocates that, to understand how power and society are constructed through the action
and inter-relationships of social actors, analysis must follow the actors as they construct
linkages and associations with one another and, further, observe how individual actors
accept, reject or manipulate the interests and objectives of others. While this inductive
methodological approach has assisted the research in identi1 ring and analysing the
complexities of the networks in which the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs
operate (see section 9.2), questions were raised early on in the thesis concerning the
extent to which analysis must follow and observe the construction of actor-networks (see
Chapter 4). How far are analysts expected to trace the linkages and associations between
actors? Are there any physical or theoretical boundaries to the methodology, or, is
research expected to analyse infinite networks?
According to actor-network theorists, some networks may possess a natural boundary to
analysis - that is, where researchers can no longer find any linkages between actors. In
his study of biotechnological innovation, Ahson (1997) found, for example, that the
"research and development networks of the R & D managers initially interviewed were
quite small; for instance, in the case of the genetically engineered chymosin, only two
people were key in the process" (p4). Accordingly, for those particular actors, it was
evident to the researcher that a natural boundary was in place and analysis could not
proceed further. However, at any other point in the actor-network analysis, Callon (1986)
asserts that the issue of boundaiies should not effectively be an issue for question. As a
non-deterministic approach to social science analysis, the actor-network approach has
sought to move away from the rigidity and determinism of traditional sociological
analysis. Thus, to place rigid boundaries on to the network analysis would dei' the
primary principles of the actor-network approach (Latour, 1987).
Indeed, as a methodology it is recognised here that the fluidity and non-determinism of
the actor-network approach are ideal analytical objectives in seeking to holistically
analyse micro and macro social relations. However, it was apparent during the field
research in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs that practical research limitations,
such as time and financial considerations, forced a personal judgement to be made
concerning where and when to cease following the agn-environmental actors. Essentially,
as the snowball methodology proceeded in the field, it was evident that for some
agri-enviromnental networks, most notably MAFF's, ihe linkages and associations
established between actors were, possibly, to extend into the European arena. Given that
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the research process was limited to pre-specifled financial and temporal resources, it was
apparent that analysis would be unable to 'follow' the agri-enviromnental actors beyond a
national level. Consequently, a cut-off point for the actor-network methodology was
chosen and executed. This involved following actors to the national level of political and
institutional settings. If their networks looked set to extend further, the research
attempted to draw upon existing research studies and literature in order to gain
information concerning inter-actor relations beyond the national level of analysis. In the
case of MAFF's agn-environmental implementation network, for example, it was evident
that as analysis traced the network of actors from the local level - starting with the FRCA
P0 - and followed it through to officials within MAFF's RSCs and then to officials
within MAFF's headquarters in Whitehall, the network looked set to continue through
into the European arena. Essentially, as Chapters 1 and 5 outlined, in the formulation and
implementation of the UK's agri-environmental schemes, MAFF's objectives are directly
influenced by the regulatoiy objectives of the EU, as currently outlined in the form of EU
Regulation 2078 92/EEC. However, despite their inclusion within MAFF's
agri-environmental network, the research did not physically follow the actors or interview
relevant officials within the EU. Rather, drawing upon studies such as Whitby (1996),
Potter (1998) and Hart and Wilson (in press), the research was able to gain some
understanding of the role and influence that the EU possesses within MAFF's
actor-network.
As a methodological approach it is recognised that relying on previous research studies
for empirical information is far from ideal. However, given common research limitations
it is perhaps the most appropriate method to adopt in order to gain a detailed
understanding of individual actor-networks. Indeed, analysing infinite networks is
idealistically sound, if analysis seeks a holistic understanding of micro and macro social
relations. However, can actor-network theorists guarantee that all researchers will be able
to follow the actors? As this research has highlighted some may not. In this context, it is
evident that the issue of network boundaries, both theoretically and methodologically,
needs to be addressed in future actor-network analyses. Currently it is left to the
individual researcher to make a personal judgement as to where the boundaries should be
placed, but can theorists devise a universal approach to the issue of boundaries which
does not compromise the non-deterministic benefits of the actor-network approach? Such
a concept is indeed a theoretical and methodological challenge, but one which, if
addressed, would benefit future studies of actor-networks.
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9.5	 Conclusion
It was suggested early on in the thesis that, given the potential limitations of Lipsky's
micro-sociological theory of street-level bureaucracy, the actor-network approach may
provide the analysis with a more holistic understanding of the role and influence of the
agri-environmental implementer in relation to their macro-social contexts. Drawing
together the analytical discussions in this chapter, it is evident that the actor-network
approach has assisted the study in gaining a detailed and informative analysis of the role
and relative influence of the agri-environmental implementer As a non-deterministic
methodological approach, the actor-network approach initially assisted the analysis in
identifying the agri-environmental implementer as part of a complex network of actors
drawn from a variety of institutional, political and spatial scales. Moreover, it helped to
highlight that the FRCA P0 exists at the interface of three autonomous actor-networks,
each possessing differential objectives and interests. Subsequent to this, Callon's (1986)
sociology of translation provided an original and informative understanding of how these
agri-enviromnental networks were established, highlighting, in particular, the role and
influence that inanimate entities, such as farm visits and bureaucratic documentation,
have within the agri-environmental implementation process.
However, despite the apparent utility of the non-deterministic conceptual and
methodological approach, the research revealed that there were two fundamental
limitations to the actor-network approach - that is, the disregard for non-decision-making
and the issue of boundary emplacement. In both contexts, the utility of the
non-deterministic philosophy of the actor-network approach was brought into question.
Firstly, it was recognised that through a non-deterministic approach, analysis enabled
actors to speak freely and to reveal their own definitions, objectives and associations, but
in doing so little information could be gained concerning those issues which actors chose
not to reveal during the research process. Secondly, while the inductive actor-network
methodology was promulgated as a useful methodological approach, it was in turn argued
that, given common research limitations (e.g. limited financial and temporal resources),
attempts may be made to place an appropriate boundary around those actors who may be
empirically analysed. As of yet, the actor-network approach does not provide any clause
for such an event, and thus, it was suggested that future research may seek to devise a
methodology that does not limit the non-deterministic benefits of the actor-network
approach and yet would assist researchers to overcome the dilemma of where and when a
boundary should be placed around the research methodology.
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At this stage of the research, the thesis has been able only to offer suggestions as to how
the actor-network approach may be developed and improved for future analyses. In the
context of non-decision-making, for example, a suggestion was made for combining the
non-deterministic actor-network approach with the utilisation of pre-existing theories and
concepts. However, to build upon the current advantages of the actor-network approach,
further analysis is needed to address the limitations of the approach and to develop its
potential as an all-encompassing conceptual and methodological approach for




As the intractability of policies continues to be of concern to many policy makers and
academics this thesis has sought to further an understanding of the policy implementation
process by analysing the role and influence that local-level implementers have on the
implementation of contemporary policies. It is a widely held belief that local-level
implementers, or street-level bureaucrats as they are often termed, are among one of the most
powerful and influential policy actors in the implementation process. They are believed to be
the formulators and iinplementers of policy. "It is through implementation 'on the street' that
defacto regulatory policy is created" (Lowe et al., 1997:203). However, as Chapter 2 revealed
many of the contemporary scholars who have discussed the role and influence of street-level
bureaucrats have tended to base their arguments on early theoretical and empirical studies with
little attempt at conducting their own analysis of the contemporary local-level implementer.
Addressing this gap within current policy research, this thesis has sought to provide an
analytical study of one contemporary policy implementer - the agri-environmental iinplementer
(i.e. FRCA P0). Further, as part of this analysis, the research has attempted to develop
analysts' conceptual understanding of the street-level bureaucrat by testing existing theories
(i.e. Lipsky, 1980) and analysing whether a new conceptualisation of the street-level
bureaucrat is required.
In this final section of the thesis the empirical and theoretical analysis of the research are
drawn together. Focusing on the agri-environmental context of this research, Chapter 10 will
firstly discuss the role and influence of the agri-environmental implementer with specific
reference to the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs. Particular attention is paid to the
complexity of the agri-environmental implementation process and the relationships that exist
between the FRCA P0 and the pnmary agn-environmental actors. Second, the theoretical
debate of the thesis is outlined. The applicability of Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy
is summarised and conclusions drawn on the appropriateness of the actor-network approach in
this research. Finally, drawing upon the research findings, some suggestions are made for




10.1 The Role and Influence of the Agri-Environmental Implementer
Focusing on the agri-environmental implementer as a case example for analysing the
contemporary policy implementer this research has addressed a major gap in
agri-environmental research studies, and has further provided a new insight into the world of
the street-level bureaucrat. Since the development of European and UK agri-environmental
policies, many researchers have sought to analyse and understand the implementation and
effectiveness of the voluntary agri-environmental schemes formulated under EU Regulations
797/85/EEC and 2078/92/EEC (Whitby, 1994, 1996; Winter, 1996; Potter, 1998). In doing so,
there has been a tendency amongst researchers to analyse the agri-environmental
decision-making nexus of farmers, and, more recently, to examine the influence that wider
macro-structural factors have had on the agri-environmental implementation process (Potter
and Gasson, 1988; Brotherton, 1991; Morris and Potter, 1995; Wilson, 1996, 1997). However,
as Part II of the thesis illustrated, little attempt has been made to build upon existing research
studies, and analyse the role and influence that the individual agri-environmental implementer
has on the implementation and effectiveness of the UK's agri-environmental schemes.
As Chapter 3 outlined, FRCA POs are actively involved in the implementation and
administration of many of the voluntary schemes formulated as part of the UK's contemporary
agri-environmental policy programme. Operating at the ground level environment, they assist
policy makers by promoting the schemes amongst those farmers eligible to participate in the
agri-environmental schemes. Further, they seek to advise and encourage all eligible farmers to
join the schemes, and, following this, to assist both MAFF and the farmers by working with the
agri-environmental participants to devise the most appropriate management agreements in
which they may integrate MAFF's national agri-environmental objectives into their individual
farm management plans. Currently, MAFF has invested a large proportion of their
agri-environmental budget in employing the FRCA POs. According to MAFF (1995), the PUs
are the key to the success of the agn-environmental schemes. "It is through the efforts of the
POs that many attitudes have changed towards the schemes, and many fanners have
participated" (MAFF, 1995:25). Thus, MAFF assert that while the cost of the POs may be
high, it has been a worthwhile investment. But has it? Are the POs such powerful and
influential actors who determine the 'success' of the agri-environmental schemes?
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Theoretically, local-level implementers where shown in Chapter 2 to be highly influential
policy actors. Granted autonomous decision-making powers by bureaucratic superiors, reliant
upon the goodwill and co-operation of the policy iinplementer, scholars asserted that the
decisions and actions of the individual local-level implementer will ultimately determine the
shape and form of the policies that are received and implemented by recipients of policy.
Adoptmg a case study approach, and focusing on the role and influence of the Breckland and
Cotswold Hills ESA POs, this research has shown that the agri-environmental implementer is a
relatively powerful and influential actor in the implementation of MAFF's individual
agri-environmental schemes. However, as Part V of the thesis revealed, the level of power
possessed by the FRCA P0 is determined and controlled by complex actor-network relations
which, to date, have not been acknowledged by earlier scholars conceptualising the role and
influence of the local-level implementer.
First and foremost, the research revealed that the FRCA P0 operates in a bureaucratic
environment where their decisions and actions are closely controlled and monitored by their
superiors in MAFF and the FRCA. Like Lipsky's street-level bureaucrat, it was evident that
MAFF utilised the POs as gatekeepers through which national agri-environmental objectives
could be transferred to the individual farmer. However, where Lipsky asserted that the
implementers would be given sufficient autonomy in which to make their own decisions and
choices throughout the implementation process, the research has revealed that the FRCA POs
are bound by rules and regulations whereby they are compelled to adhere to their paymasters'
objectives. Further, it was evident that where the POs were granted a limited degree of
discretionary freedom, notably in the administration of derogations and adoption of
implementation strategies (see Chapter 4), the decisions and actions of the P0 were controlled,
firstly, by the prescriptions of the schemes formulated by MAFF, and secondly, by local and
personal factors, such as farming group dynamics and the POs' own temporal resources. Thus,
at any one point in the implementation process, the actions of the P0 were, in effect, a product
of another actor (see Fig. 5.6).
The research has gone on to show, however, that as a local representative of this bureaucratic
network, the FRCA P0 is, for many other agri-environmental actors, an important and
influential gatekeeper through which their personal agri-environmental objectives may be
infiltrated into MAFF's official policy decision-making and implementation process. It is
widely acknowledged that farmers are powerful autonomous decision-makers whose
willingness and ability to participate in MAFF's voluntary agri-environmental schemes will be
an initial determinant of the relative 'success' of the schemes. Throughout the thesis, this fact
was not questioned. it is accepted that, in the light of the voluntary nature of the schemes,
farmers will ultimately decide whether to participate in the schemes or not. However, building
upon existing research studies, this thesis sought to analyse whether the FRCA P0, in anyway,
238
influences the enactment of the UK's agri-environmental schemes. As Chapter 6 revealed, the
FRCA POs recognise that farmers are autonomous decision-makers whose attitudes towards
the agn-environmental schemes will be shaped by a multiplicity of factors. Operating against
this background, the research outlined how the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs sought
to adopt the most appropriate implementation strategy in which to encourage farmers to
participate in the schemes and, following this, to implement MAFF's agri-environmental
objectives within the locality. The POs recognised that adopting a regulatory role in the field
would be met with extreme resistance from the farmers. Instead, defining their position as an
advisor and facilitator, the POs were seen to work with the non-participants and participants in
the two case study ESAs. They sought to listen to the farmers, to understand their personal
objectives and to assist them to mtegrate national agri-environmental objectives into their own
visions and plans for their individual farm business. In seeking to gain the trust and
co-operation of the farming community in such a way, Chapter 6 went on to reveal that for
many of the farmers interviewed in the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, the FRCA POs
have become an important actor in their personal agri-enviromnental networks. Many of the
farmers spoke of their respect for the FRCA P0. They reiterated the fact that the P0 will assist
them to implement their own objectives, a fact which, according to many farmers, has been
possible as a result of the agricultural background that the majority of the POs possess. The
farmers voiced their disdain towards the proposal that officers from environmental groups may,
as the RSPB (1996) asserted, be better advisors and implementers for the agri-environmental
schemes. They evidently favoured the existing FRCA POs, whom they regarded as an
important link to the world of the official policy maker. It was through the FRCA P0 that
farmers were able to implement their own objectives within the wider legislative boundaries of
MAFF's official agri-environmental implementation process.
Concomitantly, it was the individual FRCA P0 who, for the local interest groups involved with
the Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESAs, represented the key through which the door into the
agri-environmental implementation process may be opened. As Chapter 7 outlined, a number
of interest groups are involved with the UK's agri-environmental schemes, often as agreement
holders, advisors and consultants. However, with the exception of FWAG who, historically has
enjoyed close working relations with agricultural policy makers, MAFF have attempted to
retain their control on the agri-environmental implementation process by introducing a
confidentiality clause whereby local interest groups are unable to gain direct access to
agri-environmental participants. In this context, it was evident that for many of the interest
groups in the two case study ESAs, the FRCA P0 was the primaiy route through which their
environmental objectives may be transfeffed down to existing agreement holders. In this
context, the research has shown that operating at the interface of three different actor-networks
- MAFF, farmers and local interest groups (see Fig. 7.3) - the Breckland and Cotswold Hills
ESA POs have empowered themselves as key actors in the lifeworids of many
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agri-environmental actors. It is the FRCA P0 who facilitates the implementation of their
objectives.
While this research has shown the FRCA P0 to be an important and influential actor, MAFF's
assertions that they are the key to the 'success' of the UK's agri-environmental schemes
remains questionable. In recent years, an increasing number of researchers have turned to
address the issue of how the 'success' of agri-environmental schemes should be defined and
measured. Some researchers are currently suggesting that the success of the schemes are
dependent on the extent to which the local environment and wildlife has been enhanced by the
schemes (Adams, 1996), while others have embarked upon research to analyse socio-economic
indicators of agri-environmental 'success' (Papps, forthcoming). As a platform from which
some of these studies may progress, this research has shown that there are a number of actors
involved in the implementation of agn-environmental schemes who may, either directly or
indirectly, influence the enactment of policy at the ground level. The FRCA P0 is a central
actor within this implementation process, and it is evident that for many actors MAFF's
investment in the POs has been crucial to their own personal objectives. But it would be wrong
to assume that the 'success' of the agri-environmental schemes is wholly dependent on
whether the P0 is employed or not. As Fig. 10.1 summarises, the P0 operates in a network of
actors. Agricultural policy makers and researchers should not forget this complex network as,
collectively, the actors contribute to influencing the course of the agri-environmental
implementation process and shaping the outcome of the individual agri-environmental schemes.
Even then this research can not claim to have completed the network of actors which are
involved in the UK's agri-environinental policy process. Continuous research is required to
build upon existing studies in order to construct and analyse the agri-environmental network as
it changes through space and time.
10.2 A New Conceptualisation of the Street-Level Bureaucrat
While this research has assisted future agri-environmental studies by highlighting that the
agri-environmental implementer does have an important role to play in the network of actors
implementing the IJK's agri-environmental policy, the empirical findings of the research have
also had important implications for how the local-level implementer should be conceptualised
in future policy studies.
As Part II of the thesis outlined, Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy provides one of the
most detailed conceptual understandings of the role and influence of local-level implementers.
He describes their relationships with bureaucratic superiors and recipients of policy, and
































































sought to revive interest in the local-level implementer, so it attempted to analyse the
applicability of existing theoretical and conceptual understandings of policy unpiementers in
the contemporary policy process. In Chapter 3, concerns were raised early on that Lipsky's
theory of street-level bureaucracy would not be applicable in the agri-environmental context of
this research. Drawing upon previous agri-environmental research studies which highlighted
the number of actors who may operate alongside the a i-environmental implementer, the
research proposed that Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis of the street-level bureaucrat could
not provide an adequate understanding of the complex actor relations that may exist between
the FRCA P0 and other agri-environinental actors. In the light of the research's local empirical
analysis, this early speculation has been confirmed (see Chapter 8). Lipsky's theory can not
provide a holistic understanding of the role and influence of the agri-environmental
implementer. This is not to assert, however, that Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy
should be consigned to the academic waste bin. As Chapter 8 revealed, aspects of Lipsky's
theory have proved to be informative in explaining some of the decisions and actions of the
Breckland and Cotswold Hills ESA POs. The implementation strategies adopted by the POs in
the light of personal and scheme factors where in some way reminiscent of Lipsky's 'coping
strategies'. Further, Lip sky recognised that the street-level bureaucrat will act as a gatekeeper
between policy actors. But in his theory Lipsky only considered the relationship between three
actors - bureaucratic superiors, the street-level bureaucrat and recipients of policy. He did not
provide any explanation of the street-level bureaucrat within complex actor-networks where
power relations are transitory and determined by a multiplicity of actors.
Early on in this study, as concern was raised as to the applicability of Lipsky's theory in
relation to the agri-environmental implementer, the thesis sought to adopt an alternative
conceptual and methodological approach in which to situate the research. Given its apparent
ability to analyse the power relations between networks of actors, the actor-network approach
was adopted. As an epistemological framework, the actor-network approach has, to date,
received little attention from policy analysts. Within the field of rural studies, a small group of
researchers have attempted to apply the approach (e.g. Marsden et al., 1993; Lowe et al.,
1997), but knowledge of its applicability in policy research is limited. As Chapter 9 revealed,
however, the actor-network approach has proven to be useful as a epistemological and
methodological framework in which to analyse the role and influence of the agri-environmental
implementer. Abandoning a priori definitions, the actor-network approach has moved away
from Lipsky's attempts to define an all encompassing theory of local-level implementers and
has, instead, enabled the research to observe who or what is of importance to the
agri-environmental implementer, and, from here, to construct networks of actors who are
involved in the agri-environmental implementation process. In doing so, the actor-network
approach has been far more revealing of the relationships and relative influence of the
agri-environmental implementer than Lipsky's theory of street-level bureaucracy. It has
242
enabled the research to extend beyond Lipsky's micro-sociological analysis of local-level
implementers, and to holistically analyse the agri-environmental implementer m relation to the
actors whom they identify with, rather than actors whom a theory asserts that the iinplementer
will influence or be influenced by. Nonetheless, as Chapter 9 revealed there are a number of
methodological limitations to the actor-network approach. Drawing upon Bachrach and
Baratz's (1962, 1963) thesis, the question of non-decision-making was firstly discussed. Given
the non-detenninistic methodology advocated by actor-network theorists, it was suggested that
analyses may fail to observe and identif' hidden political relations that often underlie actors
motivations to discuss certain actors and not others. Consequently, it was proposed that, where
the actor-network approach seeks to offer the analyst a holistic conceptual framework, analysis
may benefit from drawing upon existing theones and concepts of covert political relations.
While some analysts (e.g. Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987) may argue that this contradicts the
primary principle of the actor-network approach, it was further revealed that, faced with
common research limitations, analysts may be forced to place predefined boundaries on the
networks under analysis. As Chapter 9 concluded, this research can only offer some
suggestions as to how the actor-network approach may be developed and improved. In many
respects the approach has been proven here to be highly effective in an analysis of the
agri-environmental implementer. However, it is believed that in order to build upon the
advantages of the actor-network approach further empirical research grounded within an
actor-network analysis is needed.
In this context, much can be learnt from this thesis concerning our future understanding of the
local-level implementer. It is re-emphasised here that the local-level impleinenter is an
important policy actor who warrants analysis in any study of policy implementation. They may
not be the key to the implementation and effectiveness of individual policies, but may instead
operate alongside a complex network of actors who together shape and influence the
implementation process. Further, in seeking to analyse the local-level implementer, policy
analysts should attempt to move beyond existing theoretical and conceptual understandings of
policy implementers. This is not to deny that they may provide a useful insight into the world
of the individual local-level implementer, but each implementer should be treated as a unique
policy actor, whose role and influence can only be understood in relation to the network of
actors in which they operate. In this context, the actor-network approach can offer the
contemporary policy analyst a useful epistemoiogical and methodological framework in which
to situate their research.
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COMPOSITION OF THE NATIONAL AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM
• Ministiy of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF),
• Farming and Rural Conservancy Agency,






• National Farmer's Union,
• Country Landowners Association,
• Game Conservancy Trust,
• National Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group,
• Council for the Protection of Rural England,
• World-wide Fund for Nature,
• Royal Society for the Protection of Birds,




BRECKLAND ESA AND COTS WOLD HILLS ESA MANAGEMENT
PRESCRIPTIONS
Tier I - Heathiand: 	 £140 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must maintain heathiand vegetation, by not ploughing, re-seed or cultivating
* The heathiand must be grazed hard, but not with pigs or poultry.
On known important sites for ground nesting birds, agreement holders must agree a stock management
programme in advance of the breeding season.
* Agreement holders must not apply fertilisers or fungicides on the heathiand.
* Herbicides may only be used to control specified weed species (e g nettles, Ragwort, dock & thistle) and only
then can they apply the herbicides by wick applicator or spot treatment.
* Any bracken or scrub control must be camed out in accordance with a programme agreed m advance.
Tier II- Reversion to Heathiand. 	 £350 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must cease arable or grassland production immediately after harvesting any crop already m
the ground
* Within 12 months of the start of an agreement, participants must begin an agreed programme of reversion to
heathland which will include, ploughmg the land, establishing a nurse crop & establishing a low productivity grass
sward by 15 March.
* Agreement holders must not apply any fertilisers, fungicides or insecticides to the reverted land
Herbicides may only be used to control specified weed species (e g. nettles, Ragwort & thistle) & only then can
they apply the herbicides by wick applicator or spot treatment.
After establishment the heath sward must be managed by grazing &/or cutting.
Tier ifi - River Valley Grassland. 	 £130 per bectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must avoid cultivating & cutting grassland between 31 March and 1 July.
Grassland must be lightly grazed with livestock other than pigs or poultry.
* Agreement holders must not apply any fertilisers, fungicides or insecticides to the reverted land
* Herbicides may only be used to control specified weed species (e g. nettles, Ragwort, dock and thistle) and only
then can they apply the herbicides by wick applicator or spot treatment
* Agreement holders must maintain existing drainage systems without improvements, additions or modifications.
Tier IV(a) - Arabic Field Margins/Uncropped Wildlife Strips. 	 £370 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must cease cropping on arable land at least 6ms in from existing field edge
* Agreement holders must create a seedbed in the headland between 31 July and 31 March
* Agreement holders must not apply fertilisers, fungicides, insecticides or herbicides to the strip
* Agreement holders must not use strips as access tracks
* Agreement holders must not irrigate the land or sow grass on the strip
* Regularly cultivate & apply herbicides to a Im strip on the edge of the strip
Tier lVb - Conservation Headlands. 	 £110 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must create a strip of uncropped land 6-I2ms wide at edge of arable fields
* Agreement holders must not apply any insecticides to the strip, except between 31 August and the following 1
Public Access Tier.	 £170 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders may create access routes, available free of charge to the public across their land
(MAFF, 1992)
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Tier Ia: All Land. 	 £15 per hectare, per annum
* Agreement holders must restrict the expansion of their existing arable area
* All application rates of organic or inorganic fertiliser must not exceed existing levels
* Agreement holders must maintain all landscape features (e g. walls, banks, hedges & ditches)
* Agreement holders must refrain from ploughing/spraying on land within Im of any wall or bank
1 * Agreement holders must maintain walls, banks & hedges in a stockproof condition
Agreement holders must protect any sites of known historic and/or archaeological interest.
* Agreement holders must refrain from erecting new permanent fences
1* Agreement holders must get advice on siting, design & materials of new proposed buildings
* Agreement holders must not transfer stock from ESA land to common land.
* Within 2 yrs of an agreement, participants must obtain advice on the management of woodland.
* Dry stone walls on agreement land MUST be restored using traditional styles and materials (Minimi
requirement is 0 25ms of wall /ha/yr & a maximum of 2ms of wall /halyr).
* Agreement holders MAY restore non-stock proof hedges to a stock proof condition. (Minimum requirement
0.5ms /ha/yr & a maximum of 2ms of hedge /halyr).
Tier Ib: Improved Permanent Grassland.	 £30 per hectare, per annum
* Agreement holders must follow all of tier Ia prescriptions and in addition;
* Maintain improved permanent grassland without ploughing, levelling or reseeding.
* Must not harrow or roll unless they are current agricultural practices on the agreement land.
* Improved permanent grassland must be grazed with livestock other than pigs or poultry.
* Agreement holders must rotate areas used for supplementary feeding of livestock.
* Land managed as hay meadow must continue as such.
* Agreement holders must exclude stock from meadows at least 7 weeks before first cut of hay.
* Agreement holders must cut meadows annually for hay, not for silage. They must cut in any year before 8 July,
removing the cut crop and grazing the aftermath.
* Agreement holders must maintain existing application rates of organic and inorganic fertiliser.
*AJ1 applications of fUngicides and insecticides are prohibited on agreement land.
* Herbicides may only be used to control specified weed species (e g nettles, ragwort, dock & thistle) & only
then can they apply the herbicides by wick applicator or spot treatment.
Tier Ic: Extensive Pennanent Grassland.	 £65 per hectare, per annum.
* Agreement holders must comply with Tier Ia and Tier lb (where appropriate) and in addition;
* Maintain extensive pennanent grassland by refraining to carry out any mechanical operations on the grassland
during 1 April to 8 July.
* Agreement holders must graze the land with sheep and/or cattle.
* On valley bottom grassland, stocking levels must not exceed a level of 0.75 LU/ ha during the periods of 1 April
to 31 May.
£290 per hectare, per annum
Agreement holders must cease arable production
Within 7 months of agreement, a permanent sward must be established
During the first 7 months of agreement, participants must observe all tier Ia prescription
Following this, agreement holders must adhere to tier lb and tier Ic prescriptions.
During each of the 3 years following the establishment of the grass sward, agreement holders must cut the grass,
miove the cut crop as hay and graze the aftermath
Liblic Access Tier.	 £170 per hectare, per annum.




PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS SENT TO FARMERS IN THE
BRECKLAND AND COTSWOLD HILLS ESAs1.




1.Are you eligible to participate in the Breckland ESA scheme?
Yes []
No	 []
2. Please tick the appropriate box;
1)! am cunently participating in the Breckland ESA scheme [ ]
n) I am not participating in the Breckland ESA scheme 	 []
3. What is your status on the farm?
Sole proprietor	 [1
Partner with spouse	 [ ]
Partner with parent	 []
Partner with successor 	 [ ]
Partner with other relative 	 [1
Partner with non-relative	 [ ]
Farm manager/director 	 [1
Other (please specify)





'Although the following questions are written specifically for farmers in the Breckland ESA, an identical set of
questions were sent to farmers in the Cotswold Hills ESA with necessary changes made to the text (i e the






POSTAL QUESTIONNAIRE: [RCA PROJECT OFFICERS AND ASSISTANT
PROJECT OFFICERS.
This questionnaire is designed to investigate how the FRCA Project Officers and Assistant
Project Officers implement agri-environmental schemes an their interactions with other
contributors to the schemes. Any information collected will be treated as strictly confidential
and will only be used for the purpose of a personal PhD research project. However, it is hoped
that the findings may assist FRCA in the implementation of the schemes. Although this
questionnaire does appear to be extremely lengthy, it will become apparent that many of the
questions may not be relevant to your own situation. It has been agreed with MAFF and FRCA
that you should only spend one and a half hours completing this questionnaire. Once you have
done this could you please return the completed questionnaire in the envelope provided by
Friday 10th January, 1997. If you have any questions please phone Nicola Cooper on 0171
836 5454 Ext. 1204.




11. Are you the project officer/assistant project officer for more than one
agri-environmental scheme (e.g. ESAs, Habitat Scheme - Water Fringe,
Former Set-Aside and Saltmarsh, Countryside Stewardship Scheme, Countryside
Access, NSAs, Moorland)?




(if no, go to question 4)
2. What schemes are you the project officer assistant project officer for?
(H you administer more than one ESA or NSA please speciI' which ESAs or NSAs
you administer).
ESAs	 []a) ................	 1
	
b) ................. 	 2






- Former Set-Aside [1	 5
Moorland
	 [1	 6
NSAs	 [ ] a) ................	 7
b) .................	 8
c) ................. 	 9
d) .................	 10
e) ................. 	 11
Countryside Access 	 []
	
12
Countryside Stewardship Scheme [1	 13
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3. What proportion of your time do you spend on each scheme?
	
3






























ifyou administer more than one scheme, please answer the remaining questionnaire
in relation to the scheme which occupies most ofyour wov*ing time.
Pleasespecif' what this scheme is .........................................................
4. In what year did you become the project officer assistant project officer 	 4
for this agri-environmental scheme?
5. With regard to this agri-enviromnental scheme, what are the mam 	 5
objectives of your work?
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PART B: The Relationship of the Project Officer/Assistant
Project Officer with MAFF.




No	 [ ] (if no, move to question 11)
	
2
7. In which MAFF offices are they primarily based?
	
7
MAFF Headquarters, London 	 [ ]
	
1
Regional Service Centre	 [ ]
	
2
(Please specify which centre)
8. On average how many times per year are you in contact with:
(Please answer for both)
a) MAFF Headquarters	 b) Regional Service Centre 	 8.9.
0	 []	 0	 []
	
1. 1.
1-5	 [1	 1-5	 [1	 2.2.
6-10	 []	 6-10	 []
	
3.3.
11-15	 [1	 11-15	 [ ]	 4.4.
16-20	 [ ]	 16-20	 [1	 5.5.
21-25	 [1	 21-25	 [ ]	 6.6.
25+	 []	 25+	 []
	
7.7.
9. Where does this contact mainly take place?
(Please tick one box only)	 10.
At MAFF Headquarters, London [1	 1
At Regional Service Centres	 [I	 2
(please specify which centre)
At FRCA Headquarters, London 	 [ ]
	
3
At FRCA Statutory Centres 	 []
	
4
(Please specify which centre)
Other ( please specif)	 5
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10. How is this contact pnmarily made?
	
11.
(please tick one box only)







In the Field	 [1	 4






By E-mail	 [1	 7
Other (please specify)	 8
11. Do you have a copy of the administrative instructions, relevant to 'your'
	
12.
agri-enviromnental scheme? (i.e. The Regional Service Centre chapters. For the































13. On average how many times during the year do you refer back to 	 16
these technical instructions?
Frequently (e.g. once a week)
	 [1	 1
Sometimes (e.g. once a month) 	 [ ]
	
2



















16. Were you able to have any input into the fonnulation of the technical
	
19
instructions relevant to 'your' agri-environmental scheme?















If yes, how would you change them?
	
21
PART C: Relationship of the Project Officer/Assistant Project
Officer with ADASIFRCA.
17. Flow many years have you been employed within ADAS/FRCA?
	
22.





No	 [1 (move to question 21) 	 2
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19. What section within ADAS were you previously employed? 	 24.
20. What did you work specifically entail?
	
25.
21. On a scale of 1-9, who do you have the most contact with when
implementing 'your' agri-environmental scheme?
(i.e. by letter, meeting, fax etc.).
(1 = most contact, 9 = least contact. Thus, foe example, is you are in
contact with your team manager more than any other individual put
a 1 in the box next to "Your FRCA Team Leader").
The FRCA Contract Manager 	 [
	
26
Your Statutory Centre Manager	 [
	
27
Your FRCA Group Leader	 [
	
28
Your FRCA Team Leader 	 [
	
29
Project Officers administering the same agri-environmental scheme 	 [
	
30
Project Officers administering other agri-environmental schemes	 [
	
31
Assistant Project Officers administering the same agn-environmental scheme[ 	 32
Assistant Project Officers administering other agri-environmental schemes [ 	 33
Resource Planning Group?	 [
	
34
22. What tends to be the main reason for such contact?
(please specify for each relevant category)
i) The FRCA Contract Manager:	 35
ii) The Statutory Centre Manager: 	 36
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iii) The Group Leader: 	 37
iv) The Team Leader:	 38
v) Project officers administering the same agri-environmental scheme: 	 39
vi) Project Officers administenng other agri-enviromnental schemes: 	 40
vii) Assistant Project officers administering the same agri-environmental scheme: 	 41
viii) Assistant Project officers administering other agn-environmental schemes:	 42
ix) Resource Planning Group: 	 43
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PART D: Relationship with other 'interest groups.
23. Which 'interest groups are actively involved with 'your'
agn-environmental scheme (i.e. they may own/manage protected areas
also covered by the scheme, and/or advise farmers and landowners on
agri-environmental issues)?

















































24. Have they influenced you during the implementation and administration
of the agri-environmental scheme? 	 69
Yes	 []	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, in what way have they influence your work?





























25. Approximately, how many times per year are you in contact with these












































26. In general who initiates these contacts?
(For each 'interest groups' who is involved with 'your' agri-environmental
scheme please indicate using the relevant numbers from the menu below
as to who initiates the contacts between yourself and that 'interest group'.
E g. If you assistant project officer initiates the majority of those contacts
which you may have with the Ministry of Defence, please write in number 2
in the box next to the Ministry of Defence. If any other individual or
organisation initiates the contact please write number 4 in the box and
decide it, write the name of the individual or organisation).
Yourself	 [1]
Your project officer(s)/assistant project officer(s) [2]
A representative from the 'interest group' 	 [3]
Any other actor or organisation 	 [4] (please specify)




Countryside Commission 	 [
Forestry Authority	 [
RSPB
Council for the Protection of Rural England [
English Heritage	 [
County Wildlife Trusts 	 [
National Trust	 [







Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group 	 [
Commoners Association 	 [
Others (please specify)
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27. Why are contacts made? (e.g. Technical advice guidance, scheme
administration and/or statutoly consultation requirements).
(please specify for each group)
i) Ministry of Defence:	 142
ii)NFU:	 143
iii) CLA:	 144
iv) English Nature: 	 145
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v) Countryside Commission: 	 146
147vi) Forestry Authority:
vii) RSPB:
viii) Council for the Protection of Rural England:
ix) English Heritage:






xi) National Trust:	 152
xii) National Parks Authority:	 153
xiii) Environment Agency: 	 154
xiv) Rambler's Association:	 155
xv) County Councils:	 156
xvi) County Archaeologists: 	 157
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xvii) District Councils:	 158
xviii) Parish Councils:	 159
xix) Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group:	 160
xx) Commoners Association:	 161
xxi) Other (please specify)	 162
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28. Have you ever experienced any technical differences of opinion with
farming/landowning 'interest groups' (e.g. NFU, CLA), in terms of local
issues related to the implementation of the agri-environmental schemes
(e.g. individual applications, commons, water level management)? 	 166
Yes	 [}	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, why did the problem arise and who was responsible?
(please specify for each relevant farming/landowning interest group)
	
167
How was the problem resolved?
(please specify for each relevant farming/landowning interest group)
	 175
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29 Have you ever experienced any conflict with wildlife interest groups
(e.g. NFU, CLA, RSPB), in tenus of local issues related to the
]implementation of the agri-environmental schemes? 	 179
Yes	 [1	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, why did the problem arise and who was responsible?
(please specify for each relevant farming/land-owning interest group) 	 180
How was the problem resolved?
(please specify for each group, if relevant)	 204
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PART E: The Relationship of Project Officers/Assistant Project Officers
with Farmers/Landowners.
Please continue to answer the questions in reference to that agri-environmental
scheme which occupies most ofyour working time.














31. What do you think are the main determinants of whether a farmer will
participate in an agri-environrnental schemes or not?
	 206
32. On average how many times a year do you have contact with farmers/
landowners; (please answer for all)
i) Before application	 [ ]
	 207
ii) Between application and agreement	 [1	 208
iii) After agreement	 [ ]	 209
33. How are these contacts mainly made?
	
210
(please tick one box only)








Others (please specify) 	 5
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34. What methods do you use to promote the scheme to farmers/landowners?























35. What role do you have in thawing up the scheme applications?
	
226






























37. What other sources of advice do you believe farmers/landowners use when
implementing statutoly agri-environmental schemes?



















Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group
Commoners Association
Others (please specify)
38. In your opinion did it take you a long time (i.e. over a year) to build up a















If yes, what form did this hostility take?
	 256
40. In general, how would you describe your relationship with the farmers,
both participating and no participating in 'your' agri-environinental scheme?
(Please answer for both)
a) Participants:	 257
b) Non-Participants:	 258
41. How would you describe your role as a project officer/assistant project
officer (e.g. a regulator of government policy, an advisor, a friend)? 	 259
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PART F: The Personal Background of the Project Officer/Assistant
Project Officer.
42. What is your original background?
(Please tick one box only)	 260




Urban Background	 [ ]
	 3
Other (please specify)	 4
43. What is your highest educational qualification?
	
261
0-Level, CSE, GCSE or school certificate (16 years) 	 [1	 1
A-Level	 (I ]	 2
Tertiary education (diploma, BAg etc.) 	 [ ]	 3
(please specify giving subject specialism)
44. Do you have any training in farm business management? 	 262
Yes	 []	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, where were you trained (e.g. university, in house training)? 	 263
If no, do you feel that this has disadvantaged your ability to implement
and administer the agri-environmental schemes?	 264
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45. Do you have any training in conservation issues? 	 265
Yes	 []	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, where were you trained (e.g. university, in house training)? 	 266
If no, do you feel that this has disadvantaged your ability to implement
and administer the agn-enviromnental schemes? 	 267
46. Do you have any training in communication skills?	 268
Yes	 []	 1
No	 []	 2
If yes, where were you trained (e.g. university, in house training)? 	 269
If no, do you feel that this has disadvantaged your ability to implement
and administer the agri-environmental schemes?	 270

















49. What percentage of your working time is spent at:
(please answer for all)




In the Field	 [1	 277
Other? (please specify)	 278
50. Are you a member of any of the following countryside and conservation
related organisations?




National Trust	 [ ]
	
280






Rambler's Association	 [1	 283






Other (please specify)	 286
51. How important is it, do you feel, that all farmers should implement
environmental objectives in their agricultural decision-making?
(Please circle one number on the scale) 	 287
unimportant	 miportant









<21 years of age	 [1	 1
2 1-30 years	 []	 2
31-40 years	 [1	 3
41-50 years	 []	 4
51-60 years	 I]	 5
>60 years	 [1	 6
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Project Officer	 [1	 1
Assistant Project Officer 	 [1	 2
53. Are there any other comments you would like to make?
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